THE NATURE OF REVOLUTION

HEARINGS

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CONTENTS

Statements of: Page
- Brinton, Dr. Crane, professor of history, Harvard University 2
- Hartz, Dr. Louis, professor of government, Harvard University 109
- McAlister, Dr. John T., Jr., Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University 153
- Solomon, Dr. Richard, assistant professor of political science, University of Michigan 54
- Thomson, Dr. James C., Jr., assistant professor of history, Harvard University 66

Insertions for the record:
- Biographic sketch of Dr. Brinton 1
- Biographic sketch of Dr. Solomon 53
- Biographic sketch of Dr. Thomson 66
- Biographic sketch of Dr. Hartz 109
- Letter from Thomas R. Melville to Senator Fulbright, February 14, 1968 149
- Biographic sketch of Dr. McAlister 153
- Article, "Expert's Report Assails Saigon on Land Reform," by Felix Belair, Jr., from the New York Times, March 6, 1968 169

Summary Index 195

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THE NATURE OF REVOLUTION

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1968

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Gore, Pell, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

The Committee on Foreign Relations this morning is beginning a series of public hearings on the nature of revolution and the significance of revolutions abroad for American foreign policy. The broad purpose of these open discussions is, first, to develop information about the tendency of revolutions, regardless of their ideological origins, to pass through certain relatively distinct stages, and, second, to try to identify the implications of the process in the context of current and future formulation of foreign policy by the United States.

Today the committee is pleased to have the opportunity to hear the views of Prof. Crane Brinton of Harvard University. Professor Brinton is the author of "The Anatomy of Revolution" and a leading authority on the general subject under review by the committee. We hope, in particular, to gain from him an understanding of the broad historical setting of the topic.

As announced in the press release of February 15, the committee will receive further testimony from Professors Richard Solomon and James Thomson on this Wednesday, the 21st, from Prof. Louis Hartz on the following Monday, the 26th, and from Dr. John McAlister on Thursday, March 7.

Professor Brinton, we are very pleased to have you with us this morning. I believe you have a prepared statement.

(The biographic sketch of Professor Brinton follows:)

Biographic Sketch of Prof. Crane Brinton

Prof. Crane Brinton is now at Harvard University in the Department of History. He has earned degrees at Harvard and as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. In the past, he has been an instructor and tutor at Harvard, then assistant professor and full professor. From 1942 to 1945 he was Special Assistant to the Office of Strategic Services, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.

He is Phi Beta Kappa and a member of the American Historical Association, the Royal Historical Society, and the International Institute of Arts and Letters, among others.

A partial list of Professor Brinton's publications includes:

The United States and Britain,
From Many One,
Ideas and Men,
The Temper of Western Europe,
The Shaping of the Modern Mind,
A History of Civilization (with others),
A History of Western Morals,
The Fate of Man,
Anatomy of Revolution.

Mr. BRINTON. I have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed, sir?

STATEMENT OF DR. CRANE BRINTON, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. BRINTON. I am basing these remarks on a study of four major revolutions, the English Revolution of the 1640s and 1650s, the American and the French Revolutions of the late 18th century, and the Russian Revolution of the early 20th century, a study begun some 30 years ago, but continuing to occupy much of my attention ever since. I shall spare the committee the preliminary discussions over methodology and especially definition of "revolution", common among students of revolution.

I must, however, note that I think these four revolutions, different though they are in ideology, as presumbly all revolutions, do follow a course of development, by no means an identical one, and one by no means thoroughly understood, but still a course of development that should give us some leads in an attempt to understand contemporary revolutions. In my anatomy of revolution, I use as a conceptual framework on which to organize an analysis of this course of development the analogy of the course of a fever in the human organism. I wish to state emphatically that I mean the mild word "analogy" or the even milder "figure of speech" and not any kind of identity.

SOCIAL AND NATIONALIST REVOLUTIONS

I must make one very broad preliminary generalization. Of my four revolutions three, the English, the French, and the Russian I should classify as basically social revolutions, or more heavily, socioeconomic and political revolutions; and one, the American, as basically a nationalist revolution. In a social revolution the "outs" who make the revolution regard the "ins" against whom it is made as men not fundamentally unlike themselves, but possessing power, privileges, wealth, they do not deserve and do not use properly, and from which the "outs" are excluded; in a nationalist revolution the "outs" regard their rulers as foreigners, men quite different basically from themselves, and though somehow temporarily dominant, really inferior to them in what counts for them.

Here is a very important point: None of my four revolutions were without components of both the nationalist and the social revolution.

The American Revolution was a successful nationalist revolution to drive out British rulers who had come to seem to many, probably most, Americans essentially foreigners; but its course was certainly marked by social conflict, frontier against seaboard, radical against conservative, debtors against creditors, as those aftermaths of the revolution, the Whisky Rebellion, Shays Rebellion, and indeed the whole later Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian conflict brought out.

The English, French, and Russian Revolutions were successful social revolutions in which a native, privileged, ruling class were beaten—though in England and France many members of the old privileged classes came back after a fashion; but in all of these social revolutions I am struck by the fact that the revoluntionaries sought to rouse their followers against the ruling class by insisting that these latter were in fact foreigners—in England that they were descendants of those wicked, and what is worse, French, Norman conquerors of 1066; in France that they were descendants of the cruel barbarian Germans who conquered the civilized Gauls and Romans in the fifth and sixth centures, A.D.; and even in Russia in 1917 that they were descendants of Norse, Tartar, and more recently Baltic-German conquerors, not really Slavs at all. All this is nonsense in genetic terms, but quite as surely good propaganda for the revolutionaries. For it looks as though what we coldly and abstractly call nationalism is in its human reality one of the strongest shared forms of emotion and belief in our world.

SIGNS OF A COMING REVOLUTION

The most difficult of all the phases of revolution to analyze satisfactorily is—certainly for those who have to deal with a specific revolution—the analysis of what I'll call the prodromal symptoms or signs of a coming revolution in a given society. The variables are just too many, too complex, and their interrelations so changing that the analyst of that society cannot do nearly as well in prediction as a good meteorologist or a good diagnostic physician, although I think that kind of comparison is valid. Nevertheless, I will attempt a few tentative generalizations. First and most important revolutions though their course is usually much affected by the existence of such people, are not begun by the poor and downtrodden.

Trotsky himself wrote, "In reality, the mere existence of privations is not enough to cause an insurrection; if it were, the masses would always be in revolt."

It is not even possible to find much coordination between what we call economic depressions and the beginnings of revolution.

For my four revolutions the currently popular phrase certainly applies: "revolutions of rising expectations." All four societies as a whole, and the groups within each that began the revolution, had been enjoying generally increasing prosperity. Of course, they had sound material grievances of the kind Americans understand. The wholly contented, you can argue perfectly well a priori, do not revolt. Two kinds, at least, of what Apericans commonly think explains all revolution, economic grievances, can be noted. First, not so much economic deprivation as what George Pettee calls "cramp"—restraints hindrances, of all sorts felt by the enterprising classes, second and related to this, what J. C. Davies calls the existence of "an intolerable gap between what people want and what they get."

Finally, the initial steps, what I call the "trigger pull" that starts the revolution, is often the financial plight of the Government, its inability without making major concessions, to collect taxes from its citizens. With the historian's wisdom of after-the-fact one can discern many other signs of the revolution to come—an excessively, and I underline excessively, unwieldy and inefficient political and administrative system; unusually bitter and intense class conflicts, better, perhaps, group tensions within the society, for the overly simple Marxist concept of class conflict is not very helpful; obvious incompetence, lack of discipline, lack of will to get tough among the actual ruling class, and finally, what following Lyford P. Edwards I call the "transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals."

ROLE OF THE INTELLECTUALS

At this point I do not wish to try to define carefully that unsatisfactory but indispensable term, "intellectual." I mean those among the writers, artists, teachers, preachers, journalists, and others who set the tone of thought and feeling, the "climate of opinion." To a degree, these intellectuals are always in our Western culture somewhat critical of things as they are. But in many periods and places they are supporters of—I find I can't quite avoid the fashionable word—the "establishment"—for example, Augustan Rome, Renaissance Italy, the England of Elizabeth I, the France of Louis XIV, in all of which the intellectuals were "lions under the throne." At other times and places, Victorian England, for example, or the United States in the 20th century, the intellectuals are sharply critical of their society, are "alienated" from it to some degree. But that popular phrase "alienation of the intellectuals" does not fit my societies about to burst into revolution. Alienation from the establishment is not enough; the intellectuals must have in mind, must try to make explicit in detail, must clothe in persuasiveness as to the possibility of its achievement—its rapid achievment—I almost wrote cynically a brand new and different establishment, headed by themselves, but that is not quite fair to these intellectuals. What they must do is set up a clear outline of a new society they think is a better, a much better one than the existing society. Puritans, Jacobins, Bolsheviks, all knew what they wanted. The merely alienated intellectual knows only what he doesn't want, which is not enough to stimulate major concerted revolutionary action among nonintellectuals. In these revolutions I am discussing the behavior of the intellectuals who had transferred their allegiance from what they held to be bad present institutions to what they were sure were better and quite attainable institutions to come out of revolution—this behavior seems to be on the other hand one of the surest signs of instability in a society. Such a society displays at least the possibility that it will undergo a revolution.

RESISTANCE TO LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY

The first stage of revolution proper is the actual successful resistance to constituted legal—better, for psychological understanding, legitimate—authority. The assumption of such authority as against the King's by the Long Parliament, the conjunction of the conversion of the legal Estates General into the illegal, or certainly unprecedented national assembly with the violence of Bastille Day, the series of events in what we now call greater Boston from the Tea Party to Concord Fight and Bunker Hill, the surprising expansion of the socialist celebration of their traditional Women's Day, March 8, in Petrograd in 1917 into a week of riots and the final abdication of the Czar—all of these mark the beginnings of revolution.

About this first stage I should like to make a tentative generalization. While the revolutionaries display a certain determination, rough organization and strength, the authorities display hesitation, incompetence, weakness. I cannot spare time for details, though I should like to note that at the end of the French Revolution a young officer named Napoleon Bonaparte with a small company of artillery was able to disperse a threatening anti-Government mob in Paris with a few well-directed "whiffs of grapeshot"; in July 1789 in the Bastille rioting in that city, no one even fired a shot against the rioters who, in fact, armed themselves freely at the royal arsenal in the Invalides. It is true that many French regiments had been won over to the revolutionary cause, as were most of the Petrograd garrison in 1917; but in France in 1789 the Government could rely absolutely on excellent and loyal mercenaries, Swiss and German, impervious to French propaganda. They did not use these troops against the rioters.

I do not quite dare go so far as to say that a government with a reliable police force and army and the will and capacity to use them no matter how many they kill, I emphasize that last, under those conditions could stop a revolution at its first stages, though I should go almost as far as this with regard to urban rioting, which has hitherto been an essential feature of most of our Western revolutions.

SPONTANEITY OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY

A second general problem, applicable to the later stages of a revolution as well, must now be confronted. How far is all this revolutionary activity planned, how far is it spontaneous? I should not claim to settle for even one revolution this problem, which is a philosophical one or at least one that the observer has to note is never solved to everyone's satisfaction. Broadly speaking, those who make and those who approve a given revolution tend to regard it as the spontaneous uprising of men goaded by oppression and injustice, driven to the conclusion that resistence is the only course left them, and rising in their might with no more than minimal planning and leadership under dedicated leaders. Those who unsuccessfully resist a revolution and those who disapprove it tend to regard it as the work of a wicked minority of conspirators at odds with the decent majority that makes up the society, and successful against the existing authority only by reason of unscrupulous villainy, undeserved good luck, help from jealous foreign powers, and so on. At the risk of seeming to occupy that uncomfortable, in these days dangerous, middle-of-the-road position, I should like to say that in my four revolutions either position put as an absolute is nonsense. We really don't know much about the reasons for the behavior of crowds or mobs, but we do know that even if some specific and wholly accidental event triggers their actions there are always leaders and always some kind of direction.

On the other hand, in all my revolutions, though there was clearly leadership and planning, and what is more, organized pressure groups easily turned to direct action, the crowds were, to put it mildly, eager and willing and by no means small ones.

Plot, conspiracy, planning cannot succeed if no more than a few activists want revolution. Chairman Mao's famous aphorism about fishes and water applies to more than guerrilla war.

Once the old regime has fallen and a new one is in its place, there is usually but, of course, not always, a brief period of national rejoicing and apparent unity which I have called the honeymoon period.

NATURE OF A NEW REGIME

The new regime is at first a symbol of national unity, but it soon is evident that in fact it is a coalition of groups with quite different aims and dispositions, running the gamut from those who, as Burke put it, would "reform in order to conserve" to those who would demolish all institutions and devise brand new ones. Actually this first coalition rarely includes the extremists of the left. The Russian provisional government of March 1917, ran from its titular head, old Prince Lvov—after all, a prince is a prince—through varieties of moderates and liberals to a single socialist, Kerensky.

There were no Bolsheviks included. The next stage I must state summarily: There is a series of governmental crises which end for the moment with the defeat of the most conservative, or rightist, group and what is more important, its elimination from political activity—and for many of its members, death, exile or if they are very lucky, obscurity. Another logical possibility, going over to the winning side, is very difficult in really revolutionary times. That somewhat shocking but very popular piece of American folk wisdom, "if you can't beat them, join them" rarely works among revolutionaries.

They won't let the heretics repent. This process of deplacement of power from right to left—or sometimes in Fascist revolutions, from left to right goes on until the revolutionary fever reaches its crisis in what I have called the "reign of terror and virtue," to which I shall come shortly.

VICTORY OF EXTREMISTS OVER MODERATES

I must, however, say a few words about the whole process which can be summarized as the victory of the extremists over the moderates.

First, these moderates, who before the revolution broke out, may have looked most immoderate, are usually better known, often more conscientious, and certainly do in fact take over the new provisional government—and the responsibilities of power. But just because of the mounting revolutionary tensions because of their past as revolutionaries themselves, and for many and complex other reasons, they cannot effectively use their legal powers against the continuing, the increasing illegal agitation of their extremist opponents. These opponents are more determined, better disciplined, less scrupulous, more exalted in their desire to remake the world, than the moderates. France provides a neat example of the difficulties of the moderates.

Any attempts to restore ordinary discipline in the army, order in the little details of social life, above all, any attempt to put limits to the now sacred rights of assembly, freedom of the press, freedom to demonstrate, were met by the extremists with cries of "counter-revolution," "aristocratic tyranny," "reactionary."

I am even willing to say that the moderates suffered some troubles of conscience at this; they didn't crack down effectively on their opponents in part because they were ashamed to.

They did not crack down effectively in part also—and this is most important—because of my second generalization at this stage. They were afraid of public opinion, or of what was left of public opinion. I say what was left of public opinion because a very characteristic fact of this period of struggle between moderates and extremists is that large numbers of ordinary people, out of various motives no doubt, simply withdrew from participation in politics, ceased to vote, ceased to express; except, no doubt, in very private conversation, any kind of political opinions. What was left of concerned public opinion was by now pretty radical and the moderates might well be afraid of it.

In the Russian Revolution, which went through these stages very rapidly, as, incidentally, did the Cuban, in the Moscow district elections in June the moderates received 58 percent of the vote; in the election of September the Bolshevik extremists received 52 percent of the vote. A gain for the Bolsheviks by democratic methods? Not at all. In June there were 647,000 votes cast; in September, 381,000. In three months half the voters had just quit, many no doubt echoing Mercutio, "a plague on both your houses."

Finally in this stage there emerges one of the prime factors in almost all revolutions. The moderates are in control of the, by now, legal government; the extremists acquire control of the network of what were originally propaganda or pressure groups. They then convert these into an illegal government. The two rival organizations struggle and in the end, usually by no more than a simple coup d'etat the illegal government suppresses the legal one, and takes its place.

CRISIS PERIOD OF "DUAL SOVEREIGNTY"

The crisis period has now begun. Trotsky called this phase of revolution that of "dual sovereignty" or "dual power." In England it was the new model army of the independents, aided by the many independent pulpits, that formed the nucleus of the illegal government. The new model army, working through committees, engineered "pride's purge" by which 96 Presbyterian members were forcibly excluded from Parliament, leaving only some 60 reliable extremists in what was appropriately christened the rump Parliament.

In France the extremists in control of the national network of Jacobin clubs formed an illegal government which in the coup d'etat of August 10, 1792, overthrew the monarchy; at one time on this day the legal city government of Paris was actually meeting in one room of the city hall while the illegal government was meeting in another.

In Russia, of course, the dual sovereignty is clear. The Soviets were originally mere councils of soldiers, sailors, and workers organized on the model of the St. Petersburg Soviet during the abortive revolution of 1904–05, and at first hardly more than propaganda and agitation groups. They were rapidly converted into a network of illegal governmental bodies, so effectively that in October, 1917, the slogan "all power to the Soviets" was almost superfluous; they had plenty of power already.

DUAL SOVEREIGNTY IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Our own Revolution, though for reasons I shall shortly attempt to explain it did not reach the stage of control by the extremists, did have two stages of dual sovereignty. The first goes back to the agitation over the Stamp Act and other attempts of the royal administration to reform the old empire. There were in the Colonies legal agencies of government not available to the revolutionaries in most other countries. Nevertheless, town and county governments and colonial assemblies were pushed into violent and certainly illegal resistance to the royal government by means rather more extreme than is usual in conventional political life. The merchants' committees, the Sons of Liberty, the committees of correspondence were rather more than mere pressure groups or lobbyists as, of course, you all know. But let me quote the opinion John Adams expressed on the work of his cousin Sam and others, including himself:

> What an engine! France imitated it and produced a revolution * * * And all Europe was inclined to imitate it for the same revolutionary purpose.

The second phase in this country was that struggle within the resisters to the royal administration which may be said to begin with the First Continental Congress in 1774 and to end with the Declaration of Independence.

The declaration marked the victory of the radicals—I will not call them extremists—over the moderates. Our revolution can still arouse in us emotions not aroused by other revolutions. I shall simply say here that in my opinion the struggle between moderates and radicals though not identical with that in other revolutions I have studied, not as deadly, was nonetheless cut from the same cloth. The radicals won out in the end because they were effective revolutionaries.

DICTATORSHIPS IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, AND RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS

The crisis periods present many problems on which I must be brief. Their duration varies: I reckon it in England from Pride's purge in 1648 to Cromwell's dissolution of the rump in 1653; in France from the overthrow of the monarchy in August 1792 to the overthrow of Robespierre in July 1794; in Russia from the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917, to Lenin's abandonment of the attempt at complete communization and initiation of the new economic policy in 1921. In Russia there were relapses, bouts worse than the original fever crisis; but I am far from maintaining that all revolutions are alike. These three leaders, Cromwell, Robespierre, Lenin, have all gone down in history as dictators, though they all had very different temperaments and personalities and the degree of dictatorial powers each attained was very different. But their names do give substance to the first generalization I shall make. The governments of the crisis periods are strongly centralized, and in their actual practice make no attempt to live up to the slogans under which they have come to power, nor to observe any constitutional limitations that may have been set up by their moderate predecessors. In Russia there had been no time to set up such limitations, and as is well known Lenin dissolved the constitutional assembly elected before he seized power on the grounds that if it met it would undoubtedly try to throw out the Bolsheviks.

As good a symbol as any for these dictatorships can be found in the English Revolution, when at his dissolution of the rump Parliament, Cromwell made his shocking and un-English remark about the sacred parliamentary mace: "Take away that bauble."

Yet these dictatorships are all, so to speak, improvised, are set up in societies already greatly broken up in the revolutionary ordeal, and they function imperfectly, irregularly and, therefore, often cruelly. We are all familiar with the Puritan suppression of the delights of merry England, the confiscation of property—Laurence Washington, father of the first Virginia Washington, was deprived of his clerical living—and other revolutionary acts in that now sober land; we have heard even more about the guillotine, the tumbrils, the knitting women in France; in Russia the violence of civil war and war communization are still firm in the memories of many of us here.

PHILOSOPHIES OF REVOLUTIONARIES

Though I have today eschewed discussion of the political philosophy—ideology if you would prefer—that accompanies revolutions, I must at this point insist that even revolutionaries are impelled to justify themselves in words—noble words. Here is Trotsky, himself a curious combination of theorist and man of action. Writing of the Bolshevik coup d'etat of November 1917, he says:

> The Bolsheviks took the people as preceding history had created them. * * * The Bolsheviks saw it as their mission to stand at the head of this people. Those against the insurrection were "everybody"—except the Bolsheviks. But the Bolsheviks were the people.

Robespierre put it neatly: "The revolutionary government"—that is, his dictatorship—"is the despotism of liberty against tyranny." To a rational mind, these metaphysical paradoxes are nonsense. But rationalists do not make revolutions, through I admit they help prepare for them.

And in terms of human psychology I think it clear that sheer naked resistance to legitimate authority with no, or merely cynical, attempts to justify it is rare, is in fact pathological, criminal if you like.

Revolutionaries almost invariably maintain, and in my opinion honestly believe, that in breaking the lower law they are obeying the higher law.

PURITANICAL ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE VICES

In three of these revolutions the crisis periods are definitely marked by attempts—I shall unblushingly call them puritanical—to eliminate the major and most of the minor vices and even pleasures of common life. Even in the American Revolution I find traces of such, at least in pressures to postpone unnecessary indulgences until the war is won. The puritanism of the English crisis period is well known—the revolution was the work of Puritans.

In France, however, the leaders of the terror, many of the Jacobin faithful, were secularist Puritans. Some of you may be surprised to know that during the terror, Manuel, his position roughly that of an American district attorney, made a quite successful effort to eliminate prostitution, gambling, dancehalls, and the like from the city of Paris. The old Bolsheviks, including definitely Lenin himself, were wholly without what Veblen called "conspicuous consumption" in their austere private lives. They were Puritans of a sort, though they did not share Anglo-Saxon puritanical attitudes toward sex. The society they envisaged was a society with material satisfactions for all, but without much of what the ordinary man regards as pleasure, a society of hard work and sound, healthy sport, artistic enjoyment, and loving companionship.

REIGNS OF TERROR AND VIRTUE

Much must go into any attempt to explain these reigns of terror and virtue. Save in England, all took place in the midst of civil and foreign war; and we all know that involves increased centralized executive authority. The earlier stages of revolution have accustomed men to violence and uncertainty, have destroyed most of the infinitely many threads in the web that makes up an orderly and secure society. The newly centralized government, as I have noted, has to improvise its institutions, and has to experiment, which, when done on a large scale, is always trying for those experimented on. Above all, the disorders have upset regular economic life; yet the new regime cannot let the people down. Rationing, price fixing, other forms of regulation all add to the tensions of the terror. The struggle for power among the small group of actual leaders gets more ferocious; indeed, deadly. Suspicions of betrayal of the revolution get concentrated on certain classes, and make the crisis a particularly acute form of class struggle. And finally, the small group in power—small in comparison with the whole population—Independents. Jacobins, Bolsheviks—seem to me, though I admit not to many of my colleagues—to be religious fanatics, inspired to turn this world—their world—into a utopia, a heaven on earth, a society free from what most of us would call evil—and this right away, overnight. They are obliged to rule by force; to try to make Mark Twain's "damned human race" behave as it has never before behaved in numbers and for long.

PROSELYTIZING OF REVOLUTIONS

This element of faith in a gospel helps explain an aspect of revolution I have not yet brought out; this is the obvious tendency of revolutions with such emotional backing to proselytize, to spread abroad. Revolution, if successful, strengthens a nation, and the expansion of France under Napoleon and of Russia in our time, though perhaps in part normal military nationalist expansion, is also the expansion of a faith. I shall not here go into the many problems such expansion creates. Sufficient to note that what differentiates a revolutionary crisis from ordinary political, military, or economic crises is, in fact, to use a derogatory word, its ideology—but an ideology transfused by an intolerant, illiberal, but also amazingly sturdy and vital faith which I confess I find not altogether without its admirable side.

AFTERMATH OF REVOLUTION

The aftermath of revolution, the convalescence from the fever, is a clearly recognizable stage, though one that varies greatly in time and extent with each revolution. In the great French Revolution the end of the crisis is very clearly marked by the fall of Robespierre on July 27, 1794. Those anti-Robespierrists who had engineered the coup announced at once that they were continuing the revolutionary government of the terror but Paris refused to believe them. Within a few weeks dozens of dancehalls had opened in Paris, the guillotinings had stopped, and ordinary citizens began to breathe again. Over the next few years the revolutionary process was reversed, and beginning with moderate leftists the proscribed groups began to return to political life in the order of left to right. The anti-Christian movement was stopped; and one of those loose periods of fleshly indulgence, that of the Directory, began. The return did not go as far as the extreme royalist right, and France remained a republic until it became an empire. By the new French revolutionary calendar, Robespierre had fallen in the month of Thermidor, and the one or two years afterward are called by historians the Thermidorean reaction. Though I cannot go into details, some kind of Thermidor followed the crisis period in England, the restoration comedy, Nell Gwynn and the like—and the relaxed years of the Restoration—and in Russia—the years of the NEP and the Nepmen, profiteers, and nouveaux riches. The important point about the Thermidors is that the heroic efforts to attain universal virtue are abandoned, and men and women are permitted to be themselves, to enjoy, if they wish, even a degree of privacy.

There are almost always relapses. To take our mildest case, England, having cut off the head of one King, 40 years later drove another into exile, and went on to a stormy 18th century full of riots, attempted Stuart restorations, political trials, and other disorders—I forgot to include the American Revolution—which earned her a reputation of great political instability—a reputation much like that later enjoyed by France. I suppose "enjoyed" is not quite the right word.

RENEWED INTERNAL DISTURBANCES

Both France and Russia had long bouts of renewed internal disturbances. Finally, it would seem obvious that a successful revolution powered chiefly by the desire to achieve national independence is likely to come to a sharper and more definitive end than one powered chiefly by drives to achieve for all men those unalienable rights of Jefferson's premable to our Declaration of Independence. The newly independent nation may well have internal troubles, but the main purpose of the revolution has been attained. This was certainly true for us, and for many nations in the New World emancipated in the first great wave of national revolutions in the early 19th century and for a larger number of those so freed in our time than some pessimists will admit.

Even the Irish, who settled for less than their whole island, seem today almost satisfied. But if unallayed, if left to fester, both national and social revolutionary drives must seem to the historian extremely likely to erupt again.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Brinton.

I think that is a very interesting introduction to this study.

EXPECTATIONS FOR MODERN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

Do you think that the historical tendencies of revolution to develop through more or less identifiable stages suggest any general expectations as to the likely course of modern revolutionary movements such as those that we see today in China, and in Vietnam and Cuba?

Mr. Brinton. I do, indeed; and to get a little more modern, I suggest that the Mexican revolution from this point of view is very interesting because I think it has ended. Yet it was a long-drawn-out one from the fall of Porfirio Diaz up to roughly the 1940's, and it did go through a crisis period of attempted socialism, and so on. It had its warlord periods, and so forth, but I think now it is a finished revolution, one that is finished in our own time and, therefore, worth quite a little attention.

Of course, on China I can't set up to be an expert, but I see no reason to believe that the human forces that drive masses on in this way have radically altered.

The CHAIRMAN. You do consider the Mexican revolution has been a successful social, political revolution?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes; I think it has been a very interesting revolution in this respect. When I was young in the teens I would never have believed that it would come out as it did.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean as well as it did?

Mr. BRINTON. I think from our point of view, as well as it did. I attribute part of the reasons for that to the fact that Mr. Roosevelt did not imitate Mr. Wilson in sending troops in.

The CHAIRMAN. By that you mean we allowed it to develop on its own without intervening?

Mr. BRINTON. To an amazing—yes, I will say so right now. What I find to a surprising extent we did, and we had provocation, the oil business alone was enough to justify intervention I suppose. It would have been for the first Roosevelt.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you suggesting that if we intervened we wouldn't have done a much better job with all our great resources and wisdom?

Mr. BRINTON. I am suggesting that, sir, yes. I think it would be very difficult if we had intervened.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that in most of our interventions we haven't been very successful in trying to bring about a revolution and creation of a better society?

Mr. BRINTON. Well, the history of where we have actually intervened until the present it has been mostly on this continent. And this continent, it seems to me, hasn't had a real social revolution except in Mexico and Cuba. The conventional opera bouffe South American revolution, the kind of things with Walker and Nicaragua and all the rest of it seems to me essentially the history of movements of less importance than a true revolution.

The CHAIRMAN. You wouldn't call them revolutions at all, is that what you are saying?

Mr. BRINTON. Not really. I want to dodge what you mean by a revolution basically. You use a term like the "industrial revolution," for instance. If it just means change that would be kind of a waste of a word. I would call them palace revolutions, harem revolutions, what you like, and history is just full of them. Sorokin counted hundreds of them in his book on social and cultural dynamics, but where we have attempted to intervene, notably at present in the Vietnam revolution which I regard as a very complicated one indeed, at the moment we seem not to have been successful, and except for, I suppose, a certain amount of CIA work we did not intervene in Malaya, of course, now Malaysia, and that again is, I think, a relative success story at the moment. That is a very hard question basically.

On what happened in Santo Domingo I would prefer to reserve judgment. I don't believe that story is finished.

DEFINITION OF REVOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if it would be useful at this point for you to go into a definition of what we are talking about in the way of revolution, to clarify that or try to pinpoint it very clearly. I think it would be very useful for the record.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

Well, first, you rule out, as I say, the palace revolution by relatively small groups competing in a relatively small ruling class. Turkish history is full of them, and I repeat, many of the traditional Latin American revolutions seem to be in this class. They never got beyond the ruling groups.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean there was no aim of changing the organization of society but simply of changing a few leaders at the top?

Mr. BRINTON. Simply the outs get in, but obviously the people, as a rule—I suppose you can argue that Peron in the Argentine was an example of another type of modern revolution, the Fascist revolution, which is another subtype and, of course, Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany and Franco—again the narrative history is different, but in all cases you get a relatively small group of dissatisfied outs, many of them with leftist backgrounds, who get power by the aid of the established economic leadership, but who also in the process make use of fairly large groups called paramilitary—black shirts and the like, and whose propaganda is antidemocratic but insists that under them, the life of the many, the masses, is going to be a great deal better, and so on, this seems to me one type of revolution.

Then there is the classical type with which I have dealt here and which I would, as I say, separate for purposes of analysis into those in which nationalism, the desire to throw out a foreign ruling class, or social, political, economic revolutions, which are efforts for the underdogs to get better things for themselves.

Now, I think what are called sometimes now revolutionary wars, national liberation fronts, and so forth, and so on, mostly in Asia and Africa, are basically probably in this classic type, and that they are mixed nationalist and socioeconomic in motivation, but with nationalism the strongest single element. But it is again why I use the medical or even meteorological analysis of the elements. In each concrete case you can't set up an abstract model that in a sense the social scientists like to aim at, but you have to work like a physician or meteorologist works.

The CHAIRMAN. Every one is different.

Mr. BRINTON. Each one is a little different, sure.

The CHAIRMAN. But they do go through a general phase, that is of building up, as you call it, the fever and then the Thermidor.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes, sir.

PRESENT STATE OF REVOLUTION IN CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to China, how would you characterize the present state in China? Is it in the Thermidor yet or is it still in the fever?

Mr. BRINTON. I think it is in a relapse. Mind you, I don't—you will have witnesses here who know much more about it than I do, but as far as just a person who tries to keep up with what goes on in the world can tell, I would say that in some ways it is more analogous to the Mexican revolution in that it had a war lord phase and so on, and that it occurred in a country with a really large population of coolies, in the Mexican case the Indians, and so on, and I would say its moderate phase is obviously the Sun Yat-sen period, then you get the war lords, and then you get the circumstance of the national Kuomintang itself, and with the Japanese revolution and the Communists off by themselves, a very complex thing in which, one of the things I don't know that I emphasized enough in my testimony, you must allow for the very great importance of foreign powers and their populations in anything that happens in the world today.

But the final triumph of Mao Tse-tung and his people in 1949 seems to me to indicate a beginning of the true reign of terror and virtue, so to speak, which has lasted longer—he has had some ups and downs, and the present phase, I think, is resistance to a kind of Thermidorean attempt to get back to what Mr. Harding called normalcy.

The Chairman. Resistance to that?

Mr. Brinton. And, of course, it is resisted. Yes, of course, obviously.

In France the leaders at the end of the crisis were sitting ducks. Once Robespierre fell you had one of these curious, really spontaneous reactions of people in Paris and you got back to ordinary life quite quickly.

In Russia the Thermidorean reaction was never as complete although the period from 1921 to Lenin's death was quite clearly Thermidorean in some respects, little details of social life, people began to wear neckties again, for instance, and so on.

Then Stalin represents, of course, the dictatorial phase and again not exactly like any other one and, of course, since the end of Stalin, I think Russia has clearly been in a Thermidorean period. It is now clearly such, but its development has been hindered by world politics, shall we put it mildly. But the mere fact of this present trouble with her intellectuals seems to me a good sign and in the phase of crisis period you don't have that sort of trouble.

I don't know enough about the Chinese situation to know what it is, but I suspect in this case it is the old Puritan real revolutionaries confronting the first widespread break or attempts to break with them, and so far it looks from the outside as though Mao and the rest had been successful.

But there is also, of course, the position of the military which is crucial here, too.

The Chairman. I have many other questions, but I wish to yield to my colleagues.

Senator Gore, I wonder if you would care to ask questions?

Senator Gore. Yes.

Doctor, I find your treatise extremely interesting.

EXPANSION OF REVOLUTIONARY FAITH

I notice that you identify the esprit gospel, so to speak, the dedications of faith and ideology, as being that particular element which characterizes revolutions which tend to spread beyond the national boundaries. Do I correctly interpret that?

Mr. Brinton. Yes, sir; you do, and I think I am against current American opinion which tends to minimize the importance of ideas as not being hard boiled, concrete, and realistic, but I will stick by my guns in that respect. I think this is what makes the difference, and also I think that is more likely to accompany a successful social revolution for obvious reasons than a successful nationalist revolution.

Senator Gore. In order to attain this status, is it not necessary for a revolution to have succeeded within the country of its origin?

Mr. Brinton. Yes, sir.

Senator Gore. You cite the Russian Revolution, and the French Revolution, the Napoleonic days as examples. You omitted reference to the United States.

Mr. Brinton. Well, yes, I will grant that a certain amount of our expansion follows from our revolution, but for one thing, this expansion wasn't an expansion of a revolutionary faith, but was an expansion that adds territories to the expanding nation.

In our case we had the West, much of which we got quite readily, but even so we went to war with Mexico for part of it, and we obviously made two vain attempts to get Canada. So we certainly proved that a successful revolution was a shot in the arm in terms of expansionism.

Then you get the other question as to what you mean by the American gospel, and American expansive influence and power all over the world. Yes, I would say we are attempting something of that sort. I think that inevitably goes with success. Whether we are doing it well or not is another matter.

Senator Gore. Please understand that my questions were not critical. I have been rather proud of the American evangelical spirit. I don't know that history shows a more aggressive culture than the Judaeo-Christian culture.

Mr. Brinton. Well, the Arabs did pretty well for a while. They got stopped, I think proving that coexistence is possible, but I think the expansion of the Arab race from about 622 to, what shall we say, close to 1000, is extraordinary.

Furthermore, I think it an even better example of really ferocious military energy inspired by Islam, I mean, each soldier thought he was going to heaven by taking part in this Jihad, my Arabic isn't very good, and at least in the West in modern times this hasn't been of the same quality.

Senator Gore. In this sort of philosophical exchange, I am at such great disadvantage. I expected to come later to the religious element.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

If I may pursue for a moment aggressiveness or the expansionary nature of revolutions, did not in fact the early revolution in the United States serve as a source of inspiration for the French Revolution?

Mr. Brinton. It did, indeed, yes. There is no question about that. It doesn't wholly explain the French Revolution, but certainly scholarship has shown that quite clearly it was an influence.

Senator Gore. In our history, do we not rather proudly cite the shot that was heard around the world?

Mr. Brinton. We do indeed, sir. This, of course, is what Mr. Toynbee objects to in our policy since the end of the World War II, that we have actually, as he calls it, deserted our own revolution, and we aren't any longer backing the kind of people emotionally we backed in the 19th century. We were all for the Poles. We all know how ardent we were for Irish Revolution, and so on. Now, I am not taking any sides in this, I am merely pointing it out.

Senator GORE. Do we Americans not believe in our principles of government?

Mr. BRINTON. Oh, yes; yes, indeed. I wouldn't question that.

Senator GORE. Do we believe in democracy?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes; I don't question that.

Senator GORE. Do we wish to make it available to every people on earth?

Mr. BRINTON. Available is the key word.

Senator GORE. I don't suggest that we wish to impose it.

Mr. BRINTON. Well, there are those who do, Senator. That is really one of the fighting points at the moment. Are we trying to impose it and do we wish merely to make it available?

Senator GORE. I had expected to come to that a little later.

Mr. BRINTON. This is a very fine seminar, I am enjoying it.

Senator GORE. I am in a way softening you up.

Mr. BRINTON. I will just quarrel with the word "available" or question it rather than quarrel with it.

SPIRIT BEHIND AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Senator GORE. Is not in fact our system based upon the Christian evangelical or messianic spirit?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes; but I think it got an extra injection from the 18th century, and the enlightenment, so called, which gave a somewhat different flavor to it, and which, of course, started out by being anti-Christian and I think now has been absorbed. I think the rationalism, the emphasis on comfort, success, happiness is not wholly of Judaeo-Christian origin. I don't think that Jefferson's preamble to the Declaration could have been written a hundred years before that, before the enlightenment, so I would say that Judaeo tradition, Christian tradition, plus the enlightenment, yes.

Senator GORE. I remember as a child, contributing my pennies and nickels and dimes to Baptist Sunday school and being inspired by the post card pictures of how we were taking the faith to the heathens, how we were making a better life available in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. I was inspired by that, and recently as chairman of the African Subcommittee, I visited 15 countries in Africa, and found again, to my pride, and to my pleasure, and to my approval, that every single educated person in every single one of those countries had received his education in a missionary school or mission supported largely by Christian denominations either in the United States, or of course, in some European countries.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes; there is no question about that but I think the last 10 years or more have made a big difference. There are now other types of education made available in the Afro-Asian nations. No question about the missionary history, particularly the 19th century which was a great century for the actual expansion of Christianity, but I do think the mid-20th century has seen something else happen in many of these countries.

AMERICAN SPIRIT AND INTENTIONS

Senator **Gore**. Early in January I spent two and a half weeks in South America and once again I found my pride swelling at the success of the Peace Corps. I went out into places where such help was sorely needed, and found a young man, a graduate of Yale, who had volunteered two years of his life and given his talents. He was organizing the peasants into teams of 10 and teaching them how to build, not primitive but very minimal houses. One day those 10 would dig the foundation. Some other day when he could get them together they would mix and pour concrete for the floor. Another day they would bake clay and make the bricks. I finally asked him, "Why don't you complete one?" He said "Oh, I would lose a worker." Yet in the end these people were learning the simple techniques of how to organize, how to cooperate, achieving the minimal skills of making bricks of clay in the sun, and mixing concrete to pour a solid floor in a house. I thought this was a fine example of America spreading its technical skills, its knowledge, its spirit, its good will. Would you agree with that conclusion?

Mr. **Brinton**. On the whole, but with one or two mild caveats. Some of the Peace Corps, according to my friends who have been in it, have perhaps been a little too inclined to behave as though what they regard as good is what the natives would regard as good.

Senator **Gore**. That is one of the characteristics of America.

Mr. **Brinton**. Yes. But it is one that doesn't always——

Senator **Gore**. We have the best and we insist that our sense of values is superior and, therefore, we want to make them available. We are a little impatient when people do not accept them.

Mr. **Brinton**. Yes; and I think it is a fact of life that these people don't always take it well, and even the degree to which I suppose most people would approve of sanitation if they went at it with the right means. They are going to live longer and eat more and be better. But, alas, Senator, I have a horrid feeling—I don't want to be regarded as completely cynical—that people who have achieved certain first steps—I quoted this man Davies who said men are roused to revolt when there is a gap between what they have and what they want—that one effect of all this is to make them want things that they are not going to get quickly under the conditions that the world is now in. In short, that is one phase of my worries.

I think the most important thing that I have come to conclude about revolutions in general is that they do not occur with the miserable and downtrodden and the desperate. At most such are slave revolts and revolts of desperation. I would rule them as not revolutions in my sense. But that the others are all produced by people who are—who have enough to want more. And this is one of those sad facts I think we have to face in American expansion throughout the world, that we have the best of intentions, and I sympathize with much of what we are trying to do, but the simple fact remains that it isn't altogether successful everywhere.

RELIGIOUS SPIRIT AS A REVOLUTIONARY INFLUENCE

Senator **Gore**. At one point in my discussion with you we found agreement in the historical fact that revolutions which tend successfully to spread their influences beyond their borders must have been successful within their national boundaries. You then cited the Arabic one, based upon the spread of the Moslem faith. Is there not another characteristic of spreading revolutionary influences, that those which having succeeded in spreading, have an intense religious esprit? Is that correct?

Mr. Brinton. Yes.

Senator Gore. I will tell you this kind of thing takes a long time, and I would like to engage in the discussion with you to my great benefit. But to come to the present, the point I am really seeking to make is that the Christian concept, upon which our system of government is in a very major part based, has evangelism as the very cardinal point of its faith and mission. Is that true?

Mr. Brinton. Yes.

Senator Gore. The United States, and in this I have taken a great pride, has been the most aggressive religious culture in modern days. It has spread its influence to the darkest most spots of every continent. It has reached now all the way to Vietnam, and is in confrontation with another aggressive culture that is inspired by a sort of materialistic fanaticism. I can't quite call it religion.

SPIRIT OF COMMUNIST DOCTRINE OF REVOLUTION

How would you identify the esprit of the Socialist or Communist doctrine of revolution?

Mr. Brinton. Well, I go back to my favorite 18th century and say on the 18th century belief in complete hapiness for everybody on earth worked into a faith minus much of the metaphysics and theology of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. If you think you must have a concept of a god to talk about religion, then you must invent another word than religious. But I should say in this sense the Communists are also an expansionist religious group, but what I should like to add, where you mentioned Vietnam where we confront them, I think we don't only confront the Communists but we confront this other curious element in modern culture, which I call coldly nationalism, and this goes perhaps to the root of what I said of the Peace Corps. If you go to Ecuador you discover some Ecuadoreans who don't want to behave the way we want them to behave, who don't want the gospel and so on. Nationalism is the faith of resistance on the part of people who have this in group feeling; it is awfully strong. So I should say we are not only confronting communism in Southeast Asia or other spots on the globe, we are confronting this nationalism. Toynbee himself made the remark, and he is a good Episcopalian, that nationalism is the real, if unavowed religion of the majority of peoples in the Western, modern world. Now, that is really something to grapple with.

Senator Gore. I agree.

Mr. Brinton. I am following out the seminar method with you, sir.

Senator Gore. Thank you very much. You are very helpful.

WESTERN VALUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

I come to my last point: I am led to the conclusion by these facts of history that we are attempting in our current situation to not only make available Western values to Southeast Asia, but attempting to measure our problem there by Western values. I have serious doubts that Western values are an adequate index for policy. Would you comment upon that?

Mr. Brinton. I completely agree.

That really is what I was fishing for when I was speaking of Vietnamese nationalism, of the feelings of these people. It would presumably be even worse under circumstances where we had real problems, as in India where their whole attitude toward metaphysical and theological problems is so very different. I mean this man who just came over here, the Guru's name—he is a nice example of that, how can you handle people like that in purely Western terms? I am sure they want many of the things that we want. I hate to try to look ahead in that sense, but I do feel that we are meeting resistance partly because of some of the very good things we would like to try to do from our point of view.

Senator Gore. Is self-determination a Western or an Eastern value?

Mr. Brinton. Well, those famous words are, of course, good American words. I think the sense of in-group independence is something that goes back to the tribal, and I just say it is human. That is one of the facts about the human animal. He makes various sorts of groups above the family, and the nation-state is merely the biggest one, the one we are running up against now, and in some respects the most puzzling partly because it does control so many, in the case of so many countries, so many millions of people, and you wonder how they do hang together.

Senator Gore. Would you consider democracy a Western or Asiatic value?

Mr. Brinton. Oh; I think unquestionably it is Western in the sense that I think the Greeks give the first real—the great Greeks, the classic Greeks, it is, after all,a Greek word, and in that sense government by discussion of just this kind and above all, voting and so on. I think the whole complex is an old one. But as far as I know anything about the history of Asia and Africa and so on—in this forum you gentlemen, represent, for instance, heirs of the Roman Senate—it is Greek. It doesn't mean that everywhere over the rest of the world there has been sheer despotism and tyranny. I should say the Iroquois Indians, if you want to extend the meaning of democracy enough, had government by discussion.

Senator Gore. I could cite, I think, a few more virtuous Western values, all of which I, as an American, cherish. I must acknowledge that I think as long as we attempt to either make available to or force the Western values on Vietnam of a pro-Western Christian-led democracy, the war may last a long time. I doubt if the people there are pro-West since they suffered domination and exploitation by France for a hundred years. I think history shows that a majority of them are not Christian. I don't know what they know about democracy but it seems to me what they have seen of it they don't like very well.

Mr. Brinton. I should say, sir, they really haven't seen much of it.

Senator Gore. So it leads me to the observation that the San Antonio formula is the Alamo complex in a nuclear age. [Laughter.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. That was quite a phrase.

Senator Aiken?

IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMY AS INFLUENCES ON A REVOLUTION

Senator AIKEN. Professor Brinton, how do you rate the relative influences of ideology and economy in a society as a cause of revolution?

Mr. BRINTON. Well, if I may use an awfully simple comparison, I think it is a little like asking how do I rate the sparkplug and the gas as factors in making an internal combustion engine work. I think for a revolution they are both necessary. I think pure economic desperation——

Senator AIKEN. That is, they all enter into the picture?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes, it is a whole that you can't really separate out.

Senator AIKEN. Society and economy have to go together?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes, they have to go together.

Senator AIKEN. The standard of living depends on the economy, but each factor would run in different revolutions in varying degrees?

Mr. BRINTON. I don't think you can rely on factors in the economy alone. Communication means, revolution means, you have to get lots of people to work together and you have to get some ideas. No taxation without representation is a fine piece of ideology.

Senator AIKEN. It doesn't mean it takes a lot of people to start a revolution though, does it?

Mr. BRINTON. Well it takes a certain situation, yes.

REVOLUTION OR COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY IN VIETNAM?

Senator AIKEN. I am wondering now, if we could bring this up to date, whether you would venture an opinion as to whether what is going on in Vietnam today is a revolution, a bona fide revolution, or is it part of a widespread Communist conspiracy to take over the world? How would you rate those two influences?

Mr. BRINTON. Well, since you put it bluntly in this case, I would say a widespread Communist conspiracy to take over the world doesn't make much sense in view of the relations between Russia and China, to say nothing of some of the minor Communist states like Yugoslavia and indeed North Korea as far as that goes. I do think obviously that the situation in Vietnam is very complex because there is the Communist conspiracy—better, the Communist component in it. Ho Chi Minh was trained partly in Western Europe, in the 1920s, years of Communist growth, and so on. He has had relations with it. He is a Communist.

In my opinion, if he were totally successful and united Vietnam again he would prove to be something closer to Tito than to any other Communist leader because there is the nationalist element here. Actually Vietnam, as far as I can make out today from friends who know it well, is a really complicated society in unquestionably bad shape because of the heritage from the French which gave them fine cities and many good tools of the modern world, but just reemphasized the splits between Buddhists, Catholics, and the old traditional separate groups. Cambodia, for instance, is very separate. I don't know enough in detail to say more than that. It is a very, very complex situation indeed, far more than anything that could be explained by saying it is part of a Communist worldwide conspiracy.

Senator AIKEN. But isn't it part of human nature to want something different, if a nation achieves complete communism, as you referred to in the case of Tito, is it not natural for a swing toward the right to then take place?

Mr. BRINTON. Oh, surely.

Senator AIKEN. And vice versa, if the pendelum swings to the right, a lot of sentiment is aroused in favor of a more leftist form of government?

NATURE OF GREEK REVOLUTION

How do you regard the current Greek situation? Is that revolution?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

I think it isn't one of those purely palace coup d'etat situations. If you look at the Mediterranean base generally, which is European, you must agree that in Italy, Spain, and Greece, none of them have quite achieved democracy. Italy has come closest. Yet, of course, partly with our own influence and prestige, in Greece there has been some attempt—after all, Papandreou was American trained, an American college professor, the younger one was.

Senator AIKEN. You would classify the Greek revolution as a rightwing coup?

Mr. BRINTON. I think so. But one that is being very apologetic in comparison with the Fascist ones because the world atmosphere, the European and American, is very different. I am very struck with the fact that the generals won't come out as anti-Democrats. On the contrary they say "we are not Fascist."

DEFINITION OF COMMUNISM

Senator AIKEN. Do you have a short definition of communism?

Mr. BRINTON. Well, I think classic communism is simply an attempt to realize in practice the formula set out by Marx and Engels in their whole body of work of which the essential is the abolition of private property in any essential means of production or distribution. Communists must have their own toothbrushes, of course. But they hold that, by eliminating private ownership on big things, you will so alter human nature as to make possible the classless society.

Senator AIKEN. But isn't it really a desire on the part of the people, usually a minority, to control the resources, human and natural, of the country? It winds up that way; doesn't it?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes; it does, of course. But any society has to have leaders and a ruling class. I should say that quite definitely. But I wouldn't say that these people go about—Lenin himself, for instance—with the same motivation that led, say, the elder Rockefeller in his career; there are different motivations. The atmosphere is political rather than economic.

Senator AIKEN. I suppose Lenin might be shocked to see what has happened to his ideas at the present time?

Mr. BRINTON. I am sure he would be. I am sure he would be shocked in Russia; yes. But a lot of people, my 18th century friends, would be shocked. I don't think Jefferson would be altogether happy, sir, if he should come back to life.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean about what has happened here?

Mr. BRINTON. I don't mean in this room—I think he would enjoy what is going on in this room—that was his temperament.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it he wouldn't be happy about?

Mr. Brinton. He wouldn't be happy with urbanization. He wouldn't be happy looking at New York City even without the garbage strike. I think it would discourage him deeply. And, of course, the whole Negro problem.

U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Senator Aiken. You referred to the Russian election. You say "in the Moscow district elections in June, the moderates received 58 percent of the vote; in the election of September, the Bolshevik extremists received 52 percent of the vote. A gain for the Bolsheviks by democratic methods? Not at all. In June there were 647,000 votes cast; in September, 381,000. In three months half the voters had just quit, many no doubt echoing Mercutio's 'a plague on both your houses'."

Do you expect, if all the candidates for President in the United States in the coming election have relatively similar views on war and peace and law enforcement, and so forth, that half the voters of the United States will fail to vote as they did in Moscow?

Mr. Brinton. No, sir, I don't; because this is a team business. Republicans versus Democrats alone would bring out a lot of people. It perhaps wouldn't be as much as though there were an election sharply pointed, but nobody in this country is afraid to vote, nobody is, I think, basically not enough disgusted with things as they are. If it should turn out Johnson versus Nixon, there would be a large number of absentees among college professors and the like, but I am very sure for the rest that voting is in our national habit, sir. You know—you know in your own State they continued to vote for a long time even though a Democrat didn't have a chance.

Senator Aiken. You think tradition will be a very strong influence?

Mr. Brinton. I think so.

Senator Aiken. And the game will be very strong?

Mr. Brinton. That is correct.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION

Senator Aiken. You talked about revolution. What is the difference between revolution and evolution and where does one leave off and the other begin?

Mr. Brinton. Well, I think in revolution, as I say, it has to be violent because it is resistance to the law. It is illegal actions that make it. Whereas for evolution, I would like to compare, for instance, the hundred years of British history from 1815 until the final flapper suffrage, I think it was in 1926, in which change came through a series of reform bills and agitation and so forth of which the nearest to disorder really was a monster petition presented to Parliament with a million signatures or so. All that century was pretty mild. It is a series of orderly steps, the reform bills and finally I say the flapper suffrage which meant universal manhood and female suffrage, and all that without any real violence, that I regard as an evolutionary process. Whereas a similar process in England in the 17th and 18th century from 1640 to the Lord George Gordon riots in 1780 I regard as a series of two revolutions and a vast number of political riots. Strange in the same country, the same genetically constituted people. I didn't bring in France, you notice, Senator?

Senator Aiken. I noticed.

DOES EXTREME POVERTY BEGET REVOLUTION?

Do you see potential revolutions in some of the newer states in Africa, Asia, and the older states of South America? Take the Congo, where revolution has been going on all the time, and in Nigeria, Thailand, and Burma, possibly. You would have to include the Dominican Republic, where I gather you think one revolution is not over with yet, and possibly Haiti where certainly the poverty is extreme. Does extreme poverty beget revolution as a rule?

Mr. Brinton. Not without other conditions superimposed on it, I think. That is what I meant when I said the existence of privations is not enough to cause a revolution. Even Marxism, for what they call the Lumpenproletariat, the bums, both Marx and Engels were pretty scornful about their role. But I think, Senator, in answer to your question, I think it is clear we are in an age of revolutions of which perhaps the latest was the Greek rightist coup, and where you might get another any day. I hesitate to pick out which one, perhaps the Nigerian situation is a current revolution. One can break out most anywhere really and especially in the underdeveloped nations or whatever you call them. I think there is no question about it.

Senator Aiken. Extreme poverty is always a useful tool in the hands of more affluent and possibly more capable leadership.

Mr. Brinton. I suppose probably it is. If you have a base of not poor, but still discontented people, yes.

Senator Aiken. That is all.

Mr. Brinton. Extreme rural poverty probably not. I think it has to be urban poverty really.

Senator Aiken. I agree with you. I agree about the problem of our cities. The solution to it is to discourage the growth of larger cities.

The Chairman. Senator Carlson?

REVOLUTIONS IN THE FUTURE

Senator Carlson. Dr. Brinton, I certainly appreciate your very excellent statement and the colloquy that has been given this morning on revolutions, past and some probably for the future.

Based on your statement this morning, is it certain that we are going to continue to live with revolutions?

Mr. Brinton. Yes; I think we are in that kind of period, although again you get to what Mr. Fulbright asked me where do you draw the line between revolutions, you see. There are always disorders, riotings, and such. My colleague who recently died, Sorokin, made a very interesting study with the aid of a lot of unemployed White Russian refugees, we used to call it the White Russian WPA, working statistically from, well, early Greek history on down, and he lists several thousand of what he calls internal disturbances. He had the courage to try to give them numerical weights, you see, in which, for instance, as I remember, the great French Revolution comes out at 70.42, and the Cato Street conspiracy comes out about .12. This seems to be just nonsense, window dressing for the social sciences, but it does emphasize the fact that political conflict breaking out into some kind of violence has been endemic and especially in our Western history, some periods though no doubt were a little more peaceful than others.

The 19th century looks nice now, but I think in the 20th century we are going to put up with this kind of disturbance for a long time.

LEARNING TO LIVE TOGETHER

Senator CARLSON. In view of the fact we are going to have social and economic and political and nationalist revolutions, have you any suggestion as to what might be done so that peoples can learn to live together? That seems to be the problem.

Mr. BRINTON. It is indeed, and I wouldn't claim that kind of wisdom. I do not think the people who study men and society ought to try to apply, they should simply say what they think and what they have discovered. We are not men of action. The kind of really successful collaboration seems to me in the natural sciences where the lab men do the things that the physicians who actually work know because they handle human beings, they handle specific problems.

But if you ask me my general impression there, then there is no simple formula. You don't try to suppress everyone and you don't—we can't, it is inconceivable that we should bless what Castro did in Cuba. You have to take every situation the way a good physician takes a given case of illness and bring what wisdom you have, avoiding, I should say always, the extreme, trying to follow the Hippocratic maxim of the physicians, "do not harm," don't try too much surgery and so forth. I admit this is a prescription I don't know how to fill. It could be carried out but it would seem to me one way to do it, would be to study areas, where certain things that do cause revolutions and conflict of a really bitter kind have been, so to speak, exorcised, worked out some way, eliminated.

For instance, why in Switzerland do not the French-speaking people hate the German-speaking people? Because they don't. And why in Belgium—just yesterday in the newspapers, I am sure you all saw it—did the Flemings raise hell with the Walloons over the University of Louvain?

I don't think it is a question of economics—Belgium on the whole is prosperous, it has shared in the whole growth of the Common Market. Would you think if they put the International Bank in Brussels it would help? It didn't help much to put NATO there.

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS

Senator CARLSON. Doctor, our nation has been generous with its resources. We have made a great contribution toward the economic and social development of countries through technicians and other programs. We have given away hundreds of millions of dollars worth of food, and sometimes we question, at least I do, whether we are making progress with some of our neighboring countries and allies and friends by that?

Mr. BRINTON. I think there are certainly bright spots. I think Mexico is a bright spot on the whole. I think it is possible Malaysia is, but they have a very acute communal problem as amongst the

Malays who are most numerous and the least cultivated in Western ways, the Chinese who are very gifted in many things and, of course, the East Indians; the proportions are respectively, 60, 30, 10 percent, something like that, or 15 percent for the Indians, perhaps.

On the whole, if you compare it with Vietnam, Malaysia has been a success story. You realize there were the 12 years of Communist agitation in which finally the British, plus the Malaysians, won out. I think it would be very interesting for the experts to give us more information as to why that was successful.

Actually some of the French West African former colonies are doing well. The Ivory Coast has a good position. Nigeria is having a bad time; the Congo particularly bad.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield to me? But I was under the impression we didn't have a big aid program in Mexico or Malaysia. The successes that you mentioned were not as a result of the aid programs Senator Carlson asked you about?

Mr. BRINTON. No. We did, of course, give some economic aid to Malaysia during the fifties. But you are right. Well, you are making explicit something that I was perhaps implying, Senator, We didn't try to run these countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson asked about our aid program—were we successful. And you immediately cited two countries where it happened we had a minimum of intervention. Is that not correct?

Mr. BRINTON. That is quite correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you cite them as a justification to the aid program?

GROWTH OF WESTERN EUROPE

Mr. BRINTON. Well, I also would say, if you like, there again it is a problem, it is certainly true that we primed the pump, that we made possible the amazing economic growth of Western Europe, the Common Market, and others. This is a fact of life.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. BRINTON. We did it, and, of course, that hasn't won us necessarily the love of one of the most successful of those national units, but still—I feel better about Europe today than I do about many parts of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but wasn't that done in a rather unique way; that is, they formed their own commission?

Mr. BRINTON. Surely; it is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And they did it themselves; didn't they, with our aid and on a multilateral basis; isn't that so?

Mr. BRINTON. I agree.

On the other hand, you can't go into the Congo that way. If you give aid to any of these undeveloped countries——

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. BRINTON. You can't do it. I don't know the figures as to how much economic aid we gave to Malaysia.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very small. Since 1953 the figure is $36 million. It is very small for that long a period.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, may I answer that question?

The CHAIRMAN. If Senator Carlson yields.

ROLE OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY

Senator AIKEN. He yields to me. I will say that American private industry has made tremendous investments in Mexico which have resulted in raising the standard of living of the cities materially, but it hasn't done so much toward solving the urban-rural problem which is even more acute in Mexico than it is in the United States.

Mr. BRINTON. But not as acute as it was 30 years ago.

Senator AIKEN. You can say the same for private industry in Venezuela and certain other countries.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. In some countries private industry has done more to raise the standard of living than the government has done.

Mr. BRINTON. Surely. Venezuela is a very good example of that, but it is also an interesting problem, the effect in Western Europe.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. BRINTON. Where certainly American private industry has played a large part in this miracle economy.

Senator CARLSON. I regard private industry not as part of the foreign aid program but as part of the contribution of our country to other countries.

Mr. BRINTON. But it creates more problems. The more advanced the country perhaps the more serious it would be.

Senator CARLSON. I have one comment, Doctor. I hope that somehow, some way that this coming generation can learn how to live together with people. We haven't learned that yet. As a nation we like to say we are a peace-loving nation yet we have fought a war every 25 years since we became a nation. I hope that will soon end and look for a newer era, but I am not too hopeful. Perhaps you have some encouraging words.

Mr. BRINTON. I am sorry, sir. I echo your hope but also your discouragement. I do think that perhaps we tend to minimize the toughness of the human race. I am not saying it is nice to go through what hell we go through, but the real sentimentalist is wrong. We are a tough species.

CURRENT TURMOIL IN THE SOVIET UNION

The CHAIRMAN. Professor Brinton, a moment ago, you made a very casual allusion to the current turmoil in the Soviet Union, about writers, I think you said. You were encouraged by it. What did you mean by that?

Mr. BRINTON. Well, I meant that it is a sign you were getting back to a normal state of affairs which isn't necessarily identical in each country, but which has certain, shall we say, minimal traditions, especially in the West: some degree of privacy of not having to participate every moment in what my French revolutionary friends had a phrase for, the heights of revolutionary circumstance, and the growth of an intellectual class which can say what it wants to say or very near it. In short, the comparative freedoms that the Western world has enjoyed in greater or less degrees for over 300 years, and I suspect have been enjoyed by certain classes in other cultures, too, and I regard Russia since 1917 as having had very little of this kind of normal human life.

The CHAIRMAN. But I think the common interpretation of this is the opposite, that this is a sign of retrogression. You seem to be of the impression that you think it is a sign of evolution.

Mr. BRINTON. You mean retrogression in what sense?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, going back to a more Stalinist——

Mr. BRINTON. You mean the suppression of these writers?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BRINTON. Comparative suppression.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BRINTON. But I don't think they are suppressed.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think so?

Mr. BRINTON. Not successfully, not wholly. I think they are going to crop up again. We misunderstood each other. I think it is not surprising that the present establishment there has made an effort to suppress this effort at freedom of opinion, but it seems to me in the last 10 years this problem of the writers keeps constantly coming up in a way that I know darned well didn't in the 1930s and 1940s. You never even heard of dissident intellectuals in Russia then. Even the man who wrote Dr. Zhivago presumably was quite quiet by himself in those years, Pasternak. I may be wrong, maybe the Government will succeed in suppressing them, but my whole point about certain ways in which groups of humans behave is that it is really rather tough to suppress them.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same movement has been taking place in Yugoslavia, has it not, with Djilas and so on?

Mr. BRINTON. Oh, yes. You would hardly notice—have you been there, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, several years ago.

Mr. BRINTON. Did you really notice much difference between Yugoslavia and the rest of the Balkans?

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't.

Mr. BRINTON. As a tourist you certainly don't.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

EXCESSES OF MODERN COMMUNIST REVOLUTION

Professor Brinton, what is the meaning of the excesses of this modern Communist revolution which have so repelled people in the West, such excesses as the Stalin purges and the Chinese cultural revolution and the Red guard movement and the public kangeroo trials of the first year of Castro in Cuba? What do you think they mean?

Mr. BRINTON. Well, I think they are phases of revolutions, true social revolutions, even in the case of Cuba which is the latest, without the kind of traditions that you have in Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and so on. What Bagehot says about government by discussion, those people never had it.

The CHAIRMAN. Never had it?

Mr. BRINTON. Never had it the same way and never had democracy, therefore, I shouldn't think the revolutions would be identical.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think these excesses are properly understood as something characteristic of communism and, therefore, likely to continue and recur, or are they more accurately regarded as characteristic of the extremist stage of the revolution as you define it and, therefore, likely to abate and give way to more conventional normal practices?

Mr. Brinton. I think the latter. The French Revolution was certainly no picnic in those 18 and 19 months of the Terror and in some respects, some of the cruelest things occurred in the provinces, where Carrier had the suspects put on barges and toted to the middle of the river and then removed the plugs and sank them. This is one of the most cruel phases of the revolution. But not only that, but phases of the Greek troubles in the Peleponesian War in Corcyra where the democrats, I mean the leftist group, if you like, got up on top of the temple, you may recall, and poured boiling oil down on the people who had taken sanctuary, their enemies down below. Somehow pouring the oil from above seemed less of a profanation, but it must have been uncomfortable. In fact, the record of man's inhumanity to man is always, I think, strengthened in what I call a crisis——

The Chairman. Do you think that is a precedent for the use of napalm?

Mr. Brinton. Maybe so.

The Chairman. It has pretty much the same effect.

Mr. Brinton. There is precedent for that. The Greeks used fire. But I hope I am not being just soft minded about all of this, I don't think there is any special ingredient in communism as a faith that makes it tougher or more cruel in the crisis period.

The Chairman. But isn't it a common understanding in this country and perhaps elsewhere that this is especially attributable to the fact that it is a Communist revolution rather than some other kind? Isn't that a common understanding?

Mr. Brinton. Yes, I think it is. I think it is a misunderstanding.

WAR ATROCITIES

The Chairman. You think it is erroneous?

Mr. Brinton. I think it is erroneous. We always, of course, feel that way about our opponents. The analagous thing, for instance, is the question of war atrocities, and so forth. I was much impressed the other day just rummaging around, Ithink through the Gentleman's Magazine for 1776, in which there is an account of what we call Concord Fight in which the complaint is that the minutemen cut off the ears of the dead British soldiers.

Senator Case. Did they?

Mr. Brinton. I doubt it, why should they? We can't say. Certainly we were not brought up, I will bet you weren't taught in school that patriots at Lexington and Concord had done anything of the sort. I think the magazine account was an odd hangover from the concept of scalping which was not understood thoroughly in Europe. But this business of one side blaming the other for atrocities in World War I is an example. There were atrocities, I am not questioning that for a moment, but I don't think they are the monopoly of any special group. I don't think there has ever been a nice gentle war or revolution.

Senator Case. How about the situation where one side blames itself for atrocities?

Mr. Brinton. Well, that is government by discussion. That is quite—I think it is an interesting phenomenon, of course, it can occur in certain societies. It doesn't occur at the height of what I call crisis period of the revolution.

I mean you just go to jail, if you say your side did anything wrong. But such self-accusation can occur with us. It occurred with Britain as regards the Boer War as you well know and, of course, the world took Amritsar very badly; that was 1919 and there were a thousand Hindus killed, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. It also occurred in our war against Aguinaldo in the Philippines, didn't it?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes. No matter what you say about us, we have always been a government by discussion. Even Mr. Lincoln during the Civil War and his shocking behavior toward Vallandigham, and so forth, there was a lot of discussion and we have had a long record of opposition to wars, opposition to our behavior toward the red Indians; we have had our Thoreaus. Not many as distingushed a stylist as he. But we have had many Thoreaus. I suppose most of us would be very sorry if we hadn't.

SIGNS OF A COMING REVOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. You referred in your statement to the difficulties of identifying the preliminary signs of a coming revolution. Looking at the world today, do you think it is possible to identify places that are now quiescent where there seem to be signs of a coming revolution?

Mr. BRINTON. Communist revolution?

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, any revolution.

Mr. BRINTON. Any coming revolution?

Well, I don't think the Belgian thing will erupt beyond what it has already done. I don't see anything in Europe at the moment. A major depression of the kind that began in 1929, if it occurred in any of these now-prosperous European nations, might have consequences of this sort. I wouldn't guess, but it would have to be a really deep depression.

I think in the rest of the world there are always possibilities. I mentioned Malaysia as a success, but it might very conceivably erupt. The troubles they have had with Singapore, and the Chinese situation in general, they can always erupt. The Huks might erupt again in the Philippines. In very few of these places have you yet succeeded in getting what looks like a sure, stable society. I am not even sure I would want to prophesy too much about Quebec, because that has so many of the earmarks of nationalist revolt.

I think in this country a true revolution of our kind is inconceivable for a lot of reasons, but the specific Negro situation seems to me a subcase of a revolutionary group that exhibits many of the symptoms I have discussed, including the alienation of the intellectuals and so on, the rise of extremists but, of course, the Negroes have no territory of their own. Theirs—and ours—is a special problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel in Latin America that conditions are such that there are likely to be further revolutions there?

Mr. BRINTON. Well, there have been, as I said, two genuine ones, Mexico and Cuba, and in a sense a Fascist revolution in the Argentine, although it didn't last. Yes, I should think that that is a comparatively unstable region, but again it is not a thing that I know intimately, as I do know most of Western Europe.

U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD REVOLUTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. How would you characterize, from your own point of view, the attitude of this country now toward revolutions?

Mr. BRINTON. Well, I hope you will take Louis Hartz' testimony on that because he is more competent than I am on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a great student of revolutions. I wonder what your reaction is. Do you feel we are sympathetic to revolutions, as we thought we were, or do you think we are no longer sympathetic to such revolutions?

Mr. BRINTON. I will have to use another fashionable word, ambivalence.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambivalence.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes, I think it is true that most Americans sympathized with the anticolonial revolutions. They sided with the Irish, which was one of the first such. They did not get very excited over the Algerian, I suppose for other reasons, but by and large we were certainly sympathetic, and we were sympathetic at the outbreak even of the Cuban revolution when it looked as though they would have a moderate regime.

But, there is also a very strong feeling, I think, largely due to the postwar opposition of ourselves and the Soviet Union and the Communist business, whereby people think any revolution really is going to smell of communism somehow and we don't approve of that kind of revolution. And there is a general overall feeling among good solid Americans—since our own revolution is so long past—to ennoble their own revolutionary past but to dislike current ones as not so noble.

England is a very nice example of such a tendency. They have even tried to forget the fact that they once cut a king's head off. You have to remind them of that. They don't like to be reminded.

The final generalization is that probably in the really stable countries like ours and England there is an inevitable onus against sympathy with revolutions. The English have long felt the French are disreputable and indecent, not just as regards sex, but even more as regards politics. That is a strong feeling among us, wouldn't you agree?

REVOLUTION IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Let me finish this and then I will yield. I gather from what you say we are sympathetic to revolutions except those which have a communist element in them. Is that correct?

Mr. BRINTON. I should think by and large that is true. We sympathize with people seeking to be free generally, yes. But where revolutions seem to threaten our own way of life directly, and I think it is natural, we are not sympathetic.

The CHAIRMAN. In Vietnam then you would say if Ho Chi Minh had not been a Communist, we probably would have been sympathetic to his national revolution. Is that correct?

Mr. BRINTON. I think the whole story would have been different.

The CHAIRMAN. Would have been different?

Mr. BRINTON. Oh, yes, if the French had had the good luck to have somebody like Churchill in command in 1946, that whole thing wouldn't have occurred. I think that in spite of these ardent historians who believe forces and drives are all that count, individuals do count. The French under another leader might have made concessions to Vietnamese nationalism.

The Chairman. Then the real determining factor was the fact that it was partially a Communist revolution?

Mr. Brinton. I think so.

The Chairman. But how do we reconcile this with the fact that almost at the same time we were giving actual aid to Yugoslavia? You have said yourself that you thought, if let alone, Ho Chi Minh would probably have been more like Tito.

Mr. Brinton. I know.

The Chairman. How do you reconcile these two factors?

Mr. Brinton. Well, Ho Chi Minh didn't get a chance to be a Tito because of the French behavior from 1946 through 1954.

The Chairman. How about our own behavior?

Mr. Britton. Well, OK, OK. I think——

The Chairman. We assisted the French, didn't we?

Mr. Brinton. Yes. Without advertising it very heavily, but I would agree, yes.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES

The Chairman. Is there any other case—you are a good historian—that you know of where this country has taken the part of the colonial power in seeking to retain and give actual substantial assistance to retain control of a colony?

Mr. Brinton. Not to that degree, no.

The Chairman. I don't know of any.

Mr. Brinton. We ourselves were faced with a quandry though because we had two major allies and after 1946 we were very anxious to hold the coalition together. The British and the French both had empires in dissolution and all I can say is that I think we tried to soft pedal our approval of these colonial revolutions. As to our exact relations with the final end of the Dutch empire, that is Indonesia, I don't know enough about the details. But we certainly didn't want to lose any NATO allies, even colonial powers. But I agree that in that one case of Vietnam it is very striking. It was toward the end of the situation, as I remember, in one of Mr. Dulles' ploys, that we really did actually aid the colonialist power, and yet we didn't give enough such aid.

The Chairman. In 1950 we began to give the Vietnamese aid informally and in 1951 we made an agreement to give them aid of a very substantial amount until 1954, Deinbienphu. At the same time we were criticized for urging the Dutch to get out of Indonesia, for being too eager, were we not?

Mr. Brinton. I agree. This is one of the difficulties of foreign policy in a period like our own. It makes the English in the 19th century seem to have been on easy street all the time until they hit the war. It is a hell of a job, I agree. It is very hard to maintain consistency and I don't think you ought to maintain a pedantic consistency. I repeat in my statement that each case is a different case. By 1950 it was clear that Ho Chi Minh was thoroughly identified with communism, the ICP was a Communist Party (Indochinese Communist Party) and, furthermore, he showed no signs of weakening in that respect.

Now, it is obvious that at that time also, the Russian-Chinese split was acute.

THREAT OF VIETNAM REVOLUTION

The Chairman. But it certainly wasn't that Vietnam constituted a threat to the security of this country; wouldn't you agree? You don't think that, do you?

Mr. Brinton. No, no. But some felt it did threaten, there was this famous domino theory, and it is clear, I think, that Mr. Dulles really felt that no more even small piece of this earth should have any kind of government that called itself Communist. We were going to stop them in their tracks. This is containment.

The Chairman. I see.

Mr. Brinton. That is my guess, and our leaders then felt that even this relatively small and unimportant piece of territory, Vietnam, was worth maintaining, unstained by communism. I am not saying I agree with that diagnosis of policy but that must be the reason for it.

The Chairman. I wanted to discover what your reasoning was.

Mr. Brinton. In the case of Tito he had obviously had his splits with the Russians and he was safely in command and there wasn't any serious problem involved.

The Chairman. So it wasn't really communism as much as it was the idea of an international conspiracy directed from Moscow, is that correct?

Mr. Brinton. I should agree, yes.

The Chairman. Because of what you say?

Mr. Brinton. Yes.

The Chairman. But we accepted Tito as a Communist?

Mr. Brinton. Yes, I agree, especially at the top level of policy. I think among many Americans though there is a feeling that communism is something immoral and dirty.

There is a nice line in that book, the "Ugly American," in which the Father Finian said that he sees that this whole Vietcong is an exact duplication in many ways of the Roman Catholic Church, with its discipline, its purpose, and so forth and so on, but they are in the form of evil, not good. It is, you might say, almost a black mass, therefore, he, Father Finian, comes to the conclusion that you cannot have both Christianity and Communism on this earth, and I think for various reasons a large number of Americans—I have no idea how many—feel that way, that is why I brought in religions, that there is something sinful about communism.

The Chairman. That is right.

Senator Case?

Senator Case. Professor Brinton, it is nice to have you here. You are a man of great faith, in some matters, anyway. [Laughter.]

LOCAL REVOLUTION AND BALANCE OF POWER

I wish you would just sort of speculate about the relationship, if any, between local revolution and the larger question of the balance of power. We vacillate back and forth between thinking how horrible it is that we, a great power, are destroying a little country at the tip of Southeast Asia, and being concerned about whether we do not have some responsibility for the maintenance of the balance of power, or the balance of tensions, which, in the imperfect world in which we live, provide our only semblance of stability. Just for example, I think of the difference between President Roosevelt who was, I think, a rather simple person in his view about these great things, with not much historical sense, who permitted the Russians to move so far toward the West and over the continental Europe, and a man who is often castigated for too much interference and meddling, John Foster Dulles. I wish you would talk about this for a bit.

Mr. BRINTON. Well, it is big theme.

Senator CASE. I mean, you can be right about the analysis of revolution in a small area, but still quite wrong in trying to apply that in answering a larger question.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

Well, I think all persons interested in the study of international relations and our diplomatic and basic problems, ought to get on and see when the balance of power is working and when it does not, and what kind is needed and, furthermore, history is not going to give the whole answer because the present is a world balance which, I think, was not true until the 20th century. You might learn something, but not everything from the ancient Greek world and from the European world, especially from 1500 to about 1914.

I do not know that you can come up with any recipe, formula, or know what works. But you can say, first, the balance is never perfect, and there is often some infringement upon it that does not really menace it. I mean, you cannot say that everything that happens in the way of political change must upset the balance of power. The period right after Utrecht, after 1713, is very interesting.

The Spaniards tried to get back Gibraltar, there were a whole series of really small wars, but they were so small that they did not interfere with the balance, which was not changed until the mid-century really in what we call the French and Indian wars.

BALANCE IS HARD TO ESTIMATE

I think, in the first place, in a generalization as to the modern world, there has been a little too much talk about superpowers because, as between ourselves and Russia, the balance in many respects has been pretty good. But there are so many of the so-called uncommitted—if you really look around the world you will see there are an awful lot of units, especially since the freeing of the colonies and so forth and so on—and what part changes in them will play in the big balance is really awfully hard to estimate.

I should say personally I do not think Vietnam was a sufficient menace. I confess that, on the whole, I agree with Walter Lippmann that a world balance of power probably demands that China should have the same degree of influence, at least, in Southeast Asia that we have in Latin America and that our great mistake, which is understandable, but still a mistake, was to commit ourselves on the mainland of Asia.

A comparable thing would be to imagine any serious contravention of the original intent of the Monroe Doctrine. One such serious threat was Maximilian, with French support, in Mexico, and even though it was the middle of the Civil War, our press was indignant. Once the war was over, of course, the French gave up and our State Department managed that very nicely with aid from Juarez and the Mexicans.

But just think for a moment of how we should feel really if, suppose French Canada—this is surely fiction—French Canada really revolts and then decides it wants to be an extra department of the French Republic. I suppose De Gaulle would be dead by this time. It is a fantastic idea, which I bring up to suggest how Chinese leaders take our presence on the Asian mainland. I do not think we can preserve the balance if we have any serious footholds on the continent of Asia.

I think England will have to get out of Hong Kong. I have been interested in the Far East, in precisely the matter of the balance of power, when it works and when it does not. It has not worked well in our century, and yet there is no substitute for it.

BALANCE OF POWER IN PAST CENTURIES

Senator CASE. Did it work well in the 19th century or is that a big illusion of the historians?

Mr. BRINTON. It worked pretty well. I think the bloodiest thing was our war, in the Civil War.

Senator CASE. It was the bloodiest war up to that time.

Mr. BRINTON. Well, Napoleon's little affair in Russia was pretty bad.

Senator Case. That was the second battle.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes. At any rate, it worked pretty well in the 18th century, in view of the fact that there were two rival powers, France and England, and other rivalries in central and Eastern Europe. It did not stop such rivalries. But those were pretty modest wars. Maybe there were other reasons. They did not have the technology for really total war.

Senator CASE. George Kennan's theory, as I understand it, is that there are only five powers that matter. They are all European. In effect, they are Atlantic, if you include Russia in the Atlantic powers, and you must keep a balance among them or prevent any one of them from getting too great so he cannot be threatened, by definition, and, therefore, let the rest of the world go hang; in effect, I think that is what he says. Do you agree with that?

Mr. BRINTON. I think that is unrealistic partly because all of those European powers—I am not sure he even includes France, for some reason.

Senator CASE. No, he did not.

Mr. BRINTON. The fact remains France has got a hand, a big hand, in large parts of Africa. One curious result is they are finally learning their lesson, so that they maintained their economic and political influence over at least a dozen of those particular countries.

The British, what is left of the British Commonwealth, is a problem, but it is there, and we are not going to keep our hands off. I do not mean we are going to annex any of Africa, but we are interested in it. That is why I brought in this third world. In good 18th century politics, the balance works pretty well if it is agreed that all members are members of a club, and even if you beat a man you do not ruin him and, by and large, you compensate for losses. That kind of politics we cannot play any more. But if this were an 18th century balance, then Africa would be good pickings, and the thing would be settled.

On the other hand, it is impossible for us to keep out of it. Of course, we know the Russians are going to be in it, and the Chinese before their recent troubles were, of course, trying to influence Africa.

So that I think Kennan's idea about the five major nations is not realistic. They are of major importance, but so is the whole rest of the world, if you think in terms of balance of power.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF A GREAT POWER

Senator CASE. Of course. What we are trying to get at is some definition of what the responsibilities of a great power, specifically the United States, are in the world. What should you do or when should you not intervene. Can you work out a formula, can you know in advance, is there some tenet you can draw down from Sinai that would tell you?

Mr. BRINTON. Alas, I think not. Certainly nothing that I have the courage to try to do except the formula that I will repeat, do no harm and try to keep out of anything that seems to be, well, threatening.

For instance, in Nigeria that is a good example. I do not think we ought to do anything about Nigeria.

On the other hand, if the Russians made a direct interference, it would unquestionably be serious.

The Spanish Civil War is an interesting example. That was, of course, direct interference by the Russians and by the Italians, and the Germans. The British and the French were greatly worried, but not doing much, and then, of course, the non-Franco forces blew up because of their internal discord.

But Europe and the world accepted that change, that revolution. I should say that the nearest thing I can get to a formula is to assume that a revolutionary movement is basically the concern of the country itself, and unless there are very clear evident signs of present danger to the peace of the world, we should be benevolently neutral, if you like.

Senator CASE. We carried this pretty far in regard to Hitler, did we not? We waited a long time.

Mr. BRINTON. I know, I know. But I do not see anything in Africa or Asia that seems quite the same as Hitler. I think the danger—that word "appeasement" was ruined, of course, but the cases are never identical. I think we have to wait and see.

We can hope we can clear up the Vietnam business, and then we will see if the Russians are still in an expansionist state more, say, than we are ourselves. Obviously the Russians are concerned with world balance, too.

If we could get a reasonable balance agreement with Russia, and content ourselves with noninterference in what seems by good diagnoses to be local troubles, and I will cite Nigeria as an example, and they may crop up in other places, then I think that is the best we can do.

It is clear that we cannot cease to be a great power. It is clear that we cannot cease to be concerned with any threat to our own actual independence.

INTERVENTION THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator CASE. Take a situation like South Africa. This, so far as I know now, is not a threat to the peace of the world at the moment in the larger sense. Yet it contains things deeply offensive to the rest of the world in which we are deeply concerned. We cannot avoid this in any event because it is brought constantly before our attention at the United Nations. We have to take positions.

What is your comment about intervention through the United Nations? Is this a good thing or a bad thing?

Mr. Brinton. I suppose South-West Africa—again you, as a lawyer, would be interested in this—this is a legal angle because the South Africans have no business in South-West Africa. The German colony was first mandated to them and, as you know, this has really been taken over——

Senator Case. You are talking about South-West?

Mr. Brinton. Yes, South-West.

Now, South Africa itself, it would seem to me extremely unwise for us to intervene in any practical sense or in any boycotting sense. There is no reason why if private Americans want to boycott whatever we import from South Africa, give up on diamonds, that is another matter. But I should say that officially even when we are outraged by what goes on in South Africa we should do nothing. This is one of the difficulties, I think, of the American tradition of virtuous interference. I think we ought not to interfere directly even though our sense of right is outraged.

We can use our influence in the United Nations, and there are a lot of things we can do. But I think there the comparison with Hitler is almost meaningless because it seems to be highly unlikely that South Africa would try to expand.

Rhodesia, classic Rhodesia, is a part of what I regard as the same complex anyway. If the South Africans get an inspiration and start moving into Tanzania or otherwise growing in Africa, that is still another problem.

What that would mean—but I think that is inconceivable. They have enough Negroes on their hands, and surely they are not insane. Even Hitler was only partly insane.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTELLECTUALS

Senator Case. In your statement you have a sentence in relation to the intellectuals, and you say: "I almost wrote cynically a brandnew and different establishment, headed by themselves, but that is not quite fair to these intellectuals." But it is almost fair to them, is that right?

Mr. Brinton. Well, there is an ingredient of it. Certainly the ones I know best, the French intellectuals of the late age of enlightenment, this has been a classic objection to the French Revolution that it was made by the intellectuals, and so on. But, yes; of course, that is especially true, I think, of these new countries where only the intellectuals, the educated blacks and Asians have what it takes to run a nontribal modern society.

Senator Case. Of course, you are really getting to the point that revolutions cannot succeed unless there is something specific you are trying to get hold of, that is a grasping and grabbing and holding of power.

Mr. Brinton. Yes.

Senator Case. You just cannot be unhappy and do anything.

Mr. **Brinton**. No, no.

Senator **Case**. This is one of the things——

Mr. **Brinton**. You can think of fascinating movements as early as Christianity, and as early as Buddhism, where I think the first ones were not looking for power, although if you want to ask about St. Paul, you certainly have in him a very great administrator. This element comes in very soon. It came in at once with Islam.

Senator **Case**. That is, I suppose, when we consider Paul the founder of the church.

Mr. **Brinton**. Yes. But there is at first a genuine religious impulse, not concerned with power, and really they mean it, but it does not last.

Senator **Case**. I turn the questioning back to the prime intellectual of our Senate.

The **Chairman**. Senator Pell. He is talking about you. Go ahead, Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you.

Excuse me for being late. I had the opportunity to read your testimony.

VIOLENCE AS AN ELEMENT OF REVOLUTION

I was struck that in your definition of revolution you use the same examples that Webster's Collegiate Dictionary does, the British, during the Cromwellian times, French, American and Russian ones. But do you feel that revolution must be accompanied by force? Or is not the real definition of a revolution determined by what the results are? Force may be used and force may end up with few changes. It is still a revolution.

My point is, the bona fide British Revolution occurred in 1832 and 1848 from the point of view of results, not under Oliver Cromwell. If you look at what happened before the Restoration, the ideas did not change as the Irish were aware of more than most.

I am wondering if there is not a fallacy here.

Mr. **Brinton**. There is a question of semantics. What you choose to define, I agree with you, particularly about the British series, which I should rather date from 1832 right down as I said before you came in, to the flapper suffrage of 1926 which finished the democratization, achieving universal suffrage. But I think it best if we were to associate the term "revolution" with a series of changes that involve illegality on somebody's part, treason on the part of somebody. If it is not successful it is treason. This is not nice to say, I do not want to offend anybody, but if our revolution had been somewhat different, George Washington would have been a traitor because he obviously was an officer in His Majesty's armed forces.

But it is a matter of—I agree with you, with the import of what you said—many kinds of changes, and this is indicated by the fact we used terms such as the industrial and technological revolution, meaning really rapid and real change, but not involving illegality.

I do think, though, the word always suggests a little uncomfortableness. Even the industrial revolution was uncomfortable to a lot of people, as we know.

Senator **Pell**. But, to be specific now, for there to be a genuine revolution, you would say there has to be an element of violence?

Mr. **Brinton.** I should think so, for the kind that I am interested in. But maybe you can call them political, territorial, involving some violence or illegality.

Senator **Pell.** Right.

PUNISHING THE LOSER

I would agree with your point that only in this century really has it come to be accepted that the rulers in losing wars are criminals. My father was the representative of the United States on the United Nations War Crimes Commission, and I remember his views in this regard. I wonder, from the viewpoint of history, what are your own thoughts in this regard?

Mr. **Brinton.** You mean the Nuremberg trials?

Senator **Pell.** Well, the background as set up by the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London, first.

Mr. **Brinton.** Yes.

Senator **Pell.** Do you think from the viewpoint of history that was a good or a poor precedent?

Mr. **Brinton.** Well, it is not a clear precedent to my mind. But, in general, anything that reduces the number of independent and, therefore, potentially quarreling and fighting units, anything that slowly approaches a supernational government, the possibility of federalism, and so on, would be good. Imperialism of the sort the Romans achieved for their then known world, eliminates some quarrelsome independent units but I think as Americans we work toward the other solution, the Federal, and I think there is a little sign of progress here. Occasionally I am almost optimistic as regards the Western European state system from the beginnings of consultations formalized at Utrecht, down to the United Nations Organization. At the end of general world wars, each attempted organization that comes from it, has been a little bit firmer than the other, and firm, above all, in the sense of having a legal system with some teeth in it. So to that extent I should say the attempt to make war crimes illegal is worth making.

Senator **Pell.** From your knowledge of history, would you think that if it was accepted custom that the leaders of countries that lost wars were executed or otherwise punished, that would decrease the number of wars? Or would it have made any difference?

Mr. **Brinton.** Well, put as simply as that, it would not. It probably would not.

Senator **Pell.** Because each side feels it would win in the end?

Mr. **Brinton.** It is a very nice question, Senator, and I have never phrased it in quite that form. I sympathize with the effort, but the Germans, I suppose, don't even feel really guilty about the genocide of the Jews.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A WAR AND A REVOLUTION

Senator **Pell.** So here I wonder if we do not come to one of the points of difference between war and revolution, the fact that it is accepted that leaders of revolutions if they lose, are executed, although this does not apply necessarily to the leaders of the nations losing wars.

Wouldn't that be one of the essential differences between a revolution and a war?

Mr. BRINTON. Oh, yes. Yes, it is quite true. It is especially true with revolutions that come to a real head.

I think an interesting thing about most nationalist revolutions is that the defeated leaders get executed, but what to me is most interesting is that in our abortive nationalist revolution which, I believe, in the South they called the War between the States, we did not hang Jeff Davis to a sour apple tree. Would things have been better had we done so? I think probably not.

Senator CASE. Would the Senator yield?

Senator PELL. Certainly.

Senator CASE. Is this, perhaps, because it is a quality of Americans that, as I remember Louis Hartz describes it, we have never gone through a revolution and never have had the bitterness that is attached to it.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

Senator CASE. We do, as you say here, have as part of American folk-wisdom, that if you cannot beat them, join them, and the tendency is to get together. We are not believers in all the rest, and isn't that a darned good thing?

Mr. BRINTON. Oh, yes. I think partly, sir, we get it because we have enjoyed what Vann Woodward calls free security. He supplements Turner's famous free land. Once the French were kicked out in 1763, we have not been afraid until——

Senator CASE. So we never had a class society and we never had to revolt against it.

Mr. BRINTON. We never had an external enemy that we were really afraid of.

Senator CASE. Yes.

Mr. BRINTON. With the atom bomb in Russia's possession that has changed, and that is one of the variables that must always be kept in mind.

RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to inject in here a sour note, but I think the Senator from New Jersey has forgotten Reconstruction. I am not sure that just not hanging Jeff Davis was a sign of great sympathy and an attitude of forgiveness. That was a very bad period.

Mr. BRINTON. Well, of course, it was. But Robert E. Lee became a national hero shortly afterward. We did not proscribe—Judah Benjamin departed, but if he had not he would have been all right.

Senator CASE. Thaddeus Stevens was not allowed to take over the country.

The CHAIRMAN. He did temporarily.

Senator CASE. But very informally.

Mr. BRINTON. I wondered how far that would have gone.

The CHAIRMAN. I submit the effects of that were not really worn off until, really, World War II.

Mr. BRINTON. They have not even altogether worn off today.

The CHAIRMAN. Not even now.

Mr. BRINTON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a very bad period.

IF THE BRITISH HAD INTERVENED IN THE CIVIL WAR

Senator PELL. I wonder if the British had intervened in that Civil War—as we all know, they had a very strong stake in it, a strong interest in it—if they had interfered and participated in it, sent over some supporting forces, advisers, something of that sort, I wonder if the final bloodbath that would have occurred at the end of the Revolution or the Civil War, would not have been more extreme than it was?

Mr. BRINTON. Oh, yes. This is one of the ifs of history. You, perhaps, know that Winston Churchill wrote an essay in one of his years out of power about what would have happened if the South had won the war, and he makes it a wonderful thing. There would never have been even World War I.

But I think realistically that had the English intervened it would have been terrible. It might have prolonged the war; but we have not yet discussed the interference by outsiders in the great revolutions. I cannot think of one in which they have been a success.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Mr. BRINTON. I can't think of one in which interference in a great revolution by outside powers has been a success. Of course, the Russians could put down the Hungarians in 1849 and 1956 but that is a small country under special conditions.

What we tried to do in 1920, 1921 with the French and the rest to the Russians, is a very good example. It was a complete failure. But that is perhaps a red herring.

Another failure was the mild British attempt at intervention, the British Bay of Pigs, which was the Quiberon Bay Expedition in 1795 where they landed Royalists in France to stop the revolution. It was much sadder than the Bay of Pigs because there were all of a thousand of them killed instead of being ransomed. Maybe that is a sign of progress, at any rate.

Senator PELL. Then, in your view, we should be very grateful, indeed, that the British did not send over any advisers, aid missions, in support or anything of that sort?

Mr. BRINTON. I can say yes to that, as the facts are today.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

IS A REVOLUTION ALWAYS NECESSARY?

Do you believe that as nations develop, there is a shift from the original source of power which really was land, to the next source, industry, property, or capital. Then, finally, as Galbraith points out in his latest book, "The Industrial State", your group, the scientific and educational estate, are now becoming the top of the heap. I have not seen this sign in great evidence here, but this is his thesis.

Senator CASE. We are in a regression. [Laughter.]

Mr. BRINTON. Mandarins, Mandarins, Senator, that is all we are.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Especially Harvard. [Laughter.]

Senator PELL. But do you believe that as a nation emerges from the first state, where land is the source of power to the industrial state with its so-called finer values of civilization, that a revolution is almost necessary? Or do you feel it is incorrect?

My own view is that a nation has to go through a revolution as it progresses or—not necessarily progresses, but as it moves. It may be a violent one, as you say the definition of revolution is, or as it is sometimes thought to be a peaceful revolution. But revolution, peaceful or violent, is necessary; would you agree or not?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes; yes, I should, indeed. But with that proviso that it may be a relatively peaceful change. The classic example, again, is England, of course, which underwent its great industrial revolution without much violence—the violence was all before that rather than after the English industrial revolution but it was unpleasant. The question is, can these African nations particularly, but also Asia and Southeast Asia, heaven knows what is happening in China, really, can they become industrial countries without quite serious trouble? Their intellectuals who guide them are very impatient, and yet all of my friends who have had experience, like Edward Mason, for instance, have a feeling there is no economic miracle possible in these countries, really. It is going to be a slow process, and it probably will involve troubles.

Senator PELL. Don't you believe in the case of China and in Japan, certainly one revolution has occurred and maybe China has had a more continuous one?

Mr. BRINTON. They are very different, yes; yes.

Senator PELL. Right.

Mr. BRINTON. The Japanese are like Switzerland, one of these happy cases, because except for their Fascist expansion, which we stopped, there hasn't been any great revolutionary crisis there. But yet in your wider sense, of course, there has been from Meiji on a very great change.

Senator PELL. A complete revolution from the viewpoint of ownership and social outlook.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes, yes; the Japanese of 1855 brought back now would probably be as surprised as any person brought back, probably.

POSSIBLE SOUTHEAST ASIA REVOLUTIONS

Senator PELL. What other countries in Southeast Asia, which concerns us all these days, have not had their revolutions yet?

Mr. BRINTON. Well, not their industrial or not their technological revolutions yet?

Senator PELL. Or even their peaceful ones; yes, their industrial ones.

Mr. BRINTON. Well, I cited Malaysia earlier. That wasn't exactly peaceful because it took 12 years to put down the Communists. But it was achieved. India may do it, granted that you have this separation from Pakistan which we have thought in the good old days was a shocking business, but that having been carried through, it is just possible India may come through.

In some of these, particularly in Asia, which, of course, was civilized, in a sense black Africa wasn't, the colonial powers did leave this substructure of roads, railroads, many institutions and a few cities, so that one can't say.

Taiwan is an interesting example. What happened was not quite on the Japanese level but still it has gone a long way, surprisingly.

FATE OF ABORTED REVOLUTIONS

Senator PELL. And a final question, again drawing on your knowledge of history, is there any general rule that can be made with regard to the fate of revolutions that are aborted as the result of outside pressure or influence?

Mr. BRINTON. I think especially if what I call nationalism is the steam behind them they will just try it again.

Poland, Ireland. It took the Irish about 400 years which is a long time for us Americans. But I am reminded of a statement attributed to Madariaga, as you know, the liberal Spanish exile. Later in life he got interested in the United States, in American history, and read about our Civil War and so on, and he is reported to have said, "What I can't understand is why the South didn't try it again. Our Basques and Catalonians tried it every so often."

He meant just not accept suppression as in the case of the Basques and Catalans, who regarded the Madrid government as outsiders.

I should suppose that Hungary is going to try it again. Maybe it can get loose the way Yugoslavia did. Maybe it will work out.

Senator PELL. Maybe one of the reasons that in our own war there was no outside pressures was because it was the local people who led and fought it with a minimum of outside reference. The Basques in France or overseas may stir up their brothers in Catalonia and vice versa, and usually there is an element of external pushing that causes this.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Mr. BRINTON. It is very hard to think of a nation, a group, especially in our time, that has been put down by force. Hungary is the only one I can think of right offhand.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a few more questions.

WILL THE SOUTH TRY AGAIN?

But in regard to that last question, how would you judge the prospects of our success if we did try it again in the South? Do you think we might do it this time?

Mr. BRINTON. I doubt it very much. But I don't think that even extremists, and I have read the papers carefully, even people like Mr. Wallace have seriously suggested secession.

They fly the Stars and Bars and all that. I mean heaven knows, all is not peace, but have you met any, do you know anyone who is not insane——

The CHAIRMAN. No; I hadn't thought of it until you just raised the question. [Laughter.] It was just an interesting thought.

Mr. BRINTON. Certainly the Irish kept after the British time after time, and incidentally when they finally won, they were outclassed in what is called military capability. The British should have been able to clean them up, just as we should be able to clean up Vietnam. I daresay we can.

Senator PELL. Will the Senator yield? Did they win?

Mr. BRINTON. The Irish? I think only a few Irish now doubt that they won. I think just the lunatic fringe of the old IRA still protests. They lost most of Ulster, yes; but not—my impression of Ireland, which I am very fond of, is that it has got so respectable, in fact most of my "liberal," my most "liberal," in the American sense, friends are really grieved. Ireland, that heroic land of literature and fighting and everything else, has become stuffy and respectable. There are no more James Joyces and so forth and so on. If there is no worse irredenta in the world than the six counties in Ulster, I think we are lucky.

WHEN AN IDEOLOGY IS ADMIRABLE

The Chairman. I have a few points. I don't want to keep you too long. You have been very patient. You make the point that a revolutionary crisis is distinguished from an ordinary military, political, or economic crisis by its ideology, among other things, and that this ideology is likely to be intolerant and illiberal but also to represent a sturdy and vital faith—I believe that is your language—which you say you find to be not entirely without an admirable side.

What is it that might be admirable about such an ideology?

Mr. Brinton. Vitality, guts. The opposite of stuffy. This is a romantic position. But in my book, actually, I quote Montaigne, I can't here, I will have to paraphrase him, in which he points out—he lived in some very bad disorders of the French wars of religions, so-called, as you know, I mean this was a really tough time of troubles—and he said, "I see everywhere about me dishonesty, liars, cruelty which to me is the worst of sins and so forth and yet at the same time there is something, an energy, a vitality,"—he says it much more eloquently—"that marks a height of human effort."

AMERICAN AVERSION TO COMMUNISM

The Chairman. Now applying that to the present, why is it that there is none of this admirable quality with regard to a revolution which is dominated by Communists? You have already made this point which interests me very much about revolution in Vietnam. I think you make the point that if it had not been Communist, we would have had no inclination to intervene. Why is this? What is there about this particular kind of revolution that began in Russia that is so offensive to us and causes us to get involved?

The reason I ask this is because I wonder if sometime the only way to make progress is to understand what it is that "bugs" us, as they say in slang.

Mr. Brinton. Well, again, that is a very hard task. I am sure there is no one single reason, and I wouldn't want to weigh the variables. I think one obvious one, of course, is Americans more surely than any Western peoples, except possibly the Swiss, have a firm belief, I won't quite say a religious one, but it is part of our world attitude, in what we call free enterprise. This is something that in this country isn't just an economic doctrine, it is an emotional belief, and, of course, the Russians starting back with Lenin just did away with free enterprise completely.

Second, there is, of course, the fact that the Communist revolutions from the start were anti-Christian, and this country, again, has in our own time, I think, become increasingly Christian.

I would like to ask you gentlemen if you can imagine an outright atheist, even though a spellbinder like Colonel Ingersoll, seconding the nomination of a Democratic or Republican candidate at a convention? This is what Ingersoll did, seconded the nomination of Blaine.

In short, atheism, anticlericalism and all the rest in this country has grown increasingly unpopular. Church attendance or at least some identification with church is great. Let's not go into the question of true Christianity, but we are a church-going people and the Russians have clearly in the past and continue to persecute Christians and Jews as religious people.

Then, thirdly, I think by just the accidents of actual history, communism got a black eye because Russia under the Communists welshed out and deserted us in World War I, which we naturally held a serious offense. As you know they were excluded, they were left out right from the very beginnings of attempts to settle things in 1918–19, and that surely still hangs over them. Give a dog a bad name and hang him. They got that very bad name from the start.

Those are three variables, and I am sure there are many more but you don't want to prolong this.

The Chairman. We seem not to be offended with the Japanese, who are not Christians, we are most friendly with them and so on. The factor of Christianity would not seem to be all that important.

Mr. Brinton. But they didn't—but they never were Christians.

The Chairman. That is true.

Senator Case. You were going to give a fourth reason.

The Chairman. What is the fourth?

Mr. Brinton. Well, I don't know, my mind has been racing around a bit.

The Chairman. Maybe it will come to you.

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

Take free enterprise. It is rather ironic that many of our leading public officials—especially one of our principal parties—constantly complain that this country has gone Socialist. Every day in speeches, they seek to turn back history. I have seen statements that a larger percentage of our business is Socialist than the percentage in a number of other Western countries. I have seen statements that private enterprise has a more favorable climate in Sweden than it has here, although Sweden has a professedly Socialist government. This is very mixed up. There must be something rather mystical about this animosity toward socialism and communism.

Mr. Brinton. Just irrational, Senator, not necessarily mystical. I think you are dead right. Our mixed economy would shock Herbert Spencer or any real laissez-faire people, obviously. But this American feeling is not a rational one.

The Chairman. This is what I want you to develop: whether it is possible to be more rational.

Mr. Brinton. More? It is not possible to be fully rational.

The Chairman. I agree.

Mr. Brinton. Or in international or any human relations but it is possible to be more so, and your questioning brings out that, in my personal opinion, our feelings and that is the word, our sentiments, if you like, those of the great majority of Americans toward communism are not very sound or sensible.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I just interrupt here because I think he missed a couple of things. I think one of them is the whole matter of freedom to dissent, freedom to exercise political opposition, freedom of speech. This is the reason for our differences in our systems and why we have a better chance of eventually developing a peaceful system in this country and in the West than is possible under dictatorships. I think this is the very basic difference which transcends concerns about form of religion and all the rest of it, and I think this is not irrational. I wish you would speak to this.

Is it right to put a man in jail if you disagree with him? That he has no right to express a difference, political difference? That he has no right to have property which is a base for effective political opposition? I cannot see that this is not a very basic difference in our systems.

Mr. BRINTON. I know, I know. But, again, there are a few parts of the world in which, well, actually, I like the Italian Mosca's term for civil rights. "Juridical defense," he calls it, because it means one set of the agents of the government will protect an individual against another set. And that, Senator is a remarkably rare thing. It is a very good thing.

Senator CASE. Then it is not perfect, but it is still an idea.

Mr. BRINTON. It is indeed.

Senator CASE. And it is coupled in this country with a belief by the individual that "I will be damned if anybody is going to tell me what to do," and this is a very important part of the working out of democracy.

Mr. BRINTON. I agree. But it is a thing that is extremely hard to export. And if you are asking still, as I think Mr. Fulbright asked, why we have this feeling against communism, this lack of certain freedoms in Communist countries is, I grant you, an important part of it. And I am glad you brought it in.

ATTITUDE TOWARD FASCISM

But do let me point out that the Fascist regimes were at least as illiberal, and we hadn't, I think—you have got to say this, we didn't in this country have the same hatred of Fascism per se as we did Communism.

Senator CASE. Is it not perhaps based upon the difference in degree of likelihood of the success of those regimes and their permanence? We never took Mr. Mussolini seriously for very long.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you take Mr. Franco seriously? He has been there quite a long time.

Senator CASE. Honestly, I do not. I am not for him, I am not an apologist for him.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you take him seriously? He has complete control of that country.

Senator CASE. He doesn't have the mystique of expansion, he is not a crusader.

The CHAIRMAN. You are shifting the basis now. You emphasized freedom of expression and religion. He has just as firm a control, he has been just about as severe, on American Baptists in Spain as has Moscow, is that not true, Mr. Brinton?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

Senator PELL. May I interpolate here?

I was once arrested by the police in Spain because I didn't hold up my hand, the Falangist salute.

Senator CASE. That is because you were a Baptist.

Senator PELL. I was not a Baptist.

Senator CASE. I am not joking whether we know them to be true, we believe them to be true. We don't think it is a good idea to have secret unions, we don't think political imprisonment without trial and the absence of habeas corpus and those things is a good thing. We have some view of what we call the great freedoms imperiled as they are realized here or the difference between the decencies of the West and the other kind of regimes. But—and so far as I know, the Communists justify this as nothing at all, and while they cover their disagreement with the right of an individual to have any kind of freedom and to enjoy it effectively by written constitutions, of course the words in there they still do not exist in fact, and, well, I just think it is a little—there is a point beyond which a little passion about our system is a good thing.

Mr. BRINTON. Oh, sure, surely. But the question I really raise is how to export it. I don't think they intend to export it——

JUSTIFICATION FOR OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to develop a question as to what is the explanation, or the justification for our attitude towards communism, not just about Russia. Professor Brinton stated that when he was in Yugoslavia he couldn't tell the difference between Yugoslavia and many other Balkan countries; didn't you?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a Communist state; it professes communism.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If this ideology is an inherent evil, and an utterly unacceptable idea to society, I suppose we shouldn't compromise with it, we ought to eradicate it, shouldn't we, if we are logical at all?

Mr. BRINTON. Well, reluctantly, yes; go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. But you evidently don't agree with this.

With regard to the Senator from New Jersey's remarks, I think one of the greatest observers of the American scene was Alexis de Tocqueville. Do you recall a passage in his book "Democracy in America" about the tyranny of the majority?

Mr. BRINTON. Indeed, John Mill at the same time was saying the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was without any substance at all?

Mr. BRINTON. No, no.

The CHAIRMAN. It was very real, then, and it is very real now; isn't it?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

APPROACH TO DISSENTERS

The CHAIRMAN. There is a different way we approach people who dissent. It hasn't been the tradition to shoot them or throw them in jail, but they don't get off unscathed, and never have.

Mr. BRINTON. It depends on the nature of dissent and so forth and so on. Thoreau got away pretty well unscathed. Thoreau, who was certainly one of the prize dissenters. This, for various reasons. I think a rough generalization is that civil rights, juridical defense, inevitably suffer in times of crisis and danger so that this isn't the best moment for dissent.

But it is amazing how much there is. Maybe at Harvard I have a jaundiced view, but there is an awful lot of it there.

The CHAIRMAN. The immediate reaction in the country to the recent difficulties was to enlarge the police, to call the Reserves, and talk about using the National Guard—in other words, a resort to force. Is that not so?

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Within our juridical system dissenters won't be lined up and shot, but they will be discouraged from continuing any kind of disagreement with the establishment, will they not?

Mr. BRINTON. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And this discouragement has been generally pretty effective, hasn't it?

Mr. BRINTON. In suppressing—well, I don't know how effective certain types of dissent, specifically that on the Vietnam war, are, but it has certainly not been wholly suppressed. I was saying from what Mr. Case said that nobody would maintain that our civil rights and our inheritance from the founders were perfect, and realized perfectly, but I think he is probably right in saying we are addicted to them, and that we are aware, perhaps, of transgressions made by other peoples more than we are of our own.

So I would accept his addition to my complex of reasons why we don't like communism.

But I don't think it is an adequate reason for attempting to stop communism.

I think there is every sign that some degree even of civil rights will come from communism, communistic countries, unless the world goes to pot more than it has, and that this is clear already in Czechoslovakia, as well as Yugoslavia and Hungary.

The CHAIRMAN. But the continuation or the existence of warfare tends to prevent the evolutionary process, does it not?

Mr. BRINTON. I think that is unquestioned; yes. It may be impossible to avoid such but there is no question about that. You can't run a war, you can't have a society at war and have much of these freedoms. You have more here than some other places.

HOW TO COUNTERACT COMMUNISM

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I don't question that at all. What is at stake, I think, and is important that we understand it, is how we, ourselves, conduct our national policy with regard to how you can either control it or change it. Are you more likely to change these ideological differences by armed force or by the force of your example?

Mr. Brinton. Well, I think, obviously, by the force of your example.

The Chairman. As a practical matter, not which is the easier, but which is the more effective.

Mr. Brinton. Yes, I don't question being practical, but even as regards your first alternative, I think it an utterly impossible alternative. The confrontation I like to consider comparable in some way to that between our democracy and communism, is that between Christianity and Islam, which took place basically in the Western World, and which had behind it even more passionate hatred, but which has somehow or other been settled. It is not completely settled but the world is not all Islam and it is not all Christianity.

The Chairman. I don't disagree with the criticisms of communism, but every time one gets into an argument about what to do about communism, if you don't approve of using force you are accused of being in favor of communism. We can agree we are not advocating communism, but it is very important what you do about it and whether or not you undertake to act by military means or whether there is some better, more effective, way, not necessarily an easier way. As a matter of fact, it is probably more difficult to set an example than it is to fight a war, isn't it?

Mr. Brinton. More slow and more difficult. But as for fighting, I should go so far as to say, though, that we cannot, with all of our magnificient strength and capabilities, eradicate communism on this earth by force. I cannot imagine our conquering Russia and China. Just imagine American garrisons in Moscow and Peking, and so on, in view of what has happened in the past, and in view——

The Chairman. If the Chinese entered the war in Vietnam, what do you think, would be our reaction? The usual one of extreme application of military force?

Mr. Brinton. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. And we would have to contemplate garrisons in China?

Mr. Brinton. I don't know. It is an awfully big country. It swallowed an awful lot of people who got that far.

ILLUSION OF AMERICAN OMNIPOTENCE

I really am struck—my friend Dennis Brogan has recently been giving some talks on the subject of "the illusion of American omnipotence," and I think it is very important to consider that we are not omnipotent.

The Chairman. What did he say about that? I think it would be very interesting to hear.

Mr. Brinton. Well, he said every evidence would indicate it is an illusion, what is going on in Vietnam is evidence of that; and a number of other examples that he dredged up from history, but, in particular, of course, the fact that if it takes as many men to do what we are doing now in Vietnam, how many will it take to handle a country the size of China?

The Chairman. How many did he estimate?

Mr. Brinton. He didn't dare. He just said this isn't a matter for arithmetic.

The Chairman. What amazes me is that a similar study to this was made by Generals Ridgway and Gavin and they concluded, apparently as Sir Dennis Brogan did, that this was an utterly impracticable proposal. Yet we find ourselves only a few years later undertaking it. So this is why I think it is important for you to elaborate a bit on the idea. Hopefully the irrationality isn't wholly beyond our reach.

Mr. Brinton. No; no. We can work on irrationalities as surely all of you gentlemen who have electorates know.

Senator Case. You mean exploit them?

Mr. Brinton. Exploit them for good or for bad purposes. One of my old teachers used to say you can "activate" certain strong human sentiments in people and "deactivate" others, but you can't reason such sentiments away. Madison Avenue knows that. But you can't wipe them out.

The Chairman. You still have faith that there is a possibility of changing the attitudes of people toward other people?

Mr. Brinton. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Under proper leadership.

Mr. Brinton. Yes.

The Chairman. I have one or two other questions.

EFFECT OF EXTREMIST STAGE OF A REVOLUTION

Do you think the extremist stage of a revolution in any way serves a long-term positive purpose in altering a backward or traditional society for the better?

Mr. Brinton. I just don't know. It depends how far you regard Russia as backward. Some people do. In the case of France, of course, even France did not alter rapidly.

The Chairman. It did not?

Mr. Brinton. No. I can say definitely. I don't think there has been quite that stage in the new countries, really. I think they are still in the stage of nationalist revolutions which don't have the same kind of crisis.

The Chairman. What I really had in mind is whether or not in such countries as we read about, where 90 percent of the property is owned by 2 percent of the people, that kind of a situation requires almost a serious dislocation of the established class system.

Mr. Brinton. Oh, yes; it certainly does, but I don't think we ought to make it.

The Chairman. No, no.

Mr. Brinton. No, no, I agree. I think that is basic. I like to use in general the term that applies only to the Near East, the effendi class, that class which is a strong privileged minority, much more privileged than the French in 1789, and it would be interesting if any country gets rid of them as effectively, or rather, solves the problem of a privileged rich minority as effectively as the British did over the last 200 years. It usually takes a revolution.

The Chairman. It wasn't a question of our intervening there. It seems to me in such cases we should not, at least, be guilty of intervening in their behalf.

Mr. Brinton. No.

The Chairman. That is in preventing the revolutions when such conditions do exist.

Mr. BRINTON. And we should not be surprised or outraged.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean.

Mr. BRINTON. Above all not surprised.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe, as you said properly a moment ago, we should look upon it objectively, and realize it is their own business.

A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

Do you have any advice, in a summary way, to offer now that you have an opportunity here in public as to the course for our own Government?

Mr. BRINTON. Sir, I really wouldn't have. It is against my principles.

The CHAIRMAN. To give advice?

Mr. BRINTON. Well, I think to the extent to which I am any kind of an expert, I simply state what I think is so, and it is up to people, who act under the burden of responsibility. I have never had much responsibility except to the kids I teach.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean it as broadly as perhaps you took it. What I meant was simply with regard to our approach toward revolutionary movements. I didn't mean in all cases.

Mr. BRINTON. I understand. In that case, I think, we should work against our popular irrational attitudes toward revolution and above all also attempt to weaken the delusion of the potency of our virtues.

The CHAIRMAN. Omnipotence?

Mr. BRINTON. Omnipotence, and even in terms of what Mr. Gore said I think that this general attitude should be combated as far as possible. We should put up with the world that isn't our own making. We have to anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if I understand you fairly, we shouldn't be sympathetic only to those revolutions that are in our own image; we should allow revolutions that may be different from ours to work themselves out. Is that correct?

Mr. BRINTON. I think that would be a piece of real wisdom.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean. I think that is very good advice.

I think you have been extremely patient. I apologize for taking so long. I hope we haven't worn you out.

Mr. BRINTON. Not at all. I am flattered that you found me interesting enough to take this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is very interesting. We already have revolutions and we are going to have more of them, so I think it is a very large subject.

Senator Case, do you have a further observation?

Senator CASE. I just have one question.

EFFECT OF OUR FOREIGN AID EFFORT

I was not going to ask it, but I think I shall because we got into the area in our far-ranging discussion. The suggestion has been made with some increasing frequency, that a great part of our foreign aid effort was not wise, could not be effective, in part because of dictatorships in these developing countries and because, any benefit from that aid is only going to increase wealth which the people will spend foolishly on things brought in from abroad and not on the real substance of their economic need, and the building of capital and whatnot.

Have you any comment on this whole thing?

Mr. BRINTON. Except to agree with you, Senator, no. I mean——

Senator CASE. I didn't say this is mine. I don't want to accept this as mine.

Mr. BRINTON. I accept that statement.

Senator CASE. But you think it is true?

Mr. BRINTON. But I don't think it has always been true by any long shot, even in some underdeveloped countries. But it is very difficult to do it because we can't go in and do it ourselves.

I think in the first place, I used the Ivory Coast because it is their best showcase, the French. The French have done very well. They have been—but that is because they were very generous and have been there so long and are not as hated as in other parts of their empire, and have done a good job, but we don't do that in these countries, and I think there is no question but a large proportion, I won't say how much of our money, has gone to support classes of people who are, whose behavior is, making violent revolution in those countries more likely than ever.

In that sense, it has backfired.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

Mr. BRINTON. Even, as a final thing, I don't think we ought to expect too much gratitude where it is successful.

Senator CASE. No, I wasn't talking about that.

Mr. BRINTON. I wasn't talking about that either. Although many Americans have complained bitterly about that. I think that is an unreasonable complaint.

Senator CASE. You can find better reasons for cutting down on foreign aid than that.

Mr. BRINTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Professor Brinton.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the meeting was adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)

THE NATURE OF REVOLUTION

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1968

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Case, and Cooper.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

The committee today is holding the second in a series of public hearings on the nature of revolution and the significance of revolutions abroad for American foreign policy. On Monday of this week, Prof. Crane Brinton very ably provided for us the broad historical setting of the over-all subject. In the session this morning we are moving closer to the contemporary scene with a discussion on revolutions in China and their significance for the United States.

The committee is pleased to have as witnesses today Prof. Richard Solomon of the Department of Political Science and the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, and Prof. James C. Thomson, Jr., former assistant to the National Security Council and now an associate of the Institute of Politics at Harvard University.

I understand that our witnesses have suggested a coordinated approach in which Professor Solomon would give his presentation first, to be followed immediately by Professor Thomson; questions would be withheld until the conclusion of both statements, and then would be answered jointly by the two witnesses. If there is no objection by committee members, this course of action will be followed.

Before proceeding, I would like to repeat the announcement that the committee will receive further testimony from Prof. Louis Hartz on next Monday, February 26, and from Dr. John McAlister on Thursday, March 7.

Professor Solomon, we are very glad to have you and Professor Thomson with us this morning. Would you proceed, please, sir.

(The biographic sketch of Professor Solomon follows:)

Biographic Sketch of Professor Richard Solomon

Professor Richard Solomon is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan and an Associate of the Center for Chinese Studies at that University. Before accepting his present position, Professor Solomon had served as a Lecturer for the Boston World Affairs Council on contemporary political problems and as a research analyst in a study of United Nations financing.

Born in Philadelphia in 1937, Professor Solomon attended The Westtown School, Westtown, Pennsylvania, received his S.B. and Ph. D. degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and studied at both Harvard University and the Chinese Summer Language Institute at Yale University.

Professor Solomon is a member of the American Political Science Association and the Association for Asian Studies and was an N.D.E.A. fellow in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1960 to 1963. He has received awards or grants from the Center for International Studies (M.I.T.), the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of Michigan, and the Social Science Research Council.

Professor Solomon is the author of the following publications:

"Educational Themes in China's Changing Culture," *The China Quarterly;*

"The Chinese Political Culture and Problems of Modernization," Center for International Studies, M.I.T.;

The Chinese Revolution and the Politics of Dependency, University of Michigan: Center for Chinese Studies;

"China Return," *The Yale Review;*

"On Mao's Linking of Foreign Policy with China's Domestic Political Process," in *China's Hertiage and the Communist Political System;*

"America's Revolutionary Alliance with Communist China," *Asian Survey;*

"Communication Patterns and the Chinese Revolution," *The China Quarterly;*

"Confict, Authority, and Mao's Effort to Reintegrate the Chinese Polity," (forthcoming).

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD SOLOMON, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen: Political revolutions of the Western world, and the social changes associated with them, above all have been urban phenomena. Our political traditions have grown from the experience of the Greek city-state, and Rome of the Caesars. The roots of present day industrial and artistic developments are to be found in the cities of Renaissance Italy, and our religious values are symbolized in the urban centers of Rome and Jerusalem. As well, the pattern of political revolution in an industrializing age bears the labels of urban foci: the Bastille, and the Commune of Paris, and the Leningrad Soviet.

The highly visible political revolutions of our time were preceded by less evident social changes, decades or even centuries in the making. Developments in commerce, technology, and manufacturing processes made possible the growth of new social groupings and classes, and the revolutions of power have tended to reflect existing changes in social relationships and resources, with the pattern of change proceeding outward from urban centers.

It is perhaps the "naturalness" of this pattern of social change in the West which has limited our ability to comprehend the workings of the social revolutions now convulsing the underdeveloped areas of the world.

We hear Lin Piao's assertion that revolutions of the present era will proceed by, "surrounding the cities with the countryside," but our culture and experience do not enable us to comprehend the full social meaning that lies behind Mao Tse-tung's political-military strategy of "people's war."

What has been the social pattern of the Chinese revolution; and what lessons does it hold for an America which seeks to adjust to revolutionary change in cultures and nations far removed from our own experience? Had there been no Vietnam war these questions would seem less pressing, but, given America's frustrating and costly involvement in this present conflict, we see all too clearly our failure to have drawn the proper conclusions from our earlier unsuccessful effort to relate to China and her revolution.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE REVOLUTION

In the following remarks I would like to highlight what seem to me to be certain of the distinctive characteristics of the Chinese revolution, in the hope that they will make us more aware of the paradoxical choices which confront us as we reconsider the nature and extent of our involvement in Asia and other underdeveloped areas.

China's traditional political life, like her peasant-based agricultural economy, was predominantly rural in focus. The imperial dynasties drew their strength from the support of the Confucian-oriented gentry, a small leadership stratum linked to the land tenure system and based in the quiet life of provincial administrative centers and clan villages. The milennial endurance of this agrarian and family-centered political tradition was paralleled by the limited development of an urban life style. China's few metropolitan centers, and her provincial capitals, were primarily centers of administrative and defense activity.

The scholar-officials, seeing their life style and political power threatened by the expansion of commerce or technology, stunted the growth of powerful independent centers of business and manufacturing activity. They checked the growth of heterodox views of society by linking the skill of literacy to the rote memorization of Confucian classics. In short, China's traditional urban life was not a center of new ideas, new sources of wealth, power, or social change; the "center of gravity" of this society was rural.

This pattern of imperial China's social and political life was shattered during the last century by a combination of internal and external factors: There was domestic population growth and peasant rebellion, and a recurrently experienced decline in the vitality of dynastic leadership; but there were also the new factors of the penetration of foreign military and commercial power, new social and religious ideas, new educational practices, and the example of foreign revolutionary experiences.

CITIES AS FOCUS OF CHANGE

Until World War II it appeared that China would join the modern world through much the same pattern of political and social change that had been characteristic of the West. The centers of her 20th century revolution were urban; but rather than being of indigenous creation they were the product of Western intrusion: the costal treaty port centers of commerce, manufacturing, and educational opportunity—precisely the kind of social development which had been so resisted by generations of conservative Confucian-oriented scholar-officials. These cities of the foreigner gave birth to new generations of Chinese with largely imported notions of how to make their society modern.

The more moderate or conservative of these young people sought to lend their talents and skills to the new Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, with its capital at Nanking. The Nationalists sought to base their power on the slim periphery of coastal industrial centers still linked to foreign commerce and foreign political support, while seeking indigenous backing from those political forces rooted in the more traditional base of landed wealth.

Even China's more extreme revolutionaries of the 1920s and 1930s saw the cities as the focus of change. The newly formed Chinese Communist Party, with both urging and assistance from the Comintern, sought to come to power and bring about change through mobilizing the country's small working class. During the 1920s the Chinese Communists and Nationalists competed for control over this small margin of modernity and industrial power in what remained an overwhelmingly peasant society.

CHANGE IN PATTERN OF CHINESE REVOLUTION

Between 1927 and 1932 occurred two events which profoundly altered the pattern of the Chinese revolution, reversing what had been the Western experience of growth from urban centers of change extending their influence out to the rural areas to that of the countryside encircling and bringing revolution to the cities.

The first of these events was the success of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang or Nationalist Party in crushing the urban organizational base of the Chinese Communist Party. Between April and December of 1927, Chiang's armies destroyed the power of the Communists in the labor unions, and routed their small military forces from the major cities. The Communist Party leadership was thrown into organizational disarray, and into confusion as to a proper strategy for gaining power. Some of the party's most determined young leaders fled to the mountains of South China, anxious not only to save their lives but also to seek new ways of gaining power.

The second major event was the Japanese invasion of China, beginning with the occupation of Manchuria in late 1931 and then the full scale invasion of China proper during the summer of 1937.

This series of Japanese attacks overburdened a Nationalist government still seeking to consolidate its power. Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to deal a final death blow to the Communists' newly formed peasant armies were thwarted by Japanese military pressures, and a still fragmented domestic political life. These peasant military forces, built by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh in the mountains of southern China, had been driven with considerable effort by Chiang's armies into a decimating "long march," which saw the party's new leadership escape to the northwest province of Shensi.

Had the Japanese not invaded China proper in the summer of 1937, it seems very likely that Chiang would have destroyed this small and isolated Communist leadership core. But the Japanese did attack, driving the Nationalist Government out of the coastal cities where their rule was most secure to the backwater Yangtze town of Chungking. And in the ensuing eight years of warfare, the Communists found a new lease on life.

Freed from the threat of imminent Nationalist attack, they set about building themselves a new peasant army, using the national war of resistance against Japan as a framework for their own political legitimacy, while building their military and organizational strength on the leadership of idealistic intellectuals who had fled the cities, and with the manpower of uprooted peasants.

LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE

The events of the war against the foreign invader, and the subsequent civil conflict leading to the Communist conquest of China in

1949, have been told elsewhere in great detail. What is only now becoming obvious to us, however, is the legacy of this revolutionary experience, in which a small group of radical intellectuals built a "workers" party composed largely of peasants, and led a peasant army under the control of that party in the conquest of national power.

What is the particular style of political action which has grown from this pattern of revolution? And why do Mao and his supporters loudly proclaim their revolutionary experience to be a model for the peoples of the underdeveloped world?

SOCIAL BASE OF PEASANTRY

An answer to these questions begins with the rather simple observation that the Communists in China made their revolution on the social base of peasantry. Not only were the peasants the main source of manpower for their armies, but the Communist Party itself, on attaining power, was nearly 80 percent a peasant party—and it remains in majority a peasant party to this day.

The peasantry has been a particularly problematical social class for those of a Communist political orientation. Both Marx and Lenin recognized the conservative and basically apolitical orientation of the peasants: their tenacious commitment to the land and family life; their basically antirevolutionary social views; and above all, their desire to avoid involvement in politics.

Some of the flavor of the peasants' desire to avoid contact with those with political power, and the manner in which China's pre-Communist revolution had passed them by, is contained in the following recollection by a peasant from the North China province of Shensi:

> When I was 19, I got myself sheep and goats of my own, and two years after that we heard that there was a revolution. I ran off to the hills. Then we were told that now we were called the Republic of China, and that the Ch'ing dynasty was at an end. That was all. We were old country people, and seldom went into the town and never talked about such things as the emperor or goverment. Nobody would have dared do that. And we never saw them either. The officials in the nearest yamen watched over us, and they were the same after the revolution as as before it.
>
> Ordinary people did not like going to see the officials. That was a thing one did only if compelled. If one met them, one had to kneel before them. It was exactly the same after the revolution. I could not see that there was any difference at all. (From Jan Myrdal, Report from a Chinese Village (London: Heinemann 1965, pp. 286–87.)

A more complete discussion of the problems the Chinese Communists faced in dealing with the political passivity of the peasantry is contained in my article, "America's Revolutionary Alliance with Communist China," Asian Survey, December 1967, especially pages 833–40

While the peasants might provide manpower for revolutionary movements, they were not considered a class capable of playing a leading role in the revolutions of Europe. And as we pointed out earlier, even the first decade of Communist activity in China proceeded on the assumption that the workers would be the leading force of the revolution. It was only the crushing of party power in the urban areas in 1927 which forced a reconsideration of this basic Marxist premise, and gave Mao Tse-tung—a young man who earlier had displayed a heterodox enthusiasm for the revolutionary potential of the peasantry—an opportunity to build a political movement on the power base of a peasant army.

PEASANTRY A MAIN FORCE OF REVOLUTION

How did Mao succeed, where others had hardly tried, in making the peasantry the main force of a social revolution?

Trial and error efforts to mobilize them into the Red armies over nearly two decades gave Mao firm belief in a formula for political participation that seems to be composed of four essential elements:

First, the use of *a revolutionary ideology* to explain to the peasants the political and social causes of their millenial misery and exploitation, so as to make them "conscious," of their role in the revolutionary struggle. Political "study" became a technique for drawing out the suppressed resentments and hostility that are so much a part of peasant life in any underdeveloped society, and rationalizing its release in terms of revolutionary goals. *Emotional manipulation* and "liberation" of the individual's sense of injustice, outrage, and hatred became the emotional basis of political participation in the Red army and Communist Party. This highly emotional quality of political life became the second distinctive quality of Maoist politics.

Third, there was the development of elaborate and all-inclusive *organizational work* to control the individuals who had been mobilized through political study, channeling their actions in politically meaningful directions.

And fourth, individuals thus politically "conscious," emotionally "liberated," and organized were directed into repeated *political struggles;* not only the military conflicts that have been so much a part of the Communists' rise to power, but also struggles with the individual's own "backward" thinking and the mistaken attitudes and behavior of his comrades.

This political formula was not something that Mao inherited fully developed from his Comintern mentors, or even from the early Chinese Communist leaders. It is a style of political action that evolved from years of trial and error in building a peasant party and army under the constant pressure of military campaigns and the threat of death. If we want to comprehend the depth of Mao's continuing faith in this form of political action—and it is a formula that has become quite obvious to the world in the current so-called great proletarian cultural revolution—I think it is necessary to recognize its undeniable effectiveness, in a period of intense social disruption, in taking politically passive peasants and turning them into highly motivated cadres of the revolution.

The first Communist peasant organizers, mostly young students from the cities, initially tried to reach the peasants and draw them into revolution on the basis of formal ideological doctrines learned from their urban professors. But the peasants were unmoved by pompous intellectual appeals, and their distrust of the young men in scholar's gowns, based on their enduring awe of the literate official class, kept a distance between these early party members and their would be peasant allies.

BOUNDLESS ENERGY OF THE MASSES

It was finally the peasant insurrections of the mid-1920s—triggered by natural disasters, the ravages of local warlords, and the accumulated resentments of landlord exploitation—that exposed for

Mao the key to the boundless energy of the masses: the fear of insecurity, the resentments and hatred of injustice and exploitation which, once liberated, could make the peasants a revolutionary force.

On the basis of his perception of this emotional root of the peasants' revolutionary energy, Mao set about constructing organizational forms and a style of political participation to mobilize this energy to the tasks of winning power. The particular quality of politics which we have come to associate with Communist China seems to be the sum of Mao's efforts: the constant and highly organized political study or thought reform sessions designed to make people conscious of their rage at exploitation by "telling bitterness" or "vomiting bitter water"; the highly emotional "struggle" meetings, where dunce-capped enemies of the revolution are confronted and accused by the masses, and the recurrent frantic periods of political *yun-tung* or mass campaign, where the entire population is worked up to a frenzy over some particular "counter-revolutionary," "revisionist," or "imperialist" enemy.

ORGANIZATIONAL METHODS DEVELOPED BY MAO

In sum, Mao developed organizational methods by which the Chinese, a people long taught to value harmony in social relations, would be forced to confront their enemies; their resentments and hatreds would be liberated, and, thus mobilized, they would become the driving force of China's social revolution.

The emotionalism and conflict characteristic of the Chinese revolution seems hardly unique if compared to revolutionary experiences of other times and places. Indeed, the Maoist formula for revolttionary action undoubtedly has its precedents. What does seem unique however, is the fact that this particular style of political action has been maintained following the successful completion of the revolution of power.

In the Western experience the successful attainment of power by a group of revolutionaries has tended to mean the institutionalization of social change, for the revolutions of the Western world have proceeded on the basis of existing and indigenous social, economic, and ideological changes. And as we stressed earlier, the Western city has been the focus of these changes, which later sparked off revolution.

DILEMMA OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

When the Communists attained power in China in 1949, however, with the success of the Maoist strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside, the party leaders faced a fundamental dilemma: they had come to power committed to achieve national regeneration through industrialization, yet their society and economy remained predominantly peasant based, and even their party, the vanguard of the working class, was less than 15 percent worker in composition. Or, put in other terms, the revolution of power had been completed before the development of the social and economic changes which would make the party leadership's goals of industrialization and national unification something attainable in the near future.

In the history of post-1949 Chinese Communist politics there has been constant debate over the most effective manner in which to resolve this dilemma of national development.

The period of China's first 5-year plan, roughly covering the years of 1953–57, was a time of trial of the Soviet experience in economic modernization; emphasis was placed on the development of heavy industry, and reliance was given to the technical planners and to those with scientific skills. This was a period when China's national defense policy stressed the creation of a modern army, hierarchically organized and equipped with weapons of conventional warfare that are the product of a heavy and technical industrial base. This was a time when the city, and all it represents in social and intellectual terms, was the focus of China's drive for modernization.

Toward the end of the first 5-year plan, however, the full effects of China's development dilemma—of the disparity between a peasant society and its leaders' proletarian goals—became more evident. The nation's population was rapidly expanding, and with this expansion came a decrease in the margin of agricultural surplus which could feed the urban workers, provide raw materials for industry, and earn foreign exchange for needed external purchases.

As well, the 1957 period of so-called Hundred Flowers criticism of the regime by the urban intellectuals must have convinced Mao Tse-tung—a man who has long exhibited an almost irrational contempt or hatred for intellectual pretense—that the bourgeoisie, the residents of the cities, were unreliable allies in the continuing tasks of social revolution in what was still a peasant society.

"GREAT LEAP FORWARD"

The party leadership's response to this set of frustrations was to turn against an urban-centered, moderately paced, rational, and technically oriented approach to development. Mao Tse-tung invoked, in the context of the "Great Leap Forward," the leadership techniques which had been painfully learned and had been successful during the struggle for power, and which had brought the party to its 1949 victory: in mass-based and highly emotional assaults on the rural problems which continued to block China's modernization, peasants were organized into military formations for attacks on nature, party cadres, government workers, and students were "sent down" (*hsia fang*) from the cities to work with the peasants in the countryside, and even the army was committed to economic tasks, as it had been in pre- "liberation" days.

In short, the rural areas once again became the focus of China's revolution. The enemy was identified as the imbalance between an urban-based ruling class longing for the power and material wealth of the 20th century, and a society still overwhelmingly peasant.

QUESTIONING OF MAO'S FORMULA

The subsequent failure of the "Great Leap" policies in the agricultural crisis of 1959–62 did not solve the basic dilemma of China's social revolution, but it did call into question for many Chinese the appropriateness of Mao's revolutionary experience as a model for the country's enduring economic and social problems. A crisis of authority thus grew in the soil of the crisis of agricultural production.

The effects of this questioning of Mao's formula for social development have now fully exploded upon China and the world in the current

"Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," in which a leadership fragmented over questions of proper policy for national regeneration fights among itself for the power to impose radically different solutions to China's development dilemma.

The depth and bitterness of the current leadership crisis in Communist China has astounded most of those who considered the "Long March" generation of leaders to have been particularly cohesive and give and take in their discussion of policy matters. The extent of the present turmoil in China in the context of the so-called cultural revolution seems attributable to two factors:

CULTURAL REVOLUTION ATTRIBUTABLE TO TWO FACTORS

First, there is the seriousness of the policy issues which spawned the current crisis. Not only a strategy for economic development, but national defense policy, Sino-Soviet relations, and China's posture toward the underdeveloped world and to the United States have all added fuel to the debate among China's leaders.

Secondly, the issue of leadership succession—of who will succeed a partially discredited, or soon to be gone, Mao Tse-tung—has added a particularly bitter and personal quality to the present conflict. While Mao's opponents have been given little voice in the verbal hyperbole that has been part of the cultural revolution struggle, Mao himself at least makes it clear that he seeks to sustain the style of leadership and political action which brought him and the Communist Party to power in China.

In mobilizing China's young people as Red Guards to struggle with those "representatives of the bourgeoisie who have wormed their way into the party and who want to bring about a restoration of capitalism in China", Mao is seeking to preserve a political style in which mass participation in highly emotional struggles with those burdened with the "four olds" of China's traditional customs and habits, social thinking and culture will discipline the younger generation for the tasks of leading a continuing social revolution.

Persisting attacks on China's intellectuals, and heightened efforts to educate the peasants in Socialist culture, indicate that Mao is also determined to make the countryside the continuing focus of China's revolution. In a very real sense Mao is responding to the fact that China's revolution of power was achieved before the society had developed the social changes—the cultural shift from peasant to worker, the spread of functional literacy, the development of attitudes which will facilitate birth limitation and a high rate of savings—which would make rapid modernization possible.

Mao's cultural revolution is in part, as its name implies, an effort to promote rapidly (by distinctly Maoist techniques) the changes in social attitude which must be the precursors of sustained social and economic change. It also represents Mao's effort to insure that China's leaders will remain committed to both his goals and his techniques of leadership.

The outcome of the present crisis in Communist China seems hardly within the realm of predictable human events. We in America, along with people the rest of the world over, look on with a mixture of anxiety and fascination at this incredible struggle now convulsing the world's largest political entity. Never before have Americans, who once considered themselves to have a special relationship to the Chinese people, felt more threatened by, or more isolated from, this quarter of mankind.

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1949

The radical change in Sino-American relations after 1949 from one of friendship to that of deep enmity has been a particularly bitter and ironic blow to those Americans who once sought very personal and direct ways to help the Chinese enter the modern world. Let me suggest in conclusion, however, that the United States continues to play a peculiar and surprisingly direct role in China's efforts to become a modern nation.

The intense hostility which certain Chinese Communist leaders have displayed toward us—an ill will which we have reciprocated with a policy of diplomatic isolation and military containment—is not an expression of isolation so much as of an intense political relationship. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the United States has what might be characterized as a "revolutionary alliance" with Communist China. To be sure, this is not an alliance in Western terms of interstate dealings carried out within a framework of international law and diplomatic conventions. Rather, it is cast in Mao Tse-tung's view that U.S. imperialism, so-called, is one of a series of enemies allied to his cause of uniting and motivating the Chinese people, through tension and hatred, for the tasks of creating a new society.

Earlier in this discussion we suggested that confrontation and struggle with enemies has been an essential element in Mao's approach to motivating China's peasants out of their traditional political passivity. The hated landlord, the warlord, and the foreign invader each have been one important pole in what Mao sees as a dialectical struggle between the forces of social progress and their reactionary oppressors. And in Mao's view of political processes, the tension and conflict between these forces can be used to modernize society and drive history forward.

TENSIONS SUSTAIN VALIDITY OF MAOIST FORMULA

In the years following the Communist attainment of power in China, Mao has sought to maintain the validity of his particular formula for mass political participation; yet with earlier enemies now defeated in the war of resistance against Japan, the civil war against the Nationalists, and the land reform and collectivization struggles against landlords and rich peasants in the countryside, Mao has seen the possibility of his revolution dying from a flagging of the people's will to struggle, to promote change. The feared passivity of China's peasant majority remains his greatest enemy—perhaps second only to his concern that the Communist Party will turn into a new exploiting elite (such as we know from Chinese polemical exchanges with the Russians he sees in the Soviet Communist Party).

Given these concerns, Mao has sought to identify new enemies to confront, so as to provide that tension which will maintain the dynamism of social change.

Unwittingly, America's Asian presence has worked to give Mao a new image of imperialism which he has used as a foil to mobilize China's peasant millions for continuing domestic political and social battles. Our containment posture has helped to maintain an air of threat and tension which sustains the validity of the Maoist formula for political participation in an underdeveloped society.

The Chinese Communist Party paper, *People's Daily*, could state the virtues of the U.S. "enemy" with little self-consciousness:

> The Chinese people's great enemy is U.S. imperialism. This enemy is indeed most hateful and harmful to us; but we must see that its existence also has a beneficial effect on us. To have a ferocious enemy like U.S. imperialism glowering at us and threatening us day and night will make us Chinese people always bear in mind the danger of war while living in peace and raise our vigilance a hundredfold, will keep us always on the alert and enable our enthusiasm to burst forth, can help the Chinese people always to maintain preparedness and sharpen our fighting spirit. Wanton U.S. imperialist aggression and intimidation can further raise our political consciousness, strengthen our unity, and enhance our combat readiness. Observer, "A Retort to Bundy", *People's Daily* (*Jen-min Jih-pao*), February 20, 1966.

In more recent days, as Mao's personal formula of struggle politics has been called into question by its domestic and foreign failures, the sense of external threat—and in particular, the "people's war" now rending Vietnam—has been used by the Maoists to reaffirm to doubting Chinese comrades the continuing domestic relevance of mass mobilization and struggle politics as the most effective way to deal with the country's development dilemma.

PARADOX UNDERLIES AMERICA'S ASIAN PRESENCE

This is the great paradox that underlies America's Asian presence. Our so-called revolutionary alliance with Communist China is now entangled in both the Vietnam conflict and in China's domestic leadership crisis. If the United States should seek to terminate its involvement in the costly, frustrating, and morally repugnant Vietnam war in a way that confirms Mao's "paper tiger" interpretation of American power, and the efficacy of a "people's war" strategy of insurgency, the position of China's extremists, of those who would seek to promote class struggle at home and lend support to subversive movements abroad, could only be strengthened. Yet if we remain in this conflict, we bear the cost of sustaining the image of "U.S. imperialism" and the danger of provoking Chinese intervention should the war expand in scope, or should North Vietnam be brought to a "sellout" solution unacceptable to Chinese interests.

Barring all-out war, Mao Tse-tung sees America's involvement in Vietnam as having put China in what we might characterize as a "we win if you do withdraw; we win if you don't" position.

How can the United States resolve this paradoxical quality of our Asian presence? Such a question can be given no easy answer, for the pattern of the Chinese revolution is one which continues to characterize many areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The coastal centers of urban modernity in these lands are indeed surrounded by countrysides of poverty and injustice, and the turmoil of social change continues to create new generations of would be revolutionaries, some of whom will see in the Maoist political formula a solution to their own problems, an experience to be emulated. And certain of China's leaders, deeply convinced of their own past successes, arrogantly self-righteous, and intensely suspicious of the motives of foreign powers, will seek to use the Maoist political experience in the service of insuring China's international security, and for their own domestic political purposes.

ANSWERS TO PARADOX OF OUR "REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE"

The history of China's revolution, and indeed its latter-day counterpart in Vietnam, do suggest, however, areas where answers can be found to the paradox of our "revolutionary alliance."

First, it is clear that the turmoil and social disruption of war, and particularly a war of foreign intervention, provides the climate within which those who use disciplined organization as a political weapon, and hatred as a motive force, are able to flourish. Foreign intervention places in the hands of "international" revolutionaries the very potent issue of nationalism; while nationalists, burdened with the responsibilities of relatively legitimate power, lose their air of potency before, or alongside, the foreigner's troops.

The dilemma the United States faces is a matter of, at one and the same time, checking the possibility of direct or insurgent foreign military intervention in underdeveloped areas, but while so doing resisting ourselves being pulled into these foreign conflicts in a direct and military manner.

We see clearly in the history of China's civil war, and in Vietnam today, how our massive economic and military power demoralizes and disintegrates indigenous political elites. They are all too glad to leave to us the nasty job of pulling their security chestnuts out of the fire, while they fight among themselves over unresolved power and status relationships, and squabble for a share of our economic aid.

The answer to this problem seems to lie in the *early* and *preventive* administration of economic and military aid, before insurgencies or international conflicts are already well developed. But perhaps most important, it means clearly communicating to local leaders that there are real limits to our intervention. We must work to create what might be called buffering organizations, probably of an international character, which will prevent American prestige or will from becoming so heavily committed to a given regime that we find ourselves unable to withdraw—or at least unable to threaten the legal government with withdrawal so as to motivate it to its own defense.

As well, we must be aware that our direct aid and military assistance to underdeveloped countries may provoke the intervention of adversaries doubtful of our intentions, setting off a chain reaction of preemptive involvement and reactive intervention, leading to just the kinds of "revolutionary" conflicts we seek to avoid.

We should work to internationalize our aid efforts so as to make them politically neutral and, where possible, make tacit or explicit understandings with other powers which will lead to mutual noninvolvement; agreements not to disagree over unstable local political situations.

Nationalism, and the integrity of local national elites, remain the most potent counterweights to people's wars, and our policies must work to preserve these guarantors of what ultimately is our own security. Fortunately, the extensive political disintegration of Nationalist China in the late 1940s, and Vietnam and Laos today, does not seem to characterize a majority of the underdeveloped areas.

MEANING OF CHINA'S HOSTILITY TO WORLD

Secondly, the United States must take into account the fact that China's hostility toward the world is basically a function of her own domestic weakness and divided leadership. We too easily convince ourselves that Mao Tse-tung wants to take over the world, yet we fail to see that the Chinese have never asserted they could solve their domestic problems through the acquisition of just a bit more living space, or with the added resources of bordering countries. Those Chinese leaders who seem to have advocated national defense through direct military intervention abroad were removed from power early in the Cultural Revolution, and Lin Piao's willingness to support foreign insurgencies is a defense strategy basically limited and indirect in conception.

While at present there may be little that the United States can do in a positive way to improve our relationship to China, we do have the option of *not overreacting* to Chinese expressions of hostility that are basically defensive and related to internal problems. We have the opportunity not to take actions and involve ourselves on China's borders in a way that will merely confirm the Maoist image of U.S. imperialism and strengthen the hands of China's extremists. This means neither threat nor provocation in our Asian presence (as tends to be implied by the notion of containment) nor the kind of massive and direct involvement which will give the Maoists and their foreign proteges issues which they can exploit for their own ends.

At the same time, however, it does not mean the kind of withdrawal from Vietnam and Asia that would affirm the value of a people's war strategy of political subversion, and deny to the developing countries those economic and technical resources which will enable them to deal with their problems more effectively by themselves.

Rather, the United States must seek to resolve the paradox of our revolutionary alliance with Mao's China by walking the difficult path that I have elsewhere tried to characterize as a matter of persistence without provocation (see "America's Revolutionary Alliance with Communist China" *Asian Survey*, December 1967, pp. 843–50): a matter of convincing China that she cannot cheaply attain security on her borders at the expense of the political integrity of her neighbors, yet assuring her through the restrained and constructive use of our national power that we present no intrusive threat to her domestic security.

QUESTIONING LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS IN CHINA

Ultimately, however, China herself can help us to resolve the paradox of this revolutionary alliance, for the current Cultural Revolution has exposed to the world the Long March generation's questioning of the Maoist formula of emotional mass struggle as a path to modernization.

Attacks on Mao's opponents within the top leadership to the effect that they have been soft on capitalism suggest that influential Chinese may have advocated reconciliation with the United States, and reduction of aid to foreign insurgencies. Any actions that we can take at a time when China's domestic leadership is fragmented which will strengthen the hand of these more cautious leadership elements should work to our interests in seeing a reduction of tensions in Asia. And hopefully, out of China's present domestic turmoil will come a new generation of leaders, a group of men who will no longer see confrontation and struggle with domestic and foreign enemies as necessary to China's own social progress.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Professor Solomon.

Professor Thomson, will you proceed, sir?

(The biographic sketch of Professor Thomson follows:)

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF PROFESSOR JAMES C. THOMSON

Professor James C. Thomson, whose special interests are United States Far Eastern policy and the history of modern China, became Assistant Professor of History at Harvard University on July 1, 1966. He is also Faculty Associate of the Institute of Politics and is Assistant Senior Tutor in Leverett House.

Before accepting his present position, Professor Thomson was Teaching Fellow and Resident Tutor at Harvard from 1956–59 and served as an assistant to a United States Congressman from 1959–60. Since 1960 Professor Thomson has been Special Assistant, first to Chester Bowles in the Department of State, and then to McGeorge Bundy in the White House.

Born in Princeton, New Jersey, in 1931, Professor Thomson attended Lawrenceville School and received the A.B. degree from Yale University in 1953. He holds the A.B. and the M.A. degrees from Cambridge University, England, and the Ph. D. degree from Harvard.

Professor Thomson was the editor of "Seventy-Five, A Study of a Generation in Transition" (New Haven, 1953) and the author of "Communist Policy and the United Front in China, 1935–36," *Papers on China*, Vol. 11 (Cambridge, 1957) and of reviews in the *Journal of Asian Studies*, the *New England Quarterly*, and the *Atlantic Monthly*. He is revising for publication his manuscript on "Americans as Reformers in Kuomintang, China, 1928–37."

He is a member of the Association of Asian Studies, Phi Beta Kappa and Honorary Scholar of Clare College, Cambridge, England.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES C. THOMSON, JR., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome this opportunity to participate in your discussion of revolution in Asia.

As a student of Asian history, sir, and as a former Washington bureaucrat, I will try to focus my comments on the American response to revolution in Asia rather than the internal dynamics of the revolutionary process—and in so doing may be able to supplement rather than overlap Professor Solomon's articulate and very penetrating presentation with which, incidentally, I am in complete agreement.

Our East Asia problems are only, I think, the most recent phase in an interaction that has been under way since the 16th and, in particular, the early 19th century.

COLLISION BETWEEN EAST ASIAN AND WESTERN CIVILIZATIONS

I have in mind here the ongoing collision between East Asian civilization, on the one hand, with China at its center and, on the other hand, a Western-based international order that grew out of Renaissance Europe—Mediterranean, Atlantic, or Western civilization, as you will—a loose-knit community of trade and diplomacy that has gradually spread its concepts and institutions of coexistence throughout every continent.

Despite the most vigorous efforts of Europeans and Americans, the great heartland of East Asian civilization—imperial China, Confucian China—was never fully integrated into this international order. In the face of Western pressure and persuasion, traditional China resisted such integration really with considerable success. And now Communist China has given fresh vigor to that tradition of resistance. It stands apart from the world order, or at least the world "establishment" of Washington, Moscow, Tokyo, London, Paris, whatever; it rails against this world order, it demands its overthrow and it noisily promotes an alternative vision of how the planet should be run.

CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

During the century and a half of China's revolutionary transformation, this heartland of East Asian civilization has remained the last great hold-out, in a sense, against the spreading tides of "the West." In recent years some of us have hoped that the problem of China's incorporation into the world order could be resolved through the process of China's "moderation" and "assimilation," by which I mean the moderation of the Chinese revolution in its relations with other states, and a gradual accommodation between the Chinese state and the international community. And that must still remain our ideal goal—despite the impact of recent events.

Let me quickly add, sir, that the achievement of this objective—China's moderation and assimilation—would probably be both necessary and difficult regardless of who ruled a strong reunified China.

Why? Because the powerful force of nationalism which would fuel any reunified Chinese state—and which fuels Communist China today—that powerful force would pose considerable problems for all of China's neighbors.

China's nationalism is an amalgam of two very special historical ingredients: a traditional and deep-seated sense of cultural superiority, on the one hand, and a more recent sense—since the mid-19th century—of acute international humiliation. (Incidentally, both ingredients are found today on both sides of the Formosa Straits.)

Add to these psychological factors the difficulties and frustrations of governing and modernizing China's soaring population on an inadequate resource base. I would wager that our "China problem"—and everyone's China problem—would be high on everyone's agenda regardless of who ruled a unified China. The problem does seem a good deal more acute, of course, when the pent-up force of Chinese nationalism is compounded by the messianic zeal of Chinese Communism—of Maoism.

U.S. UNPREPAREDNESS FOR REALITIES OF CHINA PROBLEM

Now it seems to me one of the real tragedies of recent history that the American people emerged in a position of world leadership—as the pre-eminent power in the international order and in particular in the Pacific region—so especially unprepared for the realities of the China problem.

Our "special unpreparedness," as I term it, relates to two phases of our China experience—our dual legacy.

In the first place, I would cite the period from the 1840s to the 1940s. As you know, we sent forth in this period a steady stream of our most vigorous and enterprising citizens—first our traders, then our missionaries (in the widest sense including teachers and doctors and nurses and technical experts, as well as evangelists) and of course our diplomats as well. These Americans, these people, were of vital significance, and played a vital role, in the transformation of traditional China. By virtue of the learning, the techniques, the power, and the foreignness they brought with them, they were the unwitting catalysts of revolution. And they helped shape American attitudes back home—an American view of China—that has become part of our intellectual bloodstream. Yet, like most participants in upheaval, these generations of Americans were only vaguely aware of what lay beneath the turbulence. And the outlook they left us contained a number of illusions.

TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA

There was, for instance, the illusion of our special status and clean hands as Americans, vis-a-vis the Europeans—an illusion fed by the fact that we generally let the Europeans do our fighting for us in China, while standing ready to benefit from their encroachments on the basis of the "most favored nation" principle.

There was also the continuing illusion of China's special responsiveness to us—an illusion fed by the hopes of our missionaries and entrepreneurs, who offered a vision of 400 million converts and 400 million customers—or 500 million or 600 million. The numbers were always going up.

There was the illusion of our special responsibility as a protector of China, on the basis of John Hay's open door and territorial integrity pronouncements—all this despite our repeated refusal after 1900 to back up our words with force when other powers—first Russia, then Japan—threatened China.

And there was, of course, the sentimental and condescending illusion of Chinese weakness, Chinese gentleness, Chinese passivity, and most serious of all, China's patent incapacity for self-government.

In short, China confirmed our sense of benevolence and moral superiority; it made us feel good. And such feelings have had some political consequences.

During the years after 1911, American sympathies for China were intense. We briefly idolized Sun Yat-sen, even Sun's opponent, Yuan Shih-kai, and finally, after the Sino-Japanese war reopened in 1937, Chiang Kai-shek—a man we had earlier called the Red Marshal. But our assistance to the Chinese republican revolution was minimal, really, and our understanding of the forces within it was pitifully thin. Most of us were barely aware of some darker realities: the sense of humiliation, the xenophobia, the rising nationalism, and the extraordinary talent for social and political organization that lay beneath the temporary chaos of China's response to the West.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN CHINESE CIVIL WAR

So our special unpreparedness relates in part to this century of involvement and the illusions that it created. But it also relates, I think, to more recent history: our involvement in the Chinese civil war.

This committee, Mr. Chairman, is well aware, I know, of the circumstances that drew the United States into a sudden and close wartime alliance with the Chinese Nationalist Government after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Suffice it to say here that that Government, despite elements of promise, had already been seriously undermined by internal and external enemies—the Chinese Communists and the Japanese—as well as inherent weaknesses; and the undermining continued apace in the long years of war. Yet sadly little did we know or comprehend of this, and we developed strong illusions about our Chinese Nationalist ally. Ill-informed on the history of modern China and preoccupied with other aspects of the war and postwar years, Americans were, therefore, profoundly shocked by that Government's collapse—our wartime ally's defeat and exile by the Chinese Communists in 1949.

So I stress again what strikes me as a central tragedy, America's special unpreparedness for the realities of the China problem in the years after World War II—unpreparedness rooted in both our traditional attitudes toward China and our involvement in the Chinese civil war.

SHOCK OF COMMUNIST VICTORY IN CHINA

Now the shock of the Communist victory in China has helped shape our approach to East Asia ever since. It has made us lose sight of big problems and long-term forces; it has forced us back on ill-considered, ad hoc responses to East Asia's instability, and it has made us overly fearful of the revolutionary process in Asia.

Let me try to explain what I mean by tracing some of the consequences of this so-called loss of China that have helped create unsound American policies in East Asia over the past 20 years or so.

In the first place, we seem to have been beguiled by a persistent fear of China on the march. This is a fear with roots in Western history—images of the Golden Horde or even the Yellow Peril, but it is a fear that was clearly reinvigorated by China's intervention in the second stage of the Korean war—an intervention, incidentally, that largely resulted from inadequate communication between Washington and Peking and terrible miscalculations on both sides. It is also a fear fed by Peking's messianic rhetoric—its call for wars of national liberation—and its actions against Tibet and the Indian frontier.

I would certainly not argue that Peking is devoid of aggressive designs; I doubt that any such statement can be made of any great power. But I would urge that a careful distinction be made between a nation's revolutionary visions—its proclaimed aspirations—on the one hand, and its actual capabilities on the other. And I would suggest that we have paid far too much attention to Chinese aspirations as opposed to Chinese capabilities, and that we have generally overestimated the threat.

I would also add that however much we may deplore Chinese military actions in Tibet and on the Indian frontier, these actions were taken in areas that both Peking and Taipei happen to regard as territory belonging to China.

COMMUNIST ALLIANCE WITH FORCES OF NATIONALISM

In the second place, I think the trauma of China's so-called loss seems to have pushed us toward misleading policy generalizations on the basis of unique examples. By this I mean that we have assumed that the success of the Chinese Communist revolution means that similar successes can and may be achieved on the Chinese model in most other parts of the underdeveloped world.

This is certainly what the Chinese claim, but there is little reason to accept their claim without very close scrutiny, and such scrutiny will reveal that the special mix of ingredients that brought the Chinese Communists to power is found in only one other nation in Asia. That nation is Vietnam. The ingredients to which I refer are the early capture by a Communist Party of a significant section of a nation's nationalist movement.

As you know, Chinese communism was in early alliance—in the 1920's—with Chinese nationalism, and when the alliance broke up, significant nationalist elements within the Chinese population retained an allegiance to Marxism-Leninism. Only in the history of Vietnam does one find a similar phenomenon: the early capture of the nationalist anticolonial revolution by indigenous Communist leadership.

FALLACY OF ASIAN DOMINOISM

A third consequence that I see of the "loss of China" relates to the second; in our concern with the containment of Communist China—with a polarized Asia in a sense—we have tended to blur over radical differences among Asian nations and Asian peoples. Here, I fear, is the source of the famous domino theory: a perception that all Asian states will act alike (if you push one, they all fall down)—a perception perhaps grounded in the old subliminal view that all Asians look alike. The domino fallacy seems to me not only inaccurate but insulting to Asians: it denies Asian diversity—the extraordinary historic, geographic, and cultural differences that distinguish Burmese from Thai, Indonesians from Koreans, Cambodians from Vietnamese, what have you.

This is not to say, of course, that one nation's adversity may not send ripples and even waves through other parts of the community—in Asia, as anywhere else. But how significant these ripples, how big these waves, how destructive the consequences (and to whom)—such a calculation requires hard and careful scrutiny of each relevant nation. Too often we have substituted for such scrutiny the simplistic clichés of dominoism.

MYTH OF ASIAN COMMUNISM AS A MONOLITHIC FORCE

There was, of course, a further obvious consequence of the so-called loss of China, a perception not merely of China-on-the-march, but of monolithic communism on the march. Ignorant, again, of the complex history of Chinese communism, we assumed that the Communist victory was simply a Moscow plot and that China would be a Soviet puppet or satellite. Although many observers had predicted a split between Peking and Moscow and then reported its early indications, American policy was far too slow to accept the reality of that split. It was also slow to appreciate the inevitably corrosive impact of conflicting nationalisms on "international communism."

Today, while avoiding such anachronisms as "monolithic" or "international" communism, I regret to note that our statesmen still refer from time to time to "Asian communism" as if it were a monolithic force. In so doing, they retard public understanding.

Now it is deeply depressing but not at all surprising that such perceptions have caused American policymakers to cope with our East Asian relationships less skillfully than one might have hoped. They have caused us, for instance, to assume the role of a highly activist Pacific power—a self-appointed guardian against the assumed floodtide of communism. Perhaps that role was initially unavoidable after the defeat of the Japanese Empire and the retreat of Western colonial powers from the Asian and Pacific region. Yet our fear of the Chinese revolution—and of possible repeat performances of that revolution—has pushed us toward intensification of our paramountcy rather than a sharing of the burdens. Such domination brings us head-on, eventually, into conflict with Asian nationalisms—no matter how selfless our purpose.

Let me hasten to add that I am not one who believes that America has no business in Asia. We entered the China trade in 1784, after the end of our revolutionary war; we became a Pacific territorial power with the acquisition of California and then Alaska; our naval officers ended Japan's isolation in 1853; and our contribution to the modernization of China, Japan, and the Philippines has been of continuous and vital significance.

The question I would pose is not one of whether we are a Pacific power with interests in East Asia. It is, rather, how to use that power—how visibly, how frontally, how uniquely.

PREVENTION OF INSTABILITY

Our post-1949 perceptions of Asia have had another unhealthy result, in my view. In attempting to stem communism we have taken on a different and far more formidable task, the prevention of instability. There is hidden here a false equation: that instability automatically derives from Communist subversion. Sooner or later we must learn otherwise, despite what aid-seeking Asian leaders may tell us from time to time—namely, that instability more often than not derives from economic, social, and political distress; that Communists, where possible, will attempt to use such grievances to advance their cause; but that instability can be cured, in the long run, if ever, only by an attack on its root causes, not by assaults on Communist agitators and their alleged peasant allies.

It is fairly predictable, I think, that instability will be endemic to much of East Asia for the remainder of this century—the gap between aspirations and resources is too great, and the vision of most of Asia's problem-solvers too narrow. Our best response would be, in this situation, to help where we can, in the treatment of root causes; to stand aside where we can't (for reasons, say, of inadequate Asian leadership, or higher American priorities elsewhere); and to keep steady nerves in the face of such instability.

Communists can be skillful at promoting instability; they are less skillful at transforming that instability automatically into a political take-over; and they have not yet shown more magic than the rest of us in perpetuating political rule on an even keel. They are as subject to the forces of nationalism as anyone else.

I would remind you of the non-success of Communist revolutions in the late 1940s—in the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma, for instance—when they fought against true nationalists. To repeat an earlier point: Only in China and Vietnam, where communism early allied itself with the forces of nationalism, were the Communists successful.

ALINEMENT WITH THE STATUS QUO

There is a further by-product of our East Asian perceptions: our fear of communism and our fear of instability has forced us into close alinement with the status quo in most nations. Now that is not really unnatural; you must deal with those who have power. Yet given Asia's instability, those who have power today will probably not have power in five to ten years. And too close an American identification with individuals and elites can result in damage to our reputation and self-image— and by hurt feelings, when such groups are forced out of office.

Here one contributing factor is, of course, our tendency in this democracy to build up and popularize foreign leaders and governments in order to win public support for costly foreign commitments. Our friends in the press are really the major offenders, but our public officials share the habit. A list of those friendly Asian leaders whose pictures have graced the covers of our mass news magazines is a list of men whose political life expectancy is not great; many, of course, have already been removed from the scene. Our tendency toward personalization and glamorization of Asian governments should somehow be resisted.

There is a related point that should be cited—though it may well be unavoidable. Our postwar Asian policies have chronically suffered from what might be termed rhetorical escalation or oversell. In order to sell costly policies in far-off places to the American public, administrations and candidates,—in both parties, I might add—have often oversold what was at stake.

The free world may not actually stand or fall as a result of what happens at Matsu and Quemoy—or in Vietnam, for that matter. But once we have said it does, our stakes in a successful outcome have been radically augmented.

TENDENCY TOWARD BILATERALISM

A final result not only of our perceptions but of our temporary uniqueness as a Pacific protector power after the defeat of Japan has been a tendency to hug to our bosom too tightly nations "on our side." We have moved, of course, quite far from the atmosphere of the 1950s when the concept of neutralism in the cold war seemed to some of us immoral. But we are still prone toward the tightening rather than the loosening of one-to-one relationships with other nations—toward bilateralism rather than multilateralism.

I am increasingly unconvinced that the security of any nation is really advanced by putting all its eggs in one basket. Bilateral agreements are frequently unhappy ones since they often arise out of highly conflicting purposes. For instance, our military assistance to Pakistan was assumed by us to be used, if need be, against China or Russia but, of course was assumed by the Pakistanis to be used against India.

Furthermore, they are self-escalating. No nation every gets quite as much protection out of his protector as he thinks he deserves, and the result is a continuing quarrel.

In addition, such arrangements too often create or sustain a mendicant-philanthropist relationship, eventually irksome for both parties; no one likes to feel either bought or a beggar, and even affluent philanthropists begin to lose patience with those who are ungrateful.

Finally, it seems clear that the short term benefits of a tight relationship with a faraway great power are more than counterbalanced by an inevitably increasing anxiety over one's isolation and vulnerability vis-a-vis one's neighbors. Some day the great power will go home, since he does not live there, and then what will happen?

I have in mind the problem of Thailand, a nation whose traditionally successful diplomacy has always involved a superbly deft balancing act among powers. I am not at all convinced that Thailand's actual security or even sense of security is advanced by today's unnaturally tight bilateral relationship with Washington. Far better to encourage and bring in other investors and protectors to multilaterialize the burden—for instance, Japan, Australia, France, and most especially, in the long run, the Soviet Union.

AMERICA'S OBJECTIVES IN DEALING WITH EAST ASIA

Let me try to make explicit some aspect of the foregoing comments by proposing three areas of overall American objectives in dealing with East Asia over the next five to ten years.

1. We should help to maintain, I think, a strong, prosperous, independent Japan, because of Japan's present economic significance to us and, increasingly, to the region, and because of Japan's potential military role in the region. I would argue myself for a formal United States-Japan partnership of equals as the ideal; but as a minimal aim, we should help the Japanese avoid domination by any outside power, including ourselves.

2. We should seek, as I have suggested, to multilateralize all aspects of our relationships with Asian states. Wherever possible, we should discreetly encourage initiatives by Asian states toward regional cooperation, including cooperation between Communist and non-Communist states, so that Asian nationalisms may be released into constructive channels and the overriding U.S. presence may recede. We should search for opportunities to multilateralize our treaty commitments in East Asia wherever possible. We should take similar action to multilateralize our economic and technical assistance.

And in conjunction with such moves, we should attempt, I think, to shift the rhetoric—and rhetoric is too often the basis of our policy—to shift the rhetoric of our East Asian involvement to conform with the evolving realities of the region: to shift from a narrow view of the dichotomy between the free world and free Asia, on the one hand, and the Communist world or Asian communism on the other, to shift from that more narrow view to a more precise and accurate view of Asia's pluralism and competing nationalisms as well as Communist polycentrism.

Here it might be useful to retire from our vocabulary such misleading concepts as "containment" and the "domino" theory and substitute such concepts as "nondiscrimination" in our relations by which we would mean that we treat all powers alike, Communist or non-Communist, on the basis of their behavior toward us.

3. I would urge that in cooperation with others, we should take steps on the central issue of Asia's future: to help moderate the Chinese revolution in its relations with other nations—here I return to my earlier thoughts—and to assimilate the Chinese state in the international community. Here the specific steps I would propose were fully discussed before this committee in your highly useful China policy hearings of two years ago: In addition to deterrence of possible Chinese aggression, we should, I think, take unilateral actions to remove the remaining prohibitions on travel between China and America; to remove the embargo on trade with Peking in nonstrategic goods—in other words, to put our trade on the same basis as our trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; to bring about Peking's membership in the United Nations General Assembly, and all other appropriate international bodies, on a "dual representation" basis that permits a separate seat for the Nationalist Government on Taiwan; and to press across the board for wider contacts and discussion, formal and informal, high level and low level, between Chinese and American officials.

The objective here would be to offer Peking's present and future leadership and elements within China today who are not yet in positions of leadership, to offer to them through our deeds as well as our words an alternative option to Mao's chosen option of eternal enmity, namely, the alternative option of peaceful coexistence with the United States.

In the short run, we should expect only rejection and denunciation in response to most of these moves; but we would be playing, I think, for very long-term results, and we would be dealing at last with East Asia's central problem.

RECONCILIATION WITH PEKING

I might add that the steps I have listed here seem to fall within the general objective of reconciliation with Peking which President Johnson enunciated on July 12, 1966, and again in the state of the Union message in January 1967. You may recall that he also urged, in 1966, the "free flow of ideas and people and goods"—the last word being the most important in our relations with mainland China, and he also called for "full participation by all nations in the international community under law."

I propose these steps yet again today in support of what might be called the conventional wisdom to which both scholars and the administration apparently subscribe. But I propose them with a heavy sense that time may have passed us by. For while we speak of reconciliation with China, it so happens that we are moving into the fourth year of systematic bombing of China's neighbor and ally, North Vietnam. Clearly no discussion of our response to revolution in Asia, Mr. Chairman, can avoid that matter of most urgent concern to us all, the war in Vietnam.

I myself have long been persuaded that our Vietnam involvement was unwise. It is, moreover, a profoundly depressing case study of our mishandling of an Asian revolutionary problem. We moved in as a result of our shock at the Communist victory in China and the French defeat in Vietnam—a defeat, as I have noted, by a Communist Party that had achieved leadership of a nationalist movement. And at each juncture that we felt ourselves losing our grip, we increased our investment. Opportunities to exit with a modicum of grace were regularly bypassed in the expectation of eventual success. And now that that success seems further off than ever, our stakes have been transformed, and exit is infinitely harder.

VIETNAM—A TEST OF A DOCTRINE

Today there are some American planners, in the universities as well as Washington, who still see Vietnam as the ultimate test of their doctrine. I have in mind those gifted but, in my view, wrongheaded men who have given a new life to the missionary thrust in American foreign relations—who believe that this Nation, in this era, has been granted a threefold endowment of sorts that can transform the world.

That endowment is, they believe, composed of, first, our unsurpassed military might; second, our clear technological supremacy; and third, our allegedly invincible benevolence (our altruism, our affluence, our lack of territorial aspirations).

Together, it is argued, this threefold endowment provides us with the opportunity and the obligation to ease the nations of the earth toward modernization and stability, toward what might be called a full-fledged "Pax American Technocratica."

In reaching toward this goal, Vietnam is seen as the last and crucial test—a test not only of doctrine but a test of our character. Once we have succeeded there, they seem to feel, the road ahead is clear. They are our counterpart to the visionaries of communism's radical left; they are, in a sense, technocracy's own Maoists.

I do not suggest that they govern Washington today, but I do suggest that their doctrine rides high and does pose a danger. It is a doctrine that would perpetuate our East Asian overinvestment in response to the Chinese revolution. And it is a doctrine, in my view, that must be rejected.

The highest test of character is clearly to learn from the past, to admit one's mistakes, and to act on that admission. The record of our East Asian involvement is long and complex; we have done unwise things, we have done hard things, we have done good things—and there is much more good we can do.

But what is asked of us now, I believe, may pose the hardest test yet.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor Thomson, you too have made a very perceptive statement. It is very provocative, and very sensible. Both of you have made a great contribution to the public discussion of this subject.

I will ask one or two questions and then I wish to call on my colleagues. I will reserve most of my questions for later.

LEVEL OF COMPETENCE IN FAR EAST FIELD

I think this question you have really answered in the last part of your statement; namely, how do you assess the present level of competence in our Government in the field of the Far East and Asia?

Mr. THOMSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the level of competence is considerable. Within the ranks—to give a plug for the Foreign

Service on the subject of China—I would make the judgment that in my six years in Government I discovered within the China service, and even within the ranks of the career service on Far Eastern policy in general, as able, trained imaginative minds as one could find in any great university.

I do, on the other hand, feel that much of this talent has not been put to full and effective use, that there are in upper echelons of the administration of our East Asian policy, men of good will, men of great ability, men of sound training, who have succumbed to some of the problems and tensions of bureaucratic life in the past six years—such simple pervasive problems as "executive fatigue". I don't think that you can ask men to deal as long with issues as extraordinarily complex as Vietnam, for instance, and still retain any freshness of thought, still retain a sense of priorities, a sense of possibilities, a sense of alternatives, even an openness to alternatives.

I think, as I say, that executive fatigue makes men dig in their heels and lose a sense of ways to move in new directions.

There is, in addition—it happens here as in any government—a factor of human ego investment when an issue gets as complex, as difficult, as hot as Vietnam, and again I speak respectfully of the able, dedicated men who have tried to grapple with this problem. In a sense their investment over the years in a series of what I believe to be very wrong decisions, their investment is so substantial that it becomes very hard to ask of them—as it would of any, even the most dedicated public servants—to take actions that would explicitly repudiate the decisions that they have been so deeply involved in themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may paraphrase what you have said, it is that there are people in the lower echelons of our Government who understand the problems, but this understanding is not reflected in the policies actually followed by the Government; is that correct?

Mr. THOMSON. I think that is substantially correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I would also ask, do you think our policy is disastrous for the country?

Mr. THOMSON. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse, I believe I will let you ask the next question. That reply rather answered most of my questions.

PROBLEM WITH OUR FOREIGN POLICY

Senator MORSE. I want to say, gentlemen, I think this is terrific testimony.

You know as well as I do what is the matter with our foreign policy. It deals with abstract veritables that are very difficult to get most people to come to grips with. Yet it is testimony such as this, and the abstract principles that it involves, that some way, somehow, we have to get across to the American people for their appraisal before it is too late. I want to thank you for the reference work that you have laid out in these two statements. We could conduct a seminar for some weeks, just using these two lectures as the basis for the seminar.

I find myself, of course, in general agreement with most of your premises. I want to say, Mr. Thomson, there is only one part of your statement I disagree with and that is the very last part when you talk about the American planners in universities as well as in Washington who still see Vietnam as the ultimate test of their doctrine, and then you very accurately set out the basic premises of their doctrine. Then you conclude "I do not suggest that they govern Washington today; but I do suggest that their doctrine rides high and poses a danger." It is my judgment that the warp and woof of their doctrine has woven our foreign policy rug. I think it pretty much outlines the foreign policy of this country today. You take your principles and apply them to any analysis of our foreign policy and I think they are all in that rug.

ADMINISTRATION CONCEPTION OF CONTAINMENT OF CHINA

So that leads me to the first question. In one of his more recent public statements before the press, the Secretary of State for the first time announced what some of us have been saying for a long time was basic to our foreign policy, that one of the reasons we are in Vietnam is to contain China. That word "containment" is an interesting semantic, but apparently part of it involves, as our State Department has demonstrated, a determination on the part of the United States to contain China in the sense of cutting off international intercourse to the maximum extent possible.

My question to you both is, do you think that we can follow this State Department and Pentagon and White House policy of containing China and not end up in an eventual war with China?

Mr. SOLOMON. Let me suggest, as a way of answering your question, that the problem is a matter of China and the United States being squared off against each other in a confrontation of mutual distrust and intense suspicion. This is a summation of China's past experience in dealing with Western powers, and our post-World War II experience with Russia in Europe and China in Korea. Today Vietnam is the immediate, if indirect, focal point of this confrontation; and the problem is how to break out of the bind of mutual misapprehension. It is a problem of action-reaction that, for example, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia at a September 1967 press conference characterized from his own particular perspective. He said, "As long as the Americans are there in Vietnam China cannot yet swallow Cambodia, and what prevents the Americans from swallowing Cambodia is precisely the fact that China has not swallowed Cambodia because of the Americans." So we have an action-reaction problem that involves the whole area along China's borders; and if I may suggest, one of the weaknesses of our public debate on Vietnam is that we have largely isolated the war from problems of the entire region. We have tended to downplay possible moves of a regional character that would lead to a neutralization of the entire area, or agreements reached with the Chinese to mutually avoid involvement in border regions, and through such agreements break out of the present bind of mutual suspicion.

We certainly can accept the fact that the Chinese have many apprehensions about our presence in Indochina. The French and the British, in times past, actively tried to penetrate China from there; and they, understandably perhaps, doubt our own motives. Yet we also have certain reasons, given China's revolutionary rhetoric if not always her actions, to doubt Chinese intentions. It seems to me that the only way you can work your way out of this kind of a bind is by, in effect, saying, "All right, let's both stay out"; and in this way mutually back away from a situation in which both parties feel threatened.

POLICY OF MUTUAL NON-INVOLVEMENT

Senator MORSE. Are you saying, Professor Solomon, that you think that is the course of action that is going to be followed by either or both countries in the decade ahead?

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, I would hope so; and I must say that in the light of recent diplomatic efforts in Cambodia, and as a result of the recent events associated with the Cultural Revolution in which the Burmese and Cambodians both reacted to increased Chinese subversive efforts in their own countries, that I sensed that we were working toward this kind of an arrangement in which either the Vietnam conflict would be maintained within present limits, or better yet, we would try to work out a neutralization solution for the entire region, using the intermediation of the International Control Commission or one or another international agency. I would simply say that I personally hope very much that this is the direction in which we try to move: attempt to communicate to the Chinese that we are interested in a situation of mutual noninvolvement, rather than the present face-to-face, nose-to-nose, confrontation which is partly the result of our current containment policy.

Senator MORSE. I am not quarreling with your hopes. I would like to join you in them.

Sitting in my position, I can't pay too much attention to hopes. I have to face up to what appear to be trends, because it is going to be the trends that will predict the future.

EFFECT ON CHINA OF U.S. ESCALATION OF CONFLICT

So let me give you a hypothetical or two: Supposing we don't succeed in accomplishing what is the greatest escalating drive of our country now in Vietnam—to force a surrender—supposing they just don't surrender. I don't see how they can continue to fight on with great losses that our increasing escalation could produce without eventually coming to a surrender table. But that will involve another question that I will ask you shortly. Suppose they don't surrender and we decide, and there are those who would like to, that we can best force a surrender by moving our divisions up into North Vietnam. Do you think that will increase the danger of China changing her attitude in regard to what to do about our so-called containment policy?

Mr. SOLOMON. I think without question this kind of a move would increase the risks of Chinese intervention. The basic problem at the moment in trying to project trends, however, centers about evaluating the limits of Chinese action set by the domestic turmoil and fragmented leadership on the mainland. The Chinese Communist armies have been committed now to the basic tasks of maintaining public order and providing the political stability which the Communist Party, fractured by the Cultural Revolution, is not able to provide.

There are indications that Lin Piao, at present Mao's heir apparent, is not in a very stable leadership position; and I would say that the outcome of the current Chinese leadership crisis will have a great deal to do with the development of trends affecting China's ability to intervene in conflicts on her borders.

I think there is no question, however, that if the United States puts military forces into North Vietnam, or escalates the level of conflict, this cannot help but raise anxieties within China. And such moves are likely to strengthen the hands of those Chinese leaders who feel there has to be a more direct military response to our presence there.

CHINESE ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Morse. As you know, I have great respect for the expertise of both of you in regard to your knowledge of China. Are you saying in effect that as of now we can go a long, long way in escalating the war in Vietnam in our endeavor to force them to come to a surrender table and not run very much of a risk that China would give military assistance by manpower and other war operations to come to the defense of North Vietnam?

Mr. Solomon. As I tried to detail in my formal presentation, I think there is a great deal about the present level, and I stress that, the present level of our involvement in Vietnam, which is very pleasing to Mao Tse-tung. This conflict confirms to him that a "people's war," as embodied in the political-military strategy that the Vietcong have developed, is still a very potent strategy of defense and political control. And Mao then says to the doubters among his own people: "Look, what is going on in Vietnam proves the validity of my formula for promoting political participation and national defense within China. It has reaffirmed my revolutionary experience." And, in realistic terms, it seems rather evident that the events of recent months, recent weeks, in Vietnam have tended to prove this; that a "people's war" type of strategy can go on and on in dissipating U.S. strength; that Vietnamese will continue to be recruited into the guerrilla political and military movement with no particular cost to China, with the gain to her of a frustrated U.S. war effort. As well, the success of this guerrilla war gives the Chinese a stronger position in their continuing conflict over ideological supremacy and revolutionary strategy with the Russians. Hence, the present scope of this war is not all against China's interests as Mao sees them, I feel.

If you escalate, however, if you invade North Vietnam or Laos, then obvously the name of the game is changed a great deal. At that point I think the Chinese would have to reassess the state of their own internal stability, assess to what extent they could free up some of their own military forces, and send certain "volunteer" units to fight in Laos or Vietnam. That kind of a decision, I am sure, would be considered, and discussed with a reluctant Hanoi.

EFFECT OF BLOCKADING BORDERS

Senator Morse. The next question, still on this line of questioning is: As we know, large quantities of war supplies manufactured in China, are going to North Vietnam, and then on down to South Vietnam. We know too that other supplies are also going in there from Russia. Some writings indicate that not nearly as large a proportion of the Russian supplies are going into Vietnam through China as they once did, but are going in more directly without using China as a corridor.

Still dealing with the hypothetical, suppose our Government does decide to do what many have advocated for a long time—blockade Haiphong and blockade China. One way to cut off supplies is to cut it off at her borders. Suppose we follow that course of action? Do you think that aspect of a containment policy might provide some reorganization in China with regard to the division you have been testifying about this morning that would unite them, at least for a war activity against the United States?

Mr. SOLOMON. My hunch would be that if, for example, we blockaded or bombed Haiphong harbor this would have the most immediate effect of limiting the Russian element of aid, thus probably tending to strengthen China's influence within North Vietnam. One of the concerns that I think motivates the Chinese is a real determination to prevent the Russians from exercising predominant influence within North Vietnam. Mao perhaps can be said to be more concerned about Russian influence in Vietnam and China than our presence on China's periphery. Is this not one lesson of the Sino-Soviet dispute? Hence, to the extent that our blockade was limited to Haiphong it might very well be viewed by Mao as not an unmixed blessing, limiting Russia's ability to play an active aid role in Hanoi, and forcing a Russian confrontation with us.

On the other hand, however, a blockade of Haiphong would obviously raise the level of tension in Asia; and I expect in the first instance it would force us into a confrontation with the Russians, not the Chinese.

Of course, if you expand the notion of blockade to include the entire China coastline, or her border with North Vietnam, then you obviously are in a very different situation. I myself have not heard that suggested.

Senator MORSE. Don't eliminate any possibility.

[Laughter.]

EFFECT OF BLOCKADE AGAINST CHINA

Since I am talking about hypotheticals, suppose you blockaded China. Do you think they would fight?

Mr. SOLOMON. Put it another way, we know that at present certain war materiel is being transshipped through Cambodia. And one of the things that Prince Sihanouk is so anxious about is that as we tighten our squeeze on land and sea transportation routes through China and North Vietnam we force the North Vietnamese to divert their logistic efforts into areas that threaten Cambodia's security: that is, the North Vietnamese expand their operations in Laos, they try to subvert elements in the Cambodian Army who will help ship materiel through Sihanoukville and then into South Vietnam by way of the so-called Cambodian-American Friendship Road. Hence our efforts to choke off all supply lines into South Vietnam tend to force an escalation of the conflict into Laos and Cambodia. And once the war really gets going in these two countries then you never know where it is going to stop.

CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator MORSE. Both of you gentlemen, in your papers, referred in one degree or another to the inevitability of a change of leadership in China, from natural causes if from none other. We were briefed once before by an authority on China who pointed out that these old

Communist leaders are going to die off and another generation will take over, and then a third, and then a fourth. His point was that by the time they got to the fourth generation you would have an entirely different China through evolution, but it would be a China that would have evolved away from Marxist-Leninism into some form of state socialism coming close in 75 years or so to resembling the state socialism of the Scandinavian countries of today.

What is your view or prediction or guess as to the kind of leadership that you think will follow the present old Communist leaders of China? Will it be a leadership that will be more Marxist-Leninist in its philosophy or in the other direction?

Mr. THOMSON. Senator, let me throw out a quick comment on that. It belongs so clearly in the crystal ball realm that anyone who would pretend to give you an answer is deluding himself. We see through a glass darkly here, and any pretense to an understanding of who will succeed Mao—and even if we knew who he was, what he would do—involves self-delusion.

I do myself believe—and I think Mao Tse-tung believes, which is why he has unleashed "Cultural Revolution,"—that China is in grave danger, from his viewpoint, (I do not regard it as a danger) of gradually evolving more in the direction of the Soviet state, toward a more pragmatic, revisionist form of Marxism-Leninism.

I certainly would not go so far as to hold out the possibility of a Scandinavian ideal coming out of this in the foreseeable future.

My own view is that the pragmatists, the revisionists, those who will want to re-engage in a useful relationship with the Soviet Union and/or with us in order to get the types of equipment and materials that they will need to build national strength—these people will come to the surface in due course, and the steam will go out of the boiler, the revolutionary boiler; that a sort of a "bourgeoisification" of the Chinese Revolution will take place. I think the time span is very long. The pace is so erratic and the demands so great just to keep the people and government unified; it is going to take an enormous amount of administrative energy, and the outcome on terms of a Soviet evolution or a Soviet goal will take far longer than any of us can see ahead at the moment.

Now, Professor Solomon knows far more about this issue than I do.

MAO AND THE COEXISTENCE NOTION

Senator MORSE. I judge from your statements that both of you, at least, are giving some thought to the point of view expressed by some of the China experts that Mao is very much concerned about the growth of the coexistence notion. That coexistence notion develops economic nationalism, and economic nationalism moves away from the economy of Marx and Lenin into an economy of some form of state socialism. These China experts also argue that with the passage of time and the evolutionary forces that take place during the passage of time, China is bound to develop greater literacy; she is bound to develop a higher level of standard of living and that if you are willing to let that passage of time flow, it is certain she is going to end up further away from the doctrine of Mao. They raise the query as to whether or not that isn't one of the concerns that causes the Mao government to use the type of direct action that his group has been using; but that direct action also spends itself with the passage of history or time; that that kind of action always produces a reaction. Every tension is followed by a relaxation, so to speak, and we, in our foreign policy, devoted to this notion of containing China are overlooking that and, therefore, we ought to move away from a containment policy to an intercourse policy which you, Professor Thomson, so eloquently expressed in your paper, and you covered it similarly, Professor Solomon, in yours.

Do you think these abstractions that I am talking about are nevertheless verities that we could help speed up if we would change our policy from that which you outlined? Couldn't we speed this up by an intercourse relationship instead of an isolation relationship?

Mr. THOMSON. I certainly believe we could. I would caution that this is a job that is going to be incumbent on all of China's neighbors, this process of learning to live in the same world with the Chinese Communist revolution and helping to moderate it and helping to assimilate it, and that our role, even if played with the greatest skill, and with a great deal of luck, may be marginal at best to the outcome.

I would nonetheless strongly argue for playing that role because—as has been set forth this morning—the role we are playing now very much serves Mao Tse-tung's purposes, the maintenance of ourselves as the enemy he needs. I believe I would agree with these abstractions that you suggest will all in fact become verities in the long run unless we, by accident or miscalculation, move into a terrible collision of the type that you have spoken of.

TRIPWIRE WHICH WOULD BRING ON CHINESE INTERVENTION

Incidentally, I would just add on an earlier point that it has been our view—those of us in government and outside government—that the tripwires or at least one tripwire which would bring on Chinese intervention in Vietnam, and, therefore, a collision with China despite China's very considerable reluctance to intervene—Mao-Tse-tung, appreciates the situation as it is now, he believes we are bleeding ourselves to death, he believes we are isolating ourselves from the rest of the world, and this ideally suits his purposes. However, the tripwire which many of us, I think, still regard as a tripwire is the following: China cannot tolerate what it regards as a real threat to its own frontiers. This means, as a corollary, that China cannot tolerate the displacement of a friendly neighbor on its immediate frontier by an unfriendly neighbor or an unknown quantity. Ergo, any imminent threat to North Vietnam as a state that would imply to China that North Vietnam was to be displaced as a state, as a friendly state, and replaced by another state, would, we have always believed, bring on almost automatically greatly intensified Chinese involvement in North Vietnam and, in effect, an intervention in North Vietnam.

This is a two-sided threat: the North Vietnamese would prefer that the Chinese not come in, and the Chinese would prefer not to come in; but engagement of this tripwire by us would be an invasion of North Vietnam or else close and destructive bombing near the China border which might accidentally spill over into China. Those of us who have looked at the China problem inside and outside government have always warned of these tripwires, and I suggest they still are relevant despite the commotion in China because one point on which I think Maoists and anti-Maoists and virtually everyone else in China would agree today is that America is an imperialist power, is posing a threat to China and China cannot tolerate, I want to say, the crossing of this tripwire.

MULTILATERALISM

Senator **Morse**. I agree with that thought except the one suggestion you made in the last statement. I don't see any chance of our so-called neighbors participating in the type of intercourse that was set out in my hypothetical until the United States acts first. Unless we are willing to change our course and participate in this type of intercourse, there is not one country that is going to go along with us if we are going to exercise this containment policy. It contains them, too. This containment policy isn't going to accept that kind of intercourse on their part. That would be considered quite anti-American. That is why I like your use of the term multilateralism because you are not going to have a multilateral program until we first reverse ourselves, because ours isn't multilateral. It is clearly unilateral, and is based upon our making the decisions for them. That is what Asia isn't going to accept.

Mr. **Thomson**. I might just comment very briefly, Senator, that I think you are absolutely right, although some of our friends and relations—for instance the Canadians and the Australians, neither of which recognize Communist China—have in fact in recent years moved rather heavily into economic relations with China despite our disinclination to encourage them to do it. I do agree that if we were to ease up ourselves a number of others would follow suit and that would in the very long run be a very healthy step.

ATTITUDE OF ALOOFNESS TOWARD CHINA

Mr. **Solomon**. Senator, if I may add another perspective on these general comments, let me suggest that an American attitude of aloofness, rather than an attempt to develop intercourse with China, would be most productive over the next five or ten years because it will probably take at least that period of time for the Chinese leadership to sort itself out and reach a state of equilibrium and confidence, given the present leadership crisis and Mao's eventual death.

As well, we infer from internal debates among the leaders of China, and accusations that Mao has made against his opponents, that some influential Chinese have advocated what are called the three reconciliations and the one reduction, one reduction being a matter of reducing aid to insurgencies or people's war struggles abroad, and the reconciliations being with the United States, the Soviet Union, and with so-called revisionist element at home.

Now, the problem, and our opportunity, is how we might encourage these less hostile leadership elements in the continuing authority and policy crisis over the next five or ten years. It seems to me that a policy of promoting intercourse, because of its intrusive nature, would likely raise Chinese anxieties, or give the more anti-foreign leaders a pretext that can be used to heighten international tensions—as by attacking visiting American professors or journalists as being spies.

This could lead to very nasty incidents. Let us imagine, for example, that American journalists or diplomats had been subjected to the indignities which British, French, and Russian public officials have been subjected to in Peking during the course of the so-called cultural revolution. I think the American public reaction would be very swift and very indignant; and it very well could lead to a period of serious international tension.

Hence, perhaps the best posture for us to adopt is one of aloofness, in which we stand back while the Chinese put their house in order. Is it not likely that the farther back we stand, the less intrusive or threatening we seem to be, the more likely it is that relatively moderate leaders will emerge out of the present situation of divided leadership?

Of course, as the Chinese themselves come to seek out orderly foreign economic and political contacts we should encourage them in directions which are of mutual interest. But would this not develop most effectively out of a meeting halfway rather than by, in a sense, foisting on them trade and journalistic relationships, exchanges of professors—contacts which at this stage of the game would just stimulate insecurities related to their own internal divisions and their memories of past dealings with foreigners

Senator MORSE. I would not force it on them. I would simply give it to them if they asked for it. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen.

WRONG-HEADED AMERICAN PLANNERS

I would like to have the comments of both of you on a couple of general propositions. I will start off by referring to Professor Thomson's statement: "Today there are some American planners, in the universities as well as Washington, who still see Vietnam as the ultimate test of their doctrine. I have in mind those gifted but wrong-headed men who have given a new life to the missionary thrust in American foreign relations."

Just so I can be clear about whom you are talking, you don't mean, I take it, either the Bermuda group or the Tuxedo group or Dr. Fairbank or Dr. Reischauer? You are not talking about them, I take it, or their statements in that?

Mr. THOMSON. No, sir; I am not speaking of any of those esteemed colleagues you just cited. I don't think it is useful to try to pinpoint it.

Senator CASE. I don't want to personalize or get into any controversies, but I am just trying to get at what you are really concerned about.

Mr. THOMSON. What I am concerned about is really a contemporary manifestation of a theme in American history. You know it was Jefferson who said that the American Revolution was intended for all mankind. In the many decades since that vision was projected, there have been some—there have been basically two types of strategies. One was that we should stand more or less as a beacon and an example—a more passive form—demonstrating to the world one form of development and hopefully the form of development that they would emulate in due course.

Senator CASE. Be more rhetorical than activist?

Mr. THOMSON. Right.

But improve our society, show who we are, bring them here, and hope that in the long run other nations will develop through the same kinds of revolution and democratic processes which we have evolved here.

There has been however—particularly toward the end of the last century—a more activist thrust, a hope that we could not only show them from afar but help them do it; and that moves awfully close in due course to doing it for them.

Senator CASE. Then you are really talking about the Max Millikans and the school that believes in helping these countries take off industrially on the assumption that industrial development is good, and that it is possible to help an undeveloped country move from a stagnant situation economically and socially into a dynamic one by outside aid and that this is the way to do it. This is part of it, is it not?

Mr. THOMSON. Yes; you cited, again, a respected and distinguished colleague.

Senator CASE. Right, a friend of both of ours.

Mr. THOMSON. Right.

APPLICABILITY OF U.S. TECHNIQUES TO ALIEN CULTURES

I would say that in general I am speaking about a tendency within our social sciences and our development-minded people, in conjunction with tendencies within some of the more enlightened of our military people. I think it was this conjunction that gave birth to the concept of counterinsurgency as a constructive, both military and economic action that could help transform revolutionary situations in our direction.

All I am asking, all I am suggesting, is that on the basis of experience, and particularly Vietnam experience but also elsewhere, we stand back a few paces and reexamine how successfully applicable that strategy, born as I say, of gifted social science minds, techniques, technology; how really applicable it can be in these highly alien cultural, historic, and geographic situations that we so barely understand—and, furthermore, I might add how entirely applicable our own experience is, because our development is unique as a nation. We never had a real feudal class, we never went through that form of revolution that even many Europeans did. We have had a much more egalitarian situation, so we are hard put to understand some of the forces within revolutionary situations elsewhere in the world, and our techniques which sound so good may not, on further reflection, be very appropriate.

WHAT IS THE AMERICAN ROLE?

Senator CASE. I sensed this is what you did have in mind. I take it both of you are in agreement on this general proposition that there has been too much missionary spirit on our part, and without characterizing it as arrogance or anything else, it has just not been wise, and practically it is not working very well now.

But what is the role that America should play? How far should we go? For example, I have seen a proposition advanced recently that all foreign aid was bound to be useless, because as soon as the receiving country began to get a little prosperous, unless it were under complete economic and political dictatorship, its people were going to choose the nice things of life, waste their small accumulation of material things in frivolous economic expenditures, for consumer goods of no value instead of the kind of hard thing they ought to be doing and putting their money into capital investments for the future. Therefore, it is said, we are just kidding ourselves when we think there is any possibility of working out under any circumstances any major form of assistance to underdeveloped countries without dictatorship. Is this a part of your thinking, for either or both of you?

Mr. THOMSON. Well, as a quick response, let me just say this was very much why, I think, both of us urged so strongly the concept of multilateral approaches—to defuse the elements of arrogance and individual nationalism that would impinge on the aid process. I myself feel emphatically that the wealthier nations of the world have an obligation to assist the agony of modernization of the rest of them.

Senator CASE. If they can or, in any event, on their own soils?

Mr. THOMSON. No, I think we ought to be careful about, as I say, the missionary impulse—although I am myself a child of missionaries, and I have great admiration for private philanthropy. I am a little alarmed at what happens in what might be called the secularization of philanthropy when States take it on, and particularly when States take it on a one-to-one relationship. What is inevitably involved is the State's prestige, the flag. You have a setback: it is no longer a case of a dedicated group of Presbyterians, say, who are thrown out of a country, it is America's image and America's prestige. That is suddenly at state.

One way to mute it without going back to private philanthropy, as we both said, is to multilateralize every situation, trying to bring in other countries, cushioning devices, intermediate agencies.

STRONG DICTATOR NEEDED IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Senator CASE. I see that, and I would like to have you comment on that point. But what about at the point that you can't help these countries? As soon as they begin to get a little bit of fat it is wasted; it is going to go down the drain unless there is a strong dictator in effect and no democracy whatever controlling these countries?

Mr. THOMSON. Right.

I tend to believe that in most of these alien situations where there are not so far the roots for parliamentary and democratic processes we have had—and have existed in Europe—a kind of centralized state socialism, under some kind of rather dictatorial leadership, will normally emerge and we should keep our cool when this happens.

Senator CASE. That isn't quite the same as I understand this man to be saying, you cannot succeed unless this is done and, therefore, you ought to either stay out entirely or create a dictator.

Mr. THOMSON. I wouldn't try to even impose that philosophical judgment on nations. I think it will probably happen normally. I wouldn't say that it has to happen.

Senator CASE. I know you wouldn't say that it has to happen or else foreign aid is useless.

Mr. THOMSON. I would not myself.

Senator CASE. Sir.

DIVERSION OF AID FUNDS

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, Senator, let me suggest that we have tended to take an overly simple view of, for instance, the phenomenon of corruption and diversion of aid funds or materiel in developing countries.

To a degree this kind of phenomenon represents the fact that people who have power in these underdeveloped societies are so threatened by the turmoil around them that they don't feel they can find security in the few remaining orderly social processes. Hence, they try to set up foreign bank accounts, escape routes to places of foreign safety, or they seek to divert our aid material or funds to private use as a way of providing for a security and a future that they don't feel is attainable within their own society. In a very real sense such behavior is a good indicator that a society isn't working very effectively, that it isn't holding together. This is something we saw in China in the late 1940s; and we see some evidence of it in Vietnam today.

WHERE ECONOMIC AID PAYS OFF

Yet it isn't a phenomenon that is an inevitable part of being underdeveloped. It is an indicator of a sickness or lack of self-confidence in a society. Let me suggest that there are certain conditions where economic aid has real payoffs even in an underdeveloped society. Where you have a leadership with technical skills, with a will to modernize, and able to maintain a relatively healthy political relationship with its own people, they still must face the following dilemma:

In a densely populated peasant society, such as is characteristic of most of the countries of Asia, development capital is "naturally" obtained by taxing it out of the hides of the peasants. To do this the leaders must resort to the kinds of stringent political and economic controls which tend to generate a degree of ill will—particularly where you have a rural population in poverty, and a relatively westernized group of leaders living rather well in the cities. This problem of capital formation helps to create some of the social conditions that gives revolutionary elements discontent that they can turn to their own advantage. One of the useful contributions of a foreign aid program, it seems to me, is that it provides an alternative source of development capital, which presumably means that the leaders in these countries don't have to tax the peasants to the degree that was necessary in tradition.

Another area where we can help is in technical aid: developing and supplying new strains of agricultural crops which will increase farm productivity. Already great progress in this direction has been made in the Philippines. The Chinese on Taiwan have a very successful agricultural aid program in a number of African countries. And the spreading of these technological developments which will increase productivity also facilitate capital accumulation.

Now, if we deny these options to underdeveloped countries just because of the undeniable difficulties and risks associated with aid programs, then it seems to me you are setting up situations which could be used by others who would do us ill or who seek their own security at other people's expense.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator CASE. I am very much obliged. Just one other question now, if I may. Apart from interventionism as a form of assistance, when would you consider intervention as a general principle to guide a country like the United States? Does it have any role beyond that of any other country because of its size and power, technological advances and military power as well as economic power? Does it have any responsibility toward others beyond that of Sweden or any other country, in intervention in foreign matters? Does it have a role which it ought to try to play in maintaining balances of power, tensions between countries, which are the basis for stable conditions in an area, anything of this sort? I wish, if you would, sort of generally talk about that. I am through talking myself.

Mr. Brzezinski came up with one great generalization on that, if you intervene you would cause more trouble than if you didn't. But that isn't saying very much.

Mr. THOMSON. I am not sure I can give you a much more precise rule. Unlike Sweden—you mentioned Sweden—we are a major nuclear power and, therefore, we do have an initial global responsibility to avoid superpower confrontations that could lead to nuclear war. That seems to me one special obligation we have. We also, therefore, have to make judgments as a corollary as to what kind of situations of instability in a perpetually, perennially unstable world might lead to nuclear war, and we should indulge in preventive diplomacy to try to mute conflicts that may not involve us, but could pull us in, on the basis of a careful calculation as to whether these conflicts might lead to a superpower confrontation. Beyond that, I am not at this moment filled with ideas about what special further obligations we have.

This problem of calculating when instability is going to upset a balance of power sufficiently to bring on superpower and nuclear confrontation—that calculation is a very difficult one to make and too often we have made it out of premature panic without sufficient knowledge of the realities of the situation. This, I do believe, as we have suggested, was at the root of our intervention in Vietnam from 1950 onward—our support of the French and our intervention—because we did misread that situation as one that involved China spilling over and, therefore, required us to contain this great force. I think that was a misreading because we did not understand the uniqueness of the Vietnamese revolutionary situation—and really it is detached in a sense from the China mainland situation. But outside of that superpower confrontation I do not think I can add too much.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, if I may ask Dr. Solomon to respond to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

A NATION'S SECURITY INTERESTS

Mr. SOLOMON. Let me suggest that if we look at what happened to China during the 19th and early 20th centuries, if we examine the international rivalries that caused her so much trouble, it is rather clear that one of the things which motivated the nations who involved themselves in China's domestic politics was the desire to preempt or limit the influence of their foreign rivals. Rather than seeking to do

China ill, they acted out of concern for their own economic or security interests.

It seems to me that one way the United States might take a creative role in international relations, given its relative lack of an ideological orientation towards foreign affairs, is to realize that rivalries and conflicts grow out of these interaction situations where one nation, out of fear of another's intentions, will intervene to try to preempt a rival's involvement or control over a given area. But to the extent that we can work to create mutual understandings with other great powers to the effect that, "All right, we realize you have security concerns; you don't want us involved in certain areas; but we also are not anxious to see you in there at someone else's expense," and thus agree not to disagree, you can defuse these interactive rivalries which have been, I think, one of the main driving forces of past imperialist or international conflicts. Unless we move to break out of these kinds of conflicts we are seriously risking future wars. Almost without exception, such rivalries have led to war in the past.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

Senator GORE. I pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

Senator LAUSCHE. I came in late. I will pass to Senator Cooper.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Cooper.

Senator COOPER. First, I would like to say I appreciate very much both of your statements. I think they have been characterized by moderate thoughts, I note, which are usually absent when people talk about China.

U.S. ROLE IN PROTECTING UNDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

I think both of you have made useful suggestions about policy toward Asia, and undeveloped countries, a policy that in the past has been so confusing. I accept your proposals as very sound, assuming that you had the ideal situation in an undeveloped country with a progressive government, one which was instituting reforms, one that was providing for increasing its food supply and industrial development, and the United States and other countries were overacting in these countries, but I think both of you, particularly you, Mr. Solomon, have left a question unanswered—I don't think it is an unanswerable question—and that is where you say "a matter of convincing China," as against the Communist revolution, "that she cannot cheaply attain security on her own borders at the expense of the political integrity of her neighbors, yet assuring her through the restrained and constructive use of our national power that we present no intrusive threat to her domestic security."

Assuming it is not an ideal situation, but one that at least shows signs of progress and there was this threat to the security of a neighbor or to an undeveloped country, what would be the role of the United States then?

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, sir, I think this is the bind we face in the Vietnam situation—

Senator COOPER. Yes, I think so.

Mr. SOLOMON. The manner in which this war is resolved will have a very significant impact, I feel, on the subsequent development of our international relations. There is a kind of dialectical swing of mood in our country back and forth between involvement and noninvolvement in foreign affairs; and the thing that concerns me is that if we seek a quick or cheap solution to the present conflict we may just be setting ourselves up for a more violent swing back to intervention at some later date. If the Chinese or Russians can say to themselves, "This strategy of guerrilla insurgency works pretty well," or if one or another Communist group in Latin America can say to themselves, "Despite the power of the U.S. she was licked," we are simply going to be confronted with guerrilla conflicts in other parts of the world at other times. And these future insurgencies are likely to be in areas of much greater concern to us; and we will risk more direct confrontations with nuclear powers. Will our public mood at these times be one of caution and restraint, or an angry desire to intervene in force?

It seems to me the way you begin to reduce the threat of such conflicts is by convincing China there isn't a cheap and dirty way of setting up buffer states under her control or influence; by proving that people's wars aren't simply a foolproof form of intervention in a nuclear age that won't be met by any particular response on our part.

A more hopeful element in this picture is that the Chinese seem sensitive to the fact that where you have a relatively stable, or what might be termed a progressive regime, the opportunities for subversion by a people's war strategy are highly limited. In such situations they will have to resort to more conventional means of exercising their influence; and to the degree we can encourage or assist smaller nations in strengthening themselves against subversive pressures, we will limit the opportunities the Chinese might have to be a disruptive power, and encourage their behavior in directions we can live with. But our efforts in this direction must be more indirect or aloof. And where China senses there are not easy opportunities for promoting people's wars, we will probably find her acting in ways that are more—that we view as less threatening, put it that way.

Senator COOPER. I think myself that many of these undeveloped countries will do better in protecting themselves against any state, whether China or Russia or the United States, if we are not there with a great presence.

U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN

But I note both of you, and in a way I won't say it is contradictory, but Professor Thomson says in point one we should help to maintain a strong prosperous independent Japan, and then you suggest then there are exceptions, that the larger states, the stronger states, we should have a very strong direct connections with them. Both of you have argued against it generally, yet there are some states such as India, Japan, other countries that if they were attacked our security interests would then demand that we do something, looking both at the economic side and the military side.

Mr. THOMSON. Senator, on the subject of Japan, I would emphasize my view, which I haven't spelled out, that Japan is a very, very special case. It is the one totally industrialized great power in East Asia. It has to be put aside from the rest of Asia, including India. It is our second best trading partner. We are Japan's No. 1 trading partner. There is a relationship here that does affect our economy and Japan's economy; and here we have a natural tie as opposed to merely a paper treaty relationship.

Japan also, of course, has the capability of producing nuclear weapons in due course if she chooses, of becoming a major military power if she so chooses. What I was trying to say in my point one was that as an optimal aim, we should seek a partnership of equals, by which I do not mean an excessive American presence and I do not mean a dominating relationship at all. I just mean a relationship which is grounded in the realities of our mutual interaction, basically economic.

But I do add there that as a minimal aim—and here some of my policymaking friends would disagree—that we should help the Japanese avoid domination by any outside power including ourselves, and that means we should not be fearful if the Japanese wanted a much looser partnership or perhaps no partnership at all, just a relationship in which our paths, where they converged, and otherwise didn't. We should not regard this as some terrible setback for our flag because the Japanese are pursuing an independent foreign policy. I think Japan would feel better about the world and would feel it would be making more of a contribution if it did pursue an independent foreign policy—which it has begun to do since coming out of its wartime trauma in more recent years.

LONGSTANDING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Senator Cooper. One other question, Mr. Chairman. We also turn to Vietnam, which is natural these days and my questions suggested if those in authority, in higher authority, would have been as wise as some others are, I would say accepting your views, things might have been different. But after all we were not advising the Government, I assume when we got involved, and I think we did get involved, didn't we, as early as 1949, and 1950 under the administration of President Truman. We got involved again when President Eisenhower offered long-term aid to Vietnam and sent some military advisers. We became more deeply involved under the administration of President Kennedy and, of course, under the present administration we have progressively gotten more and more deeply involved. This experience about Vietnam has developed, even the judgments you now make or nearly all of us now make are based upon a study of the past when matters have already occurred; isn't that correct?

I have no fault to find now about discussions concerning what we should do about the future, or about debate about what to do now as I have said at various times. But I think there is a tendency for us to look at this present impasse as a new question when in fact we have become progressively more deeply involved with it since 1949.

OUR EVALUATION OF CHINESE THREAT

Mr. Solomon. Let me suggest that what is new, Senator, is our evaluation of the Chinese threat. When these initial security commitments were made we proceeded on assumptions grown from our European experience that China's expansion would be through direct military means: a matter of her national armies crossing international boundaries. And the world as it looked in the 1950s—China's border conflict with India, the Taiwan Straits crises, and Korea—tended to perpetuate the notion that the Chinese threat was a matter of direct military intervention.

Now in this period, we may have made a reasonable assessment of the problem; or put it another way, it might have been irresponsible of our public leaders not to have assumed that the Chinese were a direct military threat.

What we have seen in more recent years is a Chinese reajustment of strategy; and we cannot estimate the degree to which this readjustment is a reflection of the fact we have successfully countered them at a direct level of confrontation. But the fact remains that the threat, as we now find it, is of a very different order of magnitude. It is of a very different quality. And the question now is whether we can restructure our commitments and involvement in this part of the world in such a way that we respond to the threat as it has in fact turned out to be, and as it may develop in the future.

Senator COOPER. I think you are right. I think you are right, we have learned and are learning through the experience in Vietnam, but there is a tendency to look at actions we took at the time in the light of how we would look at them today. There were entirely different circumstances there. I think they may have been wrong but they nevertheless were taken.

Mr. THOMSON. May I just comment, sir?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

UNIQUENESS OF VIETNAM SITUATION

Mr. THOMSON. I would certainly agree with that. I would think many of the steps we took from 1949, 1950, onward seemed plausible at that time, within the immediate circumstances although had we had better expertise available to bring to bear on the problem even in those early periods; I think that many of these decisions could have been avoided, would have seemed less plausible even in the light of the expertise at that time; and, of course, in terms of hindsight this is a process of really collective error, cumulative error, collective guilt by both parties, a long and tragic and deep involvement, and at each stage the error and the guilt is compounded.

We could and should learn from the past. I would just throw in one comment, and that is that we don't always learn the right lessons from the past, and one of the lessons we may learn from Vietnam which may not be the right lesson is that we should never get that deeply involved in an underdeveloped far-away country. I am not sure that this is the appropriate lesson. The real lesson is the uniqueness of the Vietnam situation, the unique complex of forces there, which made success in that enterprise so highly improbable even if you looked at it in 1949.

I would add that we must learn not that we should never get quite so deeply involved in an undeveloped country, but learn rather that each of these situations is unique, and that we must examine each of these—whether it is Bolivia or whatever, Venezuela, we have to look at the special mix of circumstances there and not generalize, not generalize, whether out of our European experience or our China experience or our Vietnam experience. This is the terrible tendency of our society, as we go through these times of agony.

LIMITED VIETNAM UNDERSTANDING IN UNITED STATES

Senator CASE. If the Senator would yield, was there this expertise around? Didn't most of this business, these institutions in which you are now active, didn't most of them spring up and get vigorous afterward? Wasn't the main trouble really that our concentration was on Europe, and we let the French come back, without very much thought about the Asian problem itself? Isn't this true?

Mr. THOMSON. That is entirely true; and, our problems with the French and the British, were compounded, of course, by the absence—although we have and have had very good expertise on the major states of Asia, Japan, and China, throughout much of the century—of expertise available on Southeast Asia, and particularly on the French colonies there because, by and large, these were viewed as an extension of the metropole power. Our gifted public servants, Foreign Service personnel overseas and the like who worked on the problem were European specialists, trained in France, who served in Brussels and Paris and were sent out to Embassy Saigon with an ability to communicate with the elites, but no Vietnamese linguistic skills until recently, no knowledge of how to communicate with levels below the elite; and this compounded our knowledge and training gap.

Our universities were similarly limited in their Vietnam understanding until recent years.

Senator CASE. If this was a lesson in the broader sense it means we had better get busy in similar activity in Africa and other places and develop as much as we can a real understanding of the problems in each area, is that not true?

Mr. THOMSON. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche, do you wish to proceed now?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes; I would like to ask a question or two.

AVOIDANCE OF JAPANESE DOMINATION BY AN OUTSIDE POWER

With respect to East Asia you recommend the maintenance of a strong prosperous independent Japan, the acceptance of Japan into a partnership of equals, and that, as a minimal aim, we should help the Japanese avoid domination by any outside power. What outside power do you primarily have in mind?

Mr. THOMSON. Traditionally, Senator Lausche, and I think even today, the power that Japan has feared most is Russia—and, now, of course, China. In a sense the Japanese fear of Russia is much more deep rooted and abiding and may rise to the surface yet again. China, however, does pose a real long-term threat because of its size, with its nuclear capability and the like.

Senator LAUSCHE. When you say we should help the Japanese avoid domination by an outside power, by which you mean Russia and China, how far would you proceed in taking on obligations for the United States to insure an avoidance of domination?

Mr. THOMSON. Sir, I would proceed as far as—well, in two regards: I would keep at the forefront of our thinking the continued health of the Japanese economy, which is highly dependent on a very mutually beneficial trade with us, that is, of course, infinitely more important to Japan than to us, it being primarily a trading power. And I would also use our deterrent instruments.

Senator LAUSCHE. What are they?

Mr. THOMSON. Our nuclear capabilities through offering to Japan and maintaining for Japan in effect an umbrella, a nuclear umbrella, lest Japan succumb to or be undermined by threats, nuclear threats, from either the Soviet Union or China. I don't see these threats in the immediate future, but I think the Japanese sense of security would be advanced by such an umbrella, ideally such an umbrella in which at least one other nuclear power participated, hopefully even the Soviet Union, which, of course, has been developing also good communications, a good trading relationship and travel and the like with Japan.

EFFECT OF NUCLEAR POWER PROTECTION FOR JAPAN

Senator LAUSCHE. If we commit ourselves to provide nuclear power protection to Japan, don't we become involved to a degree far in excess of what you have argued our involvement should be in the lands distant from the United States?

Mr. THOMSON. I don't believe so, sir, because I think that, as I said a little earlier, the avoidance of nuclear power confrontation—and a nuclear exchange—is, I assume to be, sort of the paramount objective of American foreign policy worldwide, and anything we can do to avert threats or nuclear blackmail against major allies can go far toward averting that nuclear exchange.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you take the position that the fall of Japan to either Red China or to Russia, would be of such grave consequence that it would justify the United States going to the full extent of using atomic power to prevent such a fall?

Mr. THOMSON. You take me in that question, sir, down a very long track. I would say that the fall of Japan or the occupation of Japan or the seizure of Japan and Japan's immense productive capabilities, industrial, military and the like, to a hostile power, to a power that did not—that was intensely hostile to our interests—would be something we must try to avert. I would hope that we would be able to avert it long before we ever got down to the end of that track and began using nuclear weapons, because I have always believed that the use of nuclear weapons probably defeats whatever objectives you originally had in mind.

DOMINATION BY THE UNITED STATES

Senator LAUSCHE. What if we could not avoid domination of Japan by either Russia or China, what would you do?

Mr. THOMSON. I would have to—I am not trying to avoid your question, sir—but I would have to look at the circumstances at the time, and I do not think that a hypothetical answer or an answer to quite such a hypothetical situation would be very responsible.

Senator LAUSCHE. Am I to take your statement at its full value when you say we should help the Japanese avoid domination by any outside power?

Mr. THOMSON. Yes; you may take that at face value.

Senator LAUSCHE. And by outside power you also mean the United States?

Mr. THOMSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are you of the belief that Japan is in danger of being dominated by the United States now?

Mr. THOMSON. I don't think so much as I would have, say, five or ten years ago.

The reason why I include ourselves in that statement relates to the fact that I am so impressed with the force of nationalism in any of these nations—and we have seen in the past the potency of Japanese nationalism. It would not serve our purposes at all well to put ourselves into a situation where Japanese nationalism was focused in hostility against us.

U.S. PROPOSALS TOWARD MULTILATERALISM

Senator LAUSCHE. Getting down to the subject of mulilateral associations with the view to eliminating frictions and bringing about peace in East Asia, hasn't the President of the United States been promoting multilateral action—and particularly through the establishing of the Asian Development Bank in his declaration that if peace came about, we would proceed to give financial aid that would help the economy not only of South Vietnam and the other former Indochina nations, but also North Vietnam?

Mr. THOMSON. That is correct, sir. I believe the Asian Development Bank was a major step forward on our part, and we did take the leadership, having initially been less willing; but in the course of the President's Johns Hopkins speech of April 1965, we did make a pledge to that Bank, which has helped it get moving, and we also made the pledge that you have cited to bring to bear on the problems of postwar Southeast Asia a great deal of our largesse.

Senator LAUSCHE. We pledged money of the American taxpayer for the development of the power and water supply and other industrial contributions that can be made through the improvement of the Mekong Valley River. Is that right?

Mr. THOMSON. We did indeed.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. Now, then, it is a fact that our Government has proposed multilateral associations with the view of solving peacefully the economic and social problems in that area?

Mr. THOMSON. That is true, sir. I believe that our rhetoric is very sound on these points. Our actions, both because of the Vietnam war and because of our maintenance of bilateral relationships, our clinging to bilateral relationships—and also, I regret to say, because in past years of the disinclination of the Congress to think well of multilateral international institutions, our actions have not really lived up to the rhetoric, to my great regret.

CONTAINMENT POLICY IN THE 1940'S

Senator LAUSCHE. I will not direct your attention to the discussion that you just had with Senator Cooper about the course of action taken by our country in the late forties and fifties when it and practically all free nations of the world concluded that arrangements were necessary to prevent the expansion of communism by aggression.

Do you agree that in the forties the policy of containment was needed?

Mr. THOMSON. I would not, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would you have opposed the creation of NATO?

Mr. THOMSON. I am sorry, sir, I was speaking of the policy of containment in East Asia but not speaking of the policy of containment in Europe.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let's direct your attention to Europe. Would you have opposed the creation of NATO to stop Russia from expanding westward?

Mr. THOMSON. I would not have opposed it. I did not oppose it—as a relatively small child.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would you have opposed the creation of the Baghdad Pact which was the result of Russia trying to move into Greece and Turkey?

Mr. THOMSON. I do not claim expertise on the subject of Middle East relations. As a naive amateur, my own view has been that the Baghdad, CENTO relationship was more a paper structure and less one that had great use; but I don't, I wouldn't engage in very deep thoughts on this subject.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. Regardless of the wisdom of creating those different pacts, you are of the opinion that conditions have changed in 1968 to the point that the thinking which dominated our Government in the late forties is no longer applicable?

Mr. THOMSON. That is true, sir, and I would also add that the experience that we gained in facing what appeared to be the real threat from victorious Soviet armies in Europe, the experience we gained from there, from that time, was not automatically applicable to other situations. And my own complaint and regret is that we did not look closely enough at other parts of the world before trying to bring to bear on very different types of situations the same kind of apparatus that we had created in Europe which was entirely appropriate to Europe.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

DETERRING CHINA FROM AGGRESSION

I go to your third point now. I notice that you propose that we help moderate the Chinese revolution in its relations with other nations; that we assimilate the Chinese state into the international community. Then you recommend four steps. I will read:

> Here the specific steps I would propose were fully discussed before the committee in your highly useful China policy hearings of two years ago. In addition to deterrence of possible Chinese aggression, we should take unilateral actions to remove the remaining prohibitions on travel between China and America.

How do you continue deterring China from aggression?

Mr. THOMSON. I would continue deterring China by making clear—as you and I spoke earlier of the threat to Japan—making clear our willingness and actually providing a nuclear umbrella, hopefully a multilateral one, to those nations that feel under the threat from China, and by resisting actual Chinese aggression, helping to resist actual Chinese aggression across China's frontiers against other duly constituted states.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you identify the states that are potential victims of Chinese aggression?

Mr. THOMSON. I would assume that they include all of China's neighbors: the Soviet Union being one of them, Pakistan, India, we get into Nepal, we move on to Burma, Thailand, North Vietnam, Laos, North and South Korea, Mongolia, that is about it.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Now, if we are to deter the Chinese from taking aggressive action, by what instrumentality would you deter them?

Mr. THOMSON. By helping to build up the societies on China's frontiers to a situation of self-confidence in strength economically, politically, and the like.

By making clear, sir, our willingness in some of these situations to come to their defense—Mongolia, I think, might be beyond our capabilities, and even countries like Nepal might pose some problems for the Joint Chiefs.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we did build them up economically, and that did not stop the Chinese from aggression, what would you do then?

Mr. THOMSON. I would examine the situation that we confronted then and decide whether it was in our national interest to engage further force required to meet the challenge.

The hypothesis that you are proposing, sir, is that the Chinese do intend—and this is one we can't keep out of our thinking—do in fact intend or might in fact intend such aggression against neighbors. I must add my own doubt that this is in the forefront of Chinese thinking for a lot of reasons including the fact that they have such immense problems to cope with at home that aggression against neighbors is not a very practical policy in the near future. However, I don't rule it out because, as I have said, all great powers have within them the potential for aggressive actions.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why should we worry about China moving against its neighbors?

Mr. THOMSON. I suppose we should worry because small wars can turn into big wars, and big wars can involve us.

Now, some of the neighbors pose a more immediate interest; as I say, our economy and the Japanese economy—it may be small pickings for us, but there is a relationship there. But there are situations like that.

Senator LAUSCHE. But you do concede that we have something to worry about concerning what China does to its neighbors in East Asia?

Mr. THOMSON. We should have a worry about what all great powers do to their neighbors, if and when—well, it is a general principle because small wars can lead to big wars and bring us in, and that is bad. We should worry, therefore, about China, about the Soviet Union, about whatever other great powers may be left.

U.S. SECURITY PACTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Would you suggest we withdraw from the pacts we have in SEATO and ANZUS and CENTO or those with the Philippines and Japan and others?

Mr. THOMSON. I would examine each of those questions, sir, on its own merits. As I say, I would plead total nonexpertise on CENTO. Some of these pacts were created many years ago to avert one kind of threat. The threat may have been changed. It may have even inccreased; in some cases it has decreased. My own view of SEATO was that at the time it was not necessarily a very sound creation, and I must confess that even during my years in government I found very few instances in which the SEATO apparatus seemed to be of any use to us in defending our national interests, including the Vietnam involvement. SEATO was basically an organization with heavy non-Asian participation—it excluded many Asian states and for a while seemed to pose a threat—I don't think it did, but it appeared to pose a threat—to even non-Communist Asian states, neutrals who regarded this as an imposition on Asian terrain. So I would have to take each one of those alliances separately, and I certainly would give you no blanket prescription. As I have said in my comments, I do not want to be counted among those who say we have no business in Asia, have no obligations in Asia, or that we are not an Asian power. We are an Asian power and a Pacific power. I may disagree with the Chairman on this point. But the key question is how we use the power we have, how frontally, how deftly, in what circumstances, et cetera.

AN AMICABLE APPROACH TO CHINA SUGGESTED

Senator LAUSCHE. In substance, you suggest that we adopt an amicable approach to Red China by stopping our trade embargo, by helping them enter the United Nations and so forth. That is correct?

Mr. THOMPSON. I am basically supporting the policy outlined by the President of the United States in July 1966 which called for, as he used the word, "reconciliation" with mainland China—which implied in due course, well, "the free flow of ideas and people and goods," which does imply trade, in my view, and also called for "full participation by all nations," again including China, one would assume, in the international community under law. I am in fact supporting that policy.

My own hope would be that in addition to the fine words, which I applaud, which our administration has been using on this subject, which involves a break from the old containment approach—incidentally, a break brought on, I think, by the hearings two years ago when Professor Barnett proposed "containment without isolation" and the Vice President adopted that phrase, which was more or less a precursor to the President's speech of July 1966 and the state of the Union message in 1967. I am supporting that; I am asking, however, that we implement the words.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

EFFECT OF RECONCILIATION POLICIES ON RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Senator COOPER. Will the Senator yield there at one point? I think it is correct as Dr. Solomon suggested, that the support of these policies would not have the slightest effect immediately upon any betterment of relations between the United States and China.

Mr. THOMSON. That is absolutely true, Senator Cooper, and I tried to stress that in my statement as well. What we are trying to do here through unilateral actions, as well as words, is to lay the basis, to offer the option of an alternative relationship to present, future, and far future Chinese leaders who still believe somewhow that our policy is to destroy the Chinese Communist state, despite the President's call for reconciliation, and who, therefore, have no recourse at the moment but to buy Mao Tse-tung's statement of what we are up to. I am saying that if we could lay such a foundation, in the expectation that it would be totally rejected and denounced for the foreseeable future, we would nonetheless be communicating to elements within this vast organism, China, communicating to elements that we have never so far in the past 20 years been able to get across to; and this, in terms of the ultimate objective, which is the health and coexistence of the international community this would be a very major step forward.

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PULL OUT OF VIETNAM?

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Thomson, there are many who are recommending that we pull out of South Vietnam. Do you recommend we take that action?

Mr. THOMSON. I recommend, Senator, that we find some way to terminate this war. I don't believe that we have——

Senator LAUSCHE. My question is: should we or should we not pull out?

Mr. THOMSON. It may be essential in the course of trying to terminate the war to eventually disinvest. As I have suggested it was an unwise investment. We have lived now for many years——

Senator LAUSCHE. You are still not answering the question. Do you recommend that we pull out?

Mr. THOMSON. I am avoiding a rather explosive term. I think some of these terms like—let me give you a clearer answer. In due course, in my view, as a student of history, we will be out of Vietnam. In due course, sir, we will be out of Vietnam. The only question is how and when. We may be out of Vietnam in 50 years, we may be out of Vietnam in six months. I would prefer some target date between those two, and I would like to see the resources of this Government marshalled to bring that about as they never have been. I do not believe we have a future in South Vietnam, because I don't believe we have a future as a massive presence in any of these countries, and our presence in South Vietnam is extremely massive.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we did pull out immediately, would that be the end of our troubles in East Asia?

Mr. THOMSON. No, sir. I would certainly——

Senator LAUSCHE. Where would our troubles be?

Mr. THOMSON. We are going to have troubles in Southeast Asia as long as we are alive. This is a trouble spot of the world. I suggest we approach it with cool nerves and a sure sense of our national interest, and I do not advocate any immediacy of withdrawal, although I may advocate a shorter term stay than some of my colleagues.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you very much.

U.S. IS A WORLD POWER, NOT ASIAN POWER

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomson, you made a remark that indicated that I though we would not have any influence or be a power in Asia. I don't think that is correct. The point I was making is much the same as you have made, namely, that the physical presence of a colony, a satellite or whatever you want to call it, is what we don't need. Being as large and economically powerful as we are, we are a world power, not an Asian power. We have interests all over the world. That is quite a different thing from creating a colony and having a physical presence there, isn't it?

Mr. THOMSON. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get the idea——

Mr. THOMSON. I was attributing to you, Mr. Chairman, a distinction between our role as a Pacific power as opposed to our role as an East Asian power, and if that is a false attribution I would certainly withdraw it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in the Pacific we do have a physical presence in the size and power of our fleet. You are not advocating we get out of Hawaii, are you?

Mr. THOMSON. No. sir.

Senator GORE. I think you are in agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think we are in disagreement, but the professor said something in an aside that made me think there was a difference.

Mr. THOMSON. A terrible tactical error.

WHO IS OUR ENEMY IN VIETNAM WAR?

The CHAIRMAN. I have a number of questions and I am afraid I can't get to them all, but I have covered most of them. I think, Mr. Thomson, you are aware of a striking lack of agreement as to exactly what type of war is taking place in Vietnam, that is, as to whether it is a civil war or an international war. If it is the latter, who exactly is our real enemy? Would you elaborate a little bit on that?

Mr. THOMSON. I believe there is such a lack of agreement, Mr. Chairman, and I am sorry to say it is not at all surprising that one of our problems within the Government and among policymakers has been a confusion or lack of agreement very much reflecting the confusion and lack of agreement outside the Government—and that this, perhaps, has been one of the sources of what is known as the credibility gap.

I don't think that there has been a conscious effort to change the rationale of our Vietnam involvement from day to day or year to year. I think that the Government is—the administration, like all administrations, is—a collective organism reflecting a number of competing constituencies, and that when you have that organism focused on a problem on which its own components can't really agree, the American public is considerably baffled by the outcome. And this, as a matter of fact, I would say, confusion, sir, as to what kind of a war we are fighting leads inevitably to confusion as to how to end that war.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that.

WAS VIETNAM WAR A CIVIL WAR?

Before our massive intrusion, was this war in the nature of a civil war or not? What is your view about it?

Mr. THOMSON. Well, if you date our arrival on the scene, as I think your question does not, as early as 1949–50 when we supported the French, of course, it was an anticolonial war, a nationalist war in which most of the Vietnamese——

The Chairman. Then subsequent to 1954?

Mr. Thomson. Subsequent to 1954 I would certainly regard it as a civil war.

The Chairman. That is what I mean. It was a civil war going on at the time we became seriously involved, was it not?

Mr. Thomson. I would say so.

The Chairman. Do you agree with that, Mr. Solomon?

Mr. Solomon. Senator, I would say that, like the Chinese Civil War, it is a civil conflict with very strong international implications.

[Laughter.]

The Chairman. Even as early as 1954, 1955, 1956?

Mr. Solomon. In the sense that had, let us say, the Viet Minh come to power, we still would have seen political instability in the underdeveloped world and efforts at subversion. And to respond to the further question you raise, it seems to me that our real enemy, or our problem, is the instability of these underdeveloped countries: political instability, and the willingness—for a variety of reasons—of a number of major powers to involve themselves in that instability.

REVOLUTIONARY OCCURRENCES

Senator Gore. To the international implications will you add revolutionary insurrectionary connotations?

Mr. Solomon. My own feeling is that if these revolutionary or insurrectionary occurrences were only isolated national phenomena—or if you could put a limiting boundary around these unstable areas—they would be of no particular concern to us. In fact we might applaud them. It is only because of their international implications that they are of concern to us.

OPPORTUNITIES TO END THE WAR

The Chairman. Mr. Thomson, do you think we have missed any important opportunities to end the war on terms that would have been compatible with our interests?

Mr. Thomson. I do indeed, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Do you, Mr. Solomon?

Mr. Solomon. I would say certainly so. But one always has a clear vision in hindsight, perhaps.

The Chairman. We have no other alternative but to look at it in hindsight.

U.S. STAKE IN VIETNAM

Mr. Thomson, what is our real stake in Vietnam? To what extent is our security involved for concrete political and strategic reasons?

Mr. Thomson. Well, Mr. Chairman, our stake in Vietnam has been transformed, augmented annually in my view. We had very little, virtually no, stake there at the time we first supported the French and at the time we then displaced the French on a small scale after the Geneva Conference. We read into this situation a stake, as I have suggested, because of our misreading of the Chinese Communist Revolution and our sense that this was merely an extension of it—somehow communism, even China, on the march. We then regarded Vietnam, somewhat later on, as a test of this famous thesis of wars of national liberation, as the other side did, too. If we could beat them there, then the thesis would be disproved worldwide, and that increased our stake in the psychological sense worldwide, we thought, although I must say that I am somewhat less apprehensive than some of my colleagues about the consequences in other revolutionary situations of a "loss" in Vietnam for us. As Mr. Solomon has pointed out, regardless of what happens, the Chinese Communists will claim that they won--that their strategy won, that their strategy was proven out—and they will try, of course, world wide to show, to pass on the news of this success and to encourage other such movements. I do not myself believe that this rhetoric is going to have a profound impact on these situations, perhaps even as profound an impact as Mr. Solomon thinks it might, because I think each of these situations relates to very special ingredients, as I have said, and you will not probably find exactly the same mix of ingredients that you found in Vietnam in other places.

AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

I might just further add, in response to your question, that, of course, our stake in Vietnam was totally transformed once we made the calamitous decision to put in our own ground forces and transform it into our war in a sense, because we created a new American constituency, a quite understandable constituency, those who are related to the troops fighting and dying in Vietnam. And where there had been no national stake, there was now created the stake, of course, summarized in the phrase "support our boys."

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a comment on that, Mr. Solomon?

Mr. SOLOMON. I would just like to add that I think recent history shows rather clearly that, quite apart from the immediate context of our involvements abroad, other powers not immediately involved draw conclusion about how we will use our power. How we do behave in one area suggests how we might behave in another. One obvious example is the Cuban situation: Would there have been a missile confrontation had President Kennedy not shown great reluctance to directly commit American power at the Bay of Pigs? I would suggest that Ex-Chairman Khrushchev drew certain assumptions or lessons from that unwillingness to commit American airpower which then later affected his willingness to take the risks of putting missiles on the island. And as we all know that led to a direct nuclear confrontation.

Senator GORE. Would the Chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

NATIONAL SECURITY SERVED BY A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

Senator GORE. Is it fair to conclude that in the joint view of you distinguished gentlemen while our national security was not involved before the commitment of ground troops in North Vietnam, it is now involved because of the massive involvement, and that that security might be best served by a negotiated settlement or disengagement?

Mr. THOMSON. I certainly agree with you, Senator. My own sense about this is that there is no solution except to force both sides into negotiations—which is why both sides have been resistent to negotiations, because each side realizes that the negotiatory process, once entered, will be difficult to abandon. The pressures would wide will be so strong on both parties to keep the talks going, and furthermore pressures on both sides will be so strong to modify their objectives, that neither side can tolerate a true negotiatory situation, knowing that each side's optimal objectives would be whittled way, way down below what they feel they can tolerate at the moment.

EFFECT OF VIETNAM INVOLVEMENT ON INDONESIA

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomson, has this war served any purpose outside of Vietnam? For example, do you believe, as has been contended, that it is the reason for the defeat of the Communists in Indonesia?

Mr. THOMSON. Well, sir, again, as a student of history, I am somewhat depressed myself at the rewriting of history and the temporary distortion of history that has come out of our national rhetoric on Vietnam—allegations about not only Vietnam's past, about China's intent, but in particular about the specific case that you cite.

It has been widely advertised, I think, despite the best efforts of some who know better, that what took place in Indonesia was a direct result of our firm stand in Vietnam. I myself, I must admit, when I served in Government, did my best to try to find evidence to prove that thesis over quite a period of time, and I failed. I failed because the facts of the matter, as far as one can determine, are simply that the Indonesian Army, which many of us had hoped would stand up to the Communist movement for many years back, finally made its stand when confronted with what one can only term instant mortality. They were down to basically one and a half generals—I say one and a half because General Nasution was wounded, but General Suharto was there—and both these eminent military leaders were faced with either fighting or being killed, and that is a moment at which men act.

The CHAIRMAN. Sort of customary, isn't it?

EFFECT OF RECENT VC OFFENSIVE ON SVN GOVERNMENT

Do you agree with the recent assessments, given by Mr. Rostow publicly that the Vietcong offensive that just recently took place has strengthened the South Vietnam Government?

Mr. THOMSON. I find it difficult myself. I don't sit in positions of high power with access to optimistic reports. I find it very hard myself to accept that interpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. What about you, do you have any comment, Mr. Solomon?

Mr. SOLOMON. I would say the recent events showed clearly that the control infrastructure is still very much in existence on the side of the VC, the NLF. They still have the capability of recruiting, organizing, and equipping large numbers of people.

On the other side of the coin, however, a number of recent developments do perhaps hold the prospect, or might be turned to the advantage of, the Saigon Government. But basically it devolves upon the Saigon Government itself to take advantage of these opportunities. Whether they are capable of doing it or not is something events in the next weeks and months will tell.

EFFECT OF URBANIZATION MOVE

Mr. Thomson. I might just add, Mr. Chairman, some of my respected academic friends in recent months have been very pleased with promising forces they saw at work in Vietnam, promising changes, one of them being urbanization. Some of my social science friends came back and cited the massive move toward urbanization as an element of tremendous promise for our side.

This struck me as slightly dubious, the idea was that once you get them all into the cities, here we know how to deal with them—as we know how to deal, of course, with labor unions, social services, poverty, slums, and the like.

I was not only slightly dubious about our proven ability to deal in that kind of sphere; I also felt that not only was urbanization being caused by antisocial activities such as heavy bombing of rural people, but that in the influx it was inevitable—as happened in China in 1947 and 1948—in the influx of refugees there would be a considerable passing into the cities of the Vietcong apparatus—not to mention inflation, my colleague adds and that rather than being an element of great new security, this posed some rather new problems which I think exploded on us over the past month.

The Chairman. You were thinking of Detroit and Los Angeles and Newark? You have been in the Government. I believe you have referred to it, is that right?

Mr. Thomson. That is right, sir.

RELIABILITY OF OFFICIAL ASSESSMENTS ON VIETNAM

The Chairman. What is your estimate of the reliability of official assessments and the quality of these reports on Vietnam?

Mr. Thomson. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think they are of mixed reliability, like reports from any fallible human beings in situations of stress and pressure. You report not only what you see, you report what you think you see, and you also tend in a situation of stress to report what the man next higher up might want to hear. This happens in American corporate life, university life, and it happens today, I would say, in a government under great stress.

I certainly would make no blanket statement that the information coming forward is all wrong. I think it is a very considerable mix, and the most important factor in making good policy is the know-how to judge the relative merits of pieces of information; and here again, human fallibility and human desire to see the best in situations tends to surface. There is a normal human instinct to emphasize the positive.

The Chairman. You made a previous remark about optimistic statements. I thought you indicated that you thought they were more optimistic than the facts warranted?

Mr. Thomson. That is my own view, yes.

The Chairman. Do you have any view on that, Mr. Solomon?

NATURE OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

Mr. Solomon. No. I would just like to add, Senator, one point concerning the matter of negotiations that we were speaking of a moment ago. I just would add my plea that any negotiated settlement not simply set us up for further instability in Indochina; for any cheap solution is likely to lead this country to a feeling of having been cheated by the other side, a feeling that we have to be extra tough with the Communists. And we would likely see pressures in this country for involvement abroad with an improper lack of restraint or measure. Thus I hope that the negotiations which presumably will come along for settling the Vietnam conflict not simply be limited to Vietnam, but rather will attempt to deal with the instabilities of the entire region; because it is the entire region which is the problem and not simply Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Gentlemen, I think your statements were extraordinarily perceptive and extremely well done. We are gratefully in your debt for taking your time and trouble to present these two statements concerning an area about which I think our knowledge is minimal. We have not given as much attention in the committee or in the country to the kind of problems that you have discussed so well. I think this information will be of great interest to the committee, to the public, and I hope to the Government.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you.

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you.

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The CHAIRMAN. I have a very brief statement which is on another matter, if you will pardon me a moment.

Yesterday, the Secretary of Defense charged that any suggestion that the United States induced the incident on the 4th of August as an excuse to attack North Vietnam was "monstrous." I agree with the Secretary that any such suggestion would be monstrous, but it is equally monstrous to insinuate that any member of the committee holds such an opinion. What Mr. McNamara has done is to impugn the integrity of the committee by suggesting that it believes there was a deliberate, planned conspiracy on his part, or that of his associates, to create the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

I want to make it perfectly clear that to the best of my knowledge no member of the Foreign Relations Committee either in his statement, or suggestion, or by implication has indicated a belief that there was a deliberate conspiracy to create the Gulf of Tonkin crisis. I want also to make it clear that the staff study prepared for this committee contains no suggestion that there was a planned conspiracy involved.

Mr. McNamara does a disservice to this committee and to the truth to suggest that any member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds such an opinion. He suggests a strawman in order to knock it down.

In time, the committee will respond in full to the statement given to the press by Secretary McNamara. The statement of Mr. McNamara was released in spite of my request that he withhold it at least until the committee had an opportunity to consider it. I regret that Mr. McNamara saw fit to disclose only one side of the story.

I may add that we received that statement only a very brief moment before the committee met and none of us had had an opportunity to read it before the meeting started.

SELECTIVE DECLASSIFICATION

The Secretary has not seen fit to declassify information relating to sonar on the *Maddox;* he has kept secret important communications from the task force that indicated doubt about the reported attack on August 4, but released communications that served his purpose; he refers to highly classified information but releases only that which serves his purposes.

Secretary McNamara's statement is a classic example of selective declassification of security material. Everything related to the Tonkin incidents is "secret" except that which the Pentagon deems should be made public. This, I believe, deceives the American public.

Security classification is intended to protect the Nation from an enemy, not to protect one branch of government against another or the public, not to protect the American people from knowledge of mistakes.

I, for one, do not accept as valid the view of Mr. Arthur Sylvester, formerly the press officer of the Pentagon, expressed recently, I think within the past year, that the Government has a right to lie to the people of this country.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

EXAMINATION OF TONKIN GULF INCIDENT

Senator GORE. The committee has been undertaking, as I have understood our efforts, quietly but incisively, to examine the Gulf of Tonkin incident, not to determine whether a war conspiracy existed, but whether mistakes were made, mistakes from which the country might profit—whether, for instance, the attack was entirely unprovoked; whether the reprisal attack was precipitous or only after the reported attack on our ships had been established beyond doubt; whether the attack of 64 planes on North Vietnam was proportionate to the provocation; and through it all whether the Congress and the country, not by design but by mistake, had been misled.

Now since the committee hearing, which heretofore has been on a quiet and incisive basis, has been brought so into public light by the release of Secretary McNamara's statement, I would like briefly, if I may, to refer to some portions of it. I suppose that since communications quoted which heretofore have been top secret to the committee, are all right to refer to now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; now that the Secretary uses them in his statement.

Senator GORE. For instance, on page 17. Here is an evaluation of the Tonkin Bay incident given to the Secretary of Defense by the Director of the Joint Staff, Lt. Gen. David A. Burchinal. The assessments is this: "The actuality of the attack is confirmed."

UNIMPEACHABLE SOURCE

Now the date of that was August 6. In the preceding paragraph there is an assessment given by Vice Adm. Roy L. Johnson. This assessment was given not on August 4, 5, or 6, but on August 14. In the first full paragraph on page 17 I read two sentences:

> In addition to the above, intelligence reports received from a highly classified and unimpeachable source reported that North Vietnam was making preparations to attack our destroyers with two Swatow Boats and with one PT boat if the PT could be made ready in time.

Now, the highly classified source, I take it, is no longer classified after the Secretary's statement yesterday. I do want to comment upon the description of it as unimpeachable. I am not now at liberty to say how it is impeachable in detail, but three instances of this source, as the Chairman will recall, as given to us, were completely in error.

The next sentence, "The same source reported, while the engagement was in progress on August 4, that the attack was underway."

I carefully listened to every minute of proceedings for the six and a half hours. I heard the so-called highly classified and unimpeachable source information. I did not hear any evidence which I thought supported the statement that the source said the attack was underway.

The same source is later referred to on page 5 of the statement. I again read: "During this same time, intelligence sources reported that North Vietnamese vessels stated they had our ships under attack." Did the Chairman hear any evidence to support that statement?

The CHAIRMAN. I did not.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, on page 6 of the statement I read: "For example, I saw a message from the on-scene task group commander which expressed doubts as to the validity of many of the sonar reports." Without identifying the contents of the task force commander's message, I would like to say there were further doubts expressed and recommendations made. I would like to see those declassified.

On page 2, I will not read the entire paragraph, but beginning on page 2 with the first full sentence:

"As I stated then," the remainder of that paragraph undertakes to describe the Secretary's statement in secret session before the committee on August 4, 1964. I submit that in important respects it is not in conformity with the classified statement given to the committte on August 6, and this goes to the question raised in the first sentence of the first paragraph on page 4: "This was an unprovoked attack on a ship of the United States on the high seas."

Now, Mr. Chairman, I regret that the hearing has burst into the public light, but since it has, it seems to me that the committee has no choice but to conduct an incisive examination of the incident so that history may record the truth and the facts, not that it will alleviate whatever error there may be, but that it may help the Nation avoid future mistakes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 1:20 o'clock p.m., the hearing was adjourned subject to call of the chair.)

THE NATURE OF REVOLUTION

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1968

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Morse, Gore, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

The committee resumes today its inquiry into revolutions abroad and their meaning for the United States. Thus far we have heard statements on some of the historical patterns of revolutionary movements and on the origins, course, and implications for the United States of the Chinese revolution.

Our witness today is Prof. Louis Hartz, professor of government, at Harvard University, who will discuss American attitudes toward revolution. Professor Hartz is the author, among other works, of "The Liberal Tradition in America."

Professor Hartz, we are very pleased to have you with us this morning. Will you proceed, sir? You have a prepared statement, I believe.

(The biographic sketch of Professor Hartz follows:)

Biographic Sketch of Professor Louis Hartz

Louis Hartz, Professor of Government at Harvard University, is a native of Youngstown, Ohio. He was graduated from Harvard College and also received his doctorate from Harvard in Political Science. His main fields of concern are political theory and history and he also directs graduate study in the Littauer School of Public Administration.

In 1956 Professor Hartz was awarded the Woodrow Wilson prize of the American Political Science Association for his book, *The Liberal Tradition in America*. He is also the author of *Economic Policy and Democratic Thought* and, most recently, of *The Founding of New Societies*. He has contributed widely to political science and historical periodicals.

Professor Hartz has served as Chairman of the Committee on American Civilization at Harvard, as Commonwealth Lecturer in American History at the University of London, and as Walker-Ames Visiting Professor of American History at the University of Washington. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

STATEMENT OF DR. LOUIS HARTZ, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. Hartz. Thank you very much.

BASIS OF THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, American liberal culture was established by the Puritan migration of the 17th century, rather than by a social revolution, and this fact has made it difficult for us to understand the movement of social revolution abroad. The difficulty, however, was not a critical problem for America in the 18th and 19th centuries, although it is writ large in our response to the European revolutions of that era. It is only in the 20th century that the problem has become entangled with our destiny. Nor is this alone because the content of social revolution has tended to shift from liberalism to collectivism, or even because the revolutionary spirit in its collectivist form has become international in purpose. It is also because, simultaneously with these developments, America itself has emerged as a great power. This has brought us, on the world plane, face to face with an experience of revolution which on the domestic plane we have not had.

There are formal and there are substantive issues involved in the effort of a nation, created out of migration, to understand the experience of revolution. Of course Americans have always had an instinctive feeling for nationalist uprisings, due to their own revolution against Britain, but in the case of social upheaval the grounding of the nation in the Puritan escape from Europe produced from the outset major problems of appreciation. For one thing, the process of migration makes possible a remarkable degree of ease and success for the liberal movement in America, since the old feudal enemies have been left behind in Europe and it is unnecessary to guillotine them or to struggle with their ghosts after death. Hence the Americans have difficulty understanding not only the violence of French revolutions abroad but the fact that they always seem to "fail." To be sure, there is bound to be sympathy for the liberal objectives, since in a liberal society you can hardly get a Burkean rejection of 1789 based on the aristocratic perspectives of the *ancien régime*. But this sympathy is always dampened in the end for the American by the inexplicable inability of the foreigner to be sufficiently moderate, sufficiently successful. Since he has forgotten the significance of his own ancestral flight from the medievalism of Europe, he finds it hard to escape explanations of the situation based on national character.

The formal problem of violence and failure is exacerbated, of course, when the substance of revolution ceases to be liberal and becomes collectivist. Then the American is detached in experience from the very values of the foreign revolution. Actually this difference is not as large as it could be. First of all, even the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolution seek the fulfillment of egalitarian norms which are also enshrined in the liberal ethos: they, too, are "children of the enlightenment." Moreover, since it is not in Paris but in Russia and the East that the collectivist version of revolution triumphs, it is not hard to see that that version seeks to accomplish many of the goals that the liberal version earlier accomplished in the West: the modernization of society as against a feudal background. It is by now practically legendary that Marxism, instead of inheriting developed societies as Marx thought it would, is viewed as itself an instrument of development. But these links, real as they are, do not alter the basic issue. Whatever the origins of collectivism or its uses, it is bound to challenge the faith of a nation that from the outset has been deeply individualistic. And the American, alienated to begin with from social revolution, is bound to be doubly alienated when its leadership passes from Locke to Marx. Even the mild European socialisms of 1848 produced, as all historians of the subject have noted, a distinct break in American attitudes.

LIBERALISM VERSUS COLLECTIVISM

It will always be a fascinating historical problem how a collision ultimately takes place on the world plane between a migrant liberalism and a transformed Marxism. Of course, Marx himself, if he did not foresee the fate of collectivism as an instrument of development, did preach world revolution. And in this sense, from his West European home, he prepared the ground for the world ambitions of Communist ideology. But in the American case, whatever its illusions, one need not have supposed that there would have been a world position. Indeed the thrust of the Puritan migration was precisely to retreat from the world. To be sure the Americans had a sense of mission, but instead of involving a Trotskyite concept of subversion, it involved the notion of a special purity preserved in the New World, of a "little Israel," as Cotton Mather put it. And yet, as it happened, the force of national power brought America onto the world scene at precisely the moment that world communism became grounded in an effective Bolshevik force. The First World War, in fact, can be viewed as the symbol of both developments.

As with all human encounters with new experience, the American confrontation of social revolution on the world plane in the 20th century has evoked both regressive and rational reactions. On the one hand there has been from the outset an impulse to surrender more passionately than ever to the earlier responses, to embellish them with new outbursts of nationalism and messianism. But as these have failed to exorcise the phenomenon of social upheaval, as it has even under Communist auspices steadily gained ground, there has been a pressure to go beyond the old view. That pressure is bound to increase. And as it does, not only will we come closer to the nature of an experience we as a nation did not have, but we are bound to discover, finally, why we did not have it. We are bound to discover the crucial importance for us of the Puritan flight from Europe, just as we are bound to appreciate the complexity of the revolutionary situation that the Puritans left behind. Perhaps this is one of the consolations involved in the sudden need to understand others, that it inevitably leads to a better understanding of self. In any case it is hard to see how we can successfully handle our current encounter with the world of revolution without a considerable increase in both of these virtues.

MIGRATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The legend of the *Mayflower* is the great legend of our history, and yet few Americans realize how thoroughly it excludes from that history the possibility of a social revolution. For if, as we are told, the glory of the Pilgrims was that they fled the social oppressions of Europe, how could they have a revolution against those oppressions after they arrived in America? How could they destroy in the New World the "canon and feudal law" which, as John Adams put it, they deserted in the Old? Of course, not even the settlers of New England, let alone those of the South, were pure liberals of the Lockean type: they were still entangled with aspects of the European medieval order. But the fact is that they did leave behind the central structure of aristocratic Europe, and doing so they escaped not only that structure but the need to destroy it on its own ground. Indeed the very psychology of escape, of getting away, is America's substitute for the European psychology of social revolution. And one cannot help noticing, in viewing that psychology, that it not only projected our ancestors out of Europe but across the entire American continent also. The legend of the covered wagon supplements, in a secondary way, the legend of the *Mayflower*.

It is not hard to show that it was the flight from Europe which made possible the completeness and the ease with which American liberalism triumphed. Who will say that the Puritans and other nonconformists who fought in the English Revolution of the 17th century were, as human beings, essentially different from those of their brethren who came to America? And yet the liberal movement they represented gave way in the end to a restoration. To be sure, it renewed itself again and again throughout English history, but always in a kind of symbiotic struggle with older institutions it could not completely destroy. This, too, of course, is the pattern of liberal history on the continent as well: a succession of violent moments, compromise victories. America escapes this pattern precisely because it leaves behind the medieval ghosts who will not die in Europe. Leaving ghosts behind, according to a certain wisdom, is impossible, for men tend to bring their miseries with them. But curiously, this wisdom must be qualified in the historical sphere, for experience shows that precisely those institutions which a revolutionary cannot destroy he can effectively desert. Indeed I would argue on the basis of the American experience, if it would not confuse my categories too much, that the only really successful revolution is in fact a migration.

Senator Gore. You mean anywhere?

PROBLEM OF CONCEPTUALIZATION

Mr. Hartz. If you can find a place.

Today there are fewer scholars than there would have been 20 years ago who would contend that the American Revolution of the 18th century was itself a social upheaval of the European type. We have moved, actually to some extent because of the education that world experience has given us, steadily away from the mood of J. Franklin Jameson and Charles Beard on this count. At bottom the issue is one of conceptualization. There are facts in the American case, but without a theory of social revolution, grounded in the alteration of social systems and class relations, they can lead us down any number of erroneous paths. It is not enough, if you wish to prove the presence of a social revolution, to collect a list of changes social in character. This is what Professor Jameson did in his epochal Princeton lectures of 1925.[1] The list was long. But it included all manner of developments which no theorist of social revolution, from Marx to Prof. George

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[1] The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement, Princeton, 1926.

Pettee, would have considered relevant to the question. The increase of domestic manufactures which followed the colonial nonimportation agreements did not establish and it did not alter the basic American bourgeois system: it merely promoted the industrial side of it. The burst of settlement beyond the Alleghenies which came from the liquidation of the British restriction of 1763 did not touch an issue of class relations: it merely extended the national bourgeoisie westward. The abolition of imprisonment for debt did not inaugurate the triumph of an American proletariat: it merely protected men from the vicissitudes of currency fluctuation and business risk.

CONTINUITY WITH THE PAST

To be sure, there are other aspects of the American Revolution more vividly reminiscent of the great European upheavals such as the expulsion of the Tories and the confiscation of their estates, the abolition of primogeniture and quitrents, the disestablishment of the Anglican church, and a general loosening of the status atmosphere which took place during the Revolutionary years. But here the problem of conceptualization is, if anything, even more important. For in the very context of the social revolution archtype we have to forge a new category which contains a migration experience outside it. I have already noted that the early American settlers, bourgeois as they were, continued to cling to many feudal habits of mind. No fragment of European culture which migrates outward is a pure organizational form and colonial society was not a lucid embodiment of the theoretical categories of John Locke or Thomas Paine. But it is, of course, one thing for a society to be torn between feudalism and liberalism, and another for it to be centrally liberal but feudal at the margins. That is the problem we face here. The Tories tended to be elitist but they were still bourgeois, and even if it could be demonstrated that more acres of land were confiscated in their case than in the case of the French aristocracy, their social status would be not increased by this fact. Quitrents and primogeniture were falling into disuse even where they existed in America in 1776, which is not surprising, since there was neither a true aristocracy nor a true peasantry on the American land. The revolutionary spirit of social democracy, though real, was merely an intensification of a mood in the colonies which every foreign observer, including Crevecour, had noted since the 17th century. In all of these cases, what we are dealing with is not a revolt but a reflex action, a shaking off by a liberal fragment of Europe of some of the medieval marginalia which clung to it as it migrated across the Atlantic. And this conceptualization, when placed alongside that of the revolutionary archtype, leads us to a conclusion concerning these changes which is not a matter of degree but a matter of kind. The outstanding thing about America's "social revolution," instead of being its break with the past, is its continuity with the past.

DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN THE 18TH CENTURY

It is this continuity, this fulfilling relationship of the Revolution to the migration, which also nourishes the democratic changes politically of the late 18th century in America. American society was already spiritually and socially democratic when the "radicals" created their famous State constitutions in 1776. To be sure, there is a purely imperial element involved here which is important. British colonial policy had not involved the centralized control which prevailed in the French and above all the Spanish colonies of the Western Hemisphere. It had involved a fair amount of "salutary neglect," as Burke put it, which permitted the growth of self-governing institutions in the colonies prior to the revolutionary movement. Indeed, as we know, colonial outrage against the Acts of Trade was due in part to the fact that they represented a departure from the historic British attitude. Hence the American colonists were prepared by prior experience for the responsibilities imposed upon them by their new institutions. It is certainly a matter of relevance that the American leaders were men like Sam Adams and Patrick Henry who had sat in colonial assemblies for years, rather than a group of alienated Latin American creoles whose experience had been confined to the most marginal aspects of government and administration.

But the issue of popular rule is not entirely a matter of leadership, as both the Latin American and the European experience show, but a matter also of the electorate at large. And what we find, when we uncover the relevance of British imperial policy is a hidden reciprocity between the autonomy which that policy nourished and the social milieu generated by the character of the American migration. A culture of independent farmers, bred in puritanism and liberalism, lay at the base of the expanding power of the colonial assemblies. And when those assemblies broke loose from Britain, and converted themselves into popular governments, it was this power which sustained them. Of course, I am not contending that the constitutions of 1776 were entirely democratic, or that American society could have supported them if they were. The old elitist streak continued, yielding a "reaction" during the constitutional era, supporting the leadership of a wealthy Whiggery. It is not until Jackson that the old gentilities collapse, that the American electorate gains full confidence in itself. But Jackson is prefigured by the Revolution, and the democracy of that era is inconceivable without the social support that a liberal society established for the politics of self-government during the colonial time. Step by step, we are led back to the *Mayflower*, to a tiny group of bourgeois settlers who left the basic spirit of feudal subordination behind in Europe in the 17th century.

SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN THE CIVIL WAR

I suppose it is in the Civil War that Americans come closest to the taste of social revolution. But this is not because Northern "capitalism," as some critics argue, overturned Southern "feudalism." Southern society was part of the American bourgeois world, both in the capitalist base of its plantation order and in the Jeffersonian base of its intellectual tradition. Indeed it is this very membership of the South in the American community which is involved in the curious kind of radicalism that the Civil War yielded. For what was at stake here, instead of the clash between two social systems, was the definition of the status of the Negro in terms of the morality of one system: the national liberal system. And this, in its own curious way, was a matter of "revolutionary" distinctions, of pure and uncompromising antitheses. For in a world where men are equal, a slave is either not a man and an object with no rights or he is a man and the necessary recipient of all rights. There is no middle ground here. The Declaration of Independence does not provide for a waiting period before human beings are given their "inalienable rights." It does not provide that only a few "inalienable rights" be given to certain groups of men. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that when the issue of slavery exploded in America, when Garrison arose to claim that the slave was a man rather than an object, the matter could not be contained by the compromise formulae of Clay or Calhoun. America experienced here, within liberal culture, the same intransigent moral confrontations that France experienced when in the 18th century liberal culture faced other cultures. At the same time, without minimizing the intensity of this encounter, which may have been even greater than the French, one is bound to stress again the common premises which contained it on both sides. After Emancipation the North and the South came together again in a unity which historians have described as miraculous. Was it really miraculous? Or was it, like other aspects of American "success," traceable to the cohesion which the Puritan 17th century had implanted forever in American life?

AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS

When the Americans viewed the chain of revolutions that broke out in Europe in the 18th century, they responded, not surprisingly, with the instinct of their history. They welcomed the initial struggle for liberal institutions, especially if it involved the issue of national independence, gathering in public meetings, lighting bonfires, issuing editorials. But when that struggle began to show excessive violence, when it began to involve "hanging and shooting," as one writer noted in the Latin American case, the "mild and merciful" peoples of North America proceeded to withdraw their affection. And, of course, as the current of revolution began to shift from the liberal to the socialist direction, as the Communards appeared in Paris and the Bolsheviks in Moscow, the Americans turned away in practically universal horror. From the French Revolution onward the American response to revolution abroad is like a love affair which is constantly turning sour, like an infatuation which is forever ending in disenchantment.

Of course, this love affair was, from the outset, a reciprocal matter, for the Europeans were enchanted with America as well. But we certainly cannot say that there was any larger analytic wisdom on the European side than on the American. If the Americans did not realize that their responses were governed by the peculiar ease with which migration had delivered them into the liberal world, the Europeans did not realize either that this large fact separated them from the men across the Atlantic. It is notorious that the American Revolution was interpreted by the French as a basis for their own social revolution, and if we are interested in precedents for the Jameson-Beard approach to that Revolution, we can note that they go back on the European side to the 18th century itself. But all that this meant was that, as the Americans withdrew from the radical phases of the European effort, they intruded into the transatlantic revolutionary romance a pathetic note of rejection. One feels this even in connection with revolutionaries who were received in America itself, and even in connection with those who symbolized mainly nationalist aspirations. Does not one feel that Louis Kossuth, for example, for all of the wild enthusiasms which greeted him in the North and West, encountered a final touch of frigidity?

DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN OUTLOOK

There is no need, of course, to argue that the American outlook on revolution abroad was a monolithic one. The visit of Kossuth himself is a case in point, for he was on the whole rejected in the South, which also had a special ax to grind whenever, as in France in 1848, a revolutionary movement tended toward the emancipation of slaves. But the diversity was not merely regional. It was a matter of the political parties as well. We know that the French Revolution was a bone of contention for a period between the Federalists and the Democrats, and the term "Jacobin" entered for decades into the American political vocabulary by virtue of its attachment to Jefferson and his friends. But the matter goes beyond the 18th century. Mr. E. N. Curtis, for example, in a careful study of American editorial reaction to all of the French revolutions of the later period, those of 1830, 1848, and 1871, notes that the Whig press was always more cautious in its sympathy, the Democratic press more unrestrained.[2]

And yet these diversities did not alter the basic pattern of the national response. If they had altered it, if the division between Whig and Democrat had been based on the European revolutionary issues themselves, as when Germany in 1848 split along French lines, we would have to reassess the whole of our history. For then it would be evident that the struggles of Europe were in fact those of America as well, that nothing had been escaped through the colonial migration. But this was far from the case. True, in the polemical shadow world of the 18th century when Democrats were not only Jacobins but Federalists were aristocrats, it was possible for Jefferson actually to believe that his own cause depended to some extent on that of the French. But since the American aristocrats were in fact bourgeois businessmen of the Hamiltonian type, there was no basis for this identification. And it did not prevent Jefferson from joining in the end the national repudiation of the Revolution because of its violence and authoritarianism. By the time we reach the Continental revolutions of 1848, moreover, the Whig aristocrats have themselves become Harrison log cabin Democrats, so that there is hardly a chance even for the illusion in which Jefferson engaged. To be sure, the European revolts had some inspiring influence on the reform movements of the 19th century, as in the case of the labor movement or Transcendentalism or Free Soilism. But this was a far cry from the precipitation of identical struggles such as took place within the European community. When the time came, as with Jefferson, it easily gave way to the disenchantment with Europe arising out of the national perspective.

RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS

There is a sense in which the moderation bred by the American migration experience clashed in its consequence with the democracy which came out of it, insofar as the response to the European revolutions went. For the moderate phases of the European revolutions were, of course, those in which a wealthy Whiggery tended to dominate, both in the case of the French Revolution and succeeding revolts. The democractic phases, when a Jacobinism took over, tended to be the violent phases. Thus we have the paradox, at the very height of the Jacksonian movement, of a universal sympathy even on the part of the Jacksonians for the French Revolution of July which in fact brought to power a big bourgeoisie which the Jacksonians themselves would have overthrown. Of course 1830 was a step forward after Charles X, and it had the additional advantage, from the standpoint of American charm of having Lafayette as one of its leaders. But when one compares the acceptance here with the rejection which took place during the final phase of the French Revolution of 1789, or of 1848 when the Second Republic moved into its radical period, it is easy to see that moderation itself is a virtue when we are dealing with a democratic country which, as Tocqueville put it, "has never had a democratic revolution."

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[2] E. N. Curtis, "American Opinion of the French 19th-Century Revolutions," American Historical Review, vol. XXXI (1924), pp. 249–270.

Of course, there is a tendency for the Jacobin political thrust to coincide in Europe with the emergence of proletarian radicalisms that threaten the bourgeois content of revolution. This was even true in the case of the original French Revolution when the Hébertistes and the Babeuvists appeared, although it is interesting that there is little in the literature of the American revulsion which takes note of them. However, there is no doubt that the appearance of even a mild socialism in 1848, of Ledru Rollin and the national workshops, was enough to produce general American dismay. There was no outcry in America against the suppression of the June revolt of the workers in Paris, as there was none over the suppression of the Communards in 1871. Here was violence, and plenty of it, but it was being used for "order and for law," [3] as one editorial writer put it. Of course, by the time we reached the Russian Revolution, the bourgeois phase of the European revolutionary pattern is telescoped and the proletarian phase extended. The Bolsheviks swallow up what would have been the Jacobin epoch, mingling a maximum of violence and social heresy, and the sympathy of the Americans is confined to the short-lived period of the provisional government. Here was a case where the American romance with European revolution ended peculiarly abruptly, and gave way to a dissaffection which lasted peculiarly long.

I have said that the American attitude toward revolution is a matter both of process and of content. Certainly this is documented in the 18th and 19th centuries. The violence of Europe alienates the American even when the liberal substance is involved, and when the substance is changed the American is alienated quite apart from violence. But the American, of course, is only faintly aware of the historic distinctions involved here, and when he views the Europeans he tends to do so not in terms of history but of character. And yet is character, whether the foreigner at the moment be good or bad, enough to understand him? Is it enough to grasp the problem he faces? Indeed one might ask even other questions. Who is the European if not an American who stayed in Europe? And who is the American if not a European, blessed by the experience of flight, who has arrived in America?

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[3] New York Journal of Commerce, quoted in M. Curti, "The Impact of the Revolutions of 1848 on American Thought," in E. Saveth, Understanding the American Past, Boston, 1954, p. 248.

THE 20TH CENTURY

When one considers our position in the 18th and the 19th centuries, complacently sizing up the European revolutions, awarding them praise or blame in terms of American virtue, it is almost poignant to contemplate the desperate degree to which we have become involved in the current of revolution abroad in the 20th century. And yet there was always, in the sheer isolationism of our earlier position, its sheer subjectivity, a potential for world response. There was the possibility of a nationalist Americanism, a certain democratic messianism, based on the very unconscious reflexes being displayed. It is not surprising that at the moment of the encounter between America and the Bolshevik Revolution these possibilities were the first to fulfill themselves. And indeed, if there were a shred left of the luxurious irresponsibility of the 19th century, one might even be tempted to accept them. But the shift on this score has been complete. Given our world position, reason itself compels us to transcend the old perspectives.

The matter of the nationalist response goes back, in fact, to the moment of the migration itself. For when the English Puritan comes to America, he is no longer completely "English," which means that he has to find a new national identity. And where is that identity to come from if not from Puritanism itself, the ideal part which he has extracted from the English whole and which alone he possesses. Hence the part becomes, as it were a new whole and Puritanism itself blossoms into "Americanism." A crisis of self-definition implicit in the migration experience resolves itself in a new nationalism compounded out of the migrant ideology. The force of that nationalism is felt everywhere in early American politics. When Jefferson calls Hamilton an "aristocrat," what is he implicitly saying if not that Hamilton is somehow outside the legitimate American community, the collective spirit of a nation entirely liberal? And yet Jefferson does not call Hamilton "un-American," though that is in fact what he is saying. The term "Americanism" does not arise until the 20th century, until collectivists have replaced aristocrats as the symbol of alien ideology. But surely this development cannot be disassociated from the presence of an aggressive worldwide Communist movement, fortified by external national power. It was the fate of the Bolshevik Revolution to precipitate a final definition of the ideal nationalism latent from the outset in American life.

Now it cannot be said that this development, whatever its utility in providing reassurance or in fortifying the national will, contributed to a solution of the problem of historical understanding that I have been discussing here. This is not alone because nationalism is an emotion rather than a conceptual tool. It is because the purpose of "Americanist" nationalism had been from the outset, as we have seen, to hide the fragmentary nature of the colonial cultural element which had detached itself from Europe, to inflate the Puritan part into a new whole equal and competitive, as it were, with the national "wholes" of Europe. Under such circumstances, how could it promote an understanding of the uniformity of American bourgeois culture in contrast to that of France, of the ease and speed of American liberal success in contrast to that of Europe? To be sure, the voyage of the Pilgrims is an article of faith in this nationalism, but curiously never in order to expose comparative historical truth. Almost from the outset—which shows how powerful the instinct for the new nationalist identity is—the Pilgrims cease to be escaping European ideologists and become the gods of a special cosmos.

AMERICAN MESSIANISM

Nor is American nationalism wholly without its implications abroad. Since it masks the relativity of American history, since it converts, as it were, an ideology into a universal, it is easy to assume that it can be instantly relevant to all societies. The kind of absolutist evaluations of European experience which we have seen at work in the American response to 19th century revolutions can be reflected in an aggressive outlook on the world plane. I suppose Wilson, with his fond hope that Europe could be immediately democratized and Americanized after the First World War, will always stand as the classic symbol of this view. Nor, once again, can one fail to note the historic coincidence of Wilson and Lenin. For if Wilson dreamt of the American projection in terms of Europe and the peace treaty, the messianism he represented gradually became, as the Bolshevik Revolution expanded, one of the main American responses to it.

In its most modern form this messianism not only projects the nationalist absolutism but some of the very historical illusions that I have been discussing. Indeed nothing perhaps proves more vividly the way in which nationalism fails to solve the analytic problem than its capacity to nourish the distortions of our history which arise from a forgetfulness of its origin. Thus it is often said that the Americans are the traditionally true revolutionaries of the world. It is said that revolution is precisely what America has been given to "export." And the American Revolution is brought forward, as are the sympathies of the French and the other Europeans for it at the time. The whole cluster of ancient misunderstandings is activated. There is a sense, to be sure, in which American bourgeois culture has been "permanently revolutionary." This is in its own internal energies. We are capable of destroying landscapes and reconstructing them, of tearing down buildings and creating new ones, on a scale vaster than any to be found in the world. And in fact this very drive has nourished the immensity of our industrial achievement. But while in an odd sense it is "revolutionary," this orientation flows itself from the emancipations that the initial migration engendered, from the escape from the traditional European order. It is when the middle class is unrestrained by even a memory of feudalism, when its Puritan intensities are given utterly free reign, that we get the American initiative.

AMERICAN EMERGENCE FROM "UNDERDEVELOPMENT"

One cannot help noticing the relevance of this fact to the issue of "underdevelopment" in terms of which, as I have said, the appeal of Marxism has been transformed in the 20th century. After the American Revolution the United States was in a certain economic sense an underdeveloped country, which makes our history analagous to that of newly independent Asian and African countries, not least because some of the difficulty derived from the British colonial system. Indeed, as in new nations today, Americans turned to government for the promotion of needed economic enterprises. And yet, if American industrialization came late, not until the latter half of the 19th century, when it came it was staggeringly successful. And the reason is that it was projected into a tradition which, as I have suggested, was in terms of modernity and utilitarianism even more advanced than that of Europe. We cannot hide the fact that such a tradition does not exist in India or Nigeria. Those countries, as they emerge from colonialism, seek to emerge also from a premodern world of values. They are only beginning to accomplish the cultural break with medievalism which we had accomplished long before our battle against George III.

It may seem that I am being deliberately brutal in this romanticism as a historical norm; I do not subscribe to it as an ethical norm either. Ethically the American revulsion against violence is defensible, and one need not quarrel with the morality of Jerrson's rejection of Bonaparte. But even unattractive things are historical facts. And my point is that no amount of illusion concerning their origin, however spontaneously it arises from familiar experience, can promote a realistic orientation to them.

Granted the pull of the past, our experience today is on the side of realism. That experience alters, indeed in a sense it reverses, our history. For what does it do if not return us to the revolutionary situation that we left behind in Europe in the 17th century? There is an epochal quality about America's world involvement from this point of view which we may not yet adequately appreciate, for few countries can claim so dramatic a shift in their history as a return voyage of the *Mayflower*. Of course, this will not undo the pattern of the past. It will not change the character of the American Revolution, reverse the Jacksonian expansion of the suffrage, or give us a different Civil War. But it will challenge us to reevaluate every one of these events in terms of the escape from revolution which shaped them, and doing so, to reassess our historic response to revolution itself. It will challenge us to see that the difference between Americans and others is not a difference between men but between men caught in different historic situations. If we seize this wisdom, whatever our goals in the world, we will have taken a step toward their achievement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Professor Hartz. That is a very profound statement which, I know, will inspire a great deal of consideration and thought by the committee and the public.

MEANING OF THE TERM "PURITAN"

I would like to try to develop a few thoughts before I call on my colleagues. You refer several times in the beginning to the Puritan aspect of American history and outlook. I wonder if you would explain a little more fully your meaning of the term "Puritan." Just what does that term mean to you?

Mr. HARTZ. I use Puritanism here as a label for the general liberal movement in Western history. Puritanism is a theological formulation of certain ideas, like individualism and equality, which ultimately in a secular form, become the basis of the liberalism we know. For example, the Declaration of Independence is in a sense a Puritan document. Jefferson himself, something of a free thinker, of course, is not theological in that document. But he articulates ideas which were introduced initially into the American colonial culture by essentially a religious people.

In all Western history there is an historical transition from the medieval world into the world of secular liberal values we know today, and that transition tends to be accomplished by the Reformation and its various individualistic formulations.

I use Puritanism in that sense.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for clarification?

The Chairman. Yes, indeed.

INDIVIDUALISM AS A THEOLOGICAL CONCEPT

Senator Gore. I don't quite get your allusion to individualism as being essentially a theological concept.

Mr. Hartz. Well, it is theological, and I rather think significantly so, in the sense that the Reformation stressed the significance of the individual believer as contrasted with revelation and the Church.

Puritanism is in these terms an individualistic dogma, because it stresses the private conscience of the believer. This was also done by Lutheranism and we can say that the Reformation as a whole conspires to promote that orientation.

Senator Gore. Are you referring here to the growth of individualism in the individual concept of religious responsiblity and accountability that grew out of the Reformation in Europe?

Mr. Hartz. That is correct, yes.

Senator Gore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RESTRICTIVE QUALITY IN PURITANISM

The Chairman. I am not quite sure that I quite understand your explanation of Purtanism. I had ascribed to that term somewhat different meanings, a certain restrictive and self-centered, self-rightous attitude more than liberalism. Is this the way you think the term is generally used among historians these days?

Mr. Hartz. Well, your interpretation is a perfectly acceptable one because there were restrictive elements in Puritanism despite its historic contribution to individualism and if you define liberalism now not in the classical historical sense that I am thinking of in my own remarks but as a kind of humane doctrine, a general doctrine of humanity, there can be a clash between some of restrictive moral and spiritual elements in Puritanism and that general humanity.

However, if we concentrate on the strict development of the ideals, let us say, which went into the Declaration of Independence, which I referred to before, then we have to say that Puritanism even in the midst of this harsh quality did contribute very significantly to the development of the ideas involved.

Senator Gore. Will the Chairman yield?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Gore. Do I correctly understand that you say, or imply, that the chairman's interpretation of Puritanism, is to use the secondary definition of another term rather vulgar in concept?

Mr. Hartz. Well, the term vulgar has many connotations. I would say that it is an interpretation which is rather popular, and which to the extent that I have described it as accurate, is perfectly acceptable to me.

I am not myself, for example, a defender of the restrictive aspects of Puritan morality, and, as a matter of fact, some of them have gone into the American frame of mind even on the international plane as we know it. But in historical terms if we are concerning ourselves with how we escaped a revolution and why we have difficulty understanding revolutions elewhere, the movement of Puritanism out of Europe—and by Puritanism I mean to symbolize all nonconformity, all liberalism—is crucial.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't wish to quarrel with you. I am trying to straighten it out. Nonconformity and liberalism, I do submit, at least in some circles, aren't considered Puritan.

I have noticed in news coverage mention of an early characteristic in China and in Russia of certain puritanical aspects, as they say. I don't think they use the words as you are using them. They refer to the abolition of tipping, the complete honesty in hotels. I have read stories that in Peking you can't even get rid of an old sock but they return it to you because of their preoccupation with honesty. It is called a certain puritanical aspect of the regime, but it isn't used in the way you use it.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, yes. The issue is a distinction between two elements within the Puritan ideology. One is a mood, a restrictiveness. Another has to do with certain intrinsic ideas, and these intrinsic ideas detach themselves from the Puritan movement and enter into much more humane formulations.

The CHAIRMAN. It bothers me because I have used the word "Puritan" in a number of statements perhaps erroneously, at least not in accordance with your definition. I have meant it in the sense of narrowness, restrictiveness.

In any case for our present purpose you have explained it.

"FAILURE" OF FRENCH REVOLUTIONS

One statement you made that interests me. Where you say, "Hence the Americans have difficulty in understanding not only the violence of French revolutions abroad, but the fact that they also seem to 'fail'." Do they always? What do you mean by their also seeming to "fail"?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I did put quotation marks around the term "fail" there.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, but I was wondering what you meant by it.

Mr. HARTZ. Yes.

Well, French revolutions always fail in contrast to the enormous success of American democratic developments. For example, if you look at the classic case of the French Revolution, it did not achieve the goals, let us say, of the Jacobins, the democratic participants in that Revolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. It did. I thought it was interrupted and it never completed itself because of Napoleon and other developments; that it was brought back.

Mr. HARTZ. And there was, of course, ultimately a restoration of Bourbons.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. Hartz. And it was necessary to have several other revolutions in the 19th century before you even accomplished anything comparable to a democracy.

ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The Chairman. Could one not say that the Russian revolution has failed in the sense that it has not proceeded? Would you say it has failed?

Mr. Hartz. Well, of course, what is involved in the Russian revolution is a Socialist and Marxist hope outside the American liberal hope, so that the kind of comparative assessment the American would make here would be different in any cast.

However, if we applied the same problem in a general way to the Russian revolution, I would say it exists there as well. I don't think the Russian revolution has in that sense been a success. That is to say I don't think, despite all of the achievements which have come out of it in terms of development and so on, that it has fulfilled the Marxian hope.

The Chairman. Oh, no. But it is still proceeding in a sense, is it not? It is still evolving?

Mr. Hartz. That is correct.

The Chairman. We don't know what has happened to it.

Mr. Hartz. That is right.

The Chairman. But there has not been a return to the *ancien régime* as there was in France.

Mr. Hartz. There has not been that kind of restoration.

The Chairman. And I don't use the word "succeed" in the sense that we would like achieved. But with regard to their own objectives, while they have not been fulfilled, they still think they are proceeding to develop the revolution, don't they?

Mr. Hartz. They certainly do. And one would not deny in all of these cases or at least in the French Revolution and the Russian revolutionary case that the revolution kept evolving for quite a long period. But if we contrast both of these revolutionary experiences with the basic kind of experience with which we are familiar in the United States, it is obvious, again to use quotations around the words involved, that we are far more "successful." We expand the suffrage, and we don't go back. We develop a democratic system and we have got it. The need for a constant pattern of surrender and affirmation is outside a situation where, in fact, you have left your enemies behind.

ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND REVOLUTIONS

The Chairman. I have a number of other questions I will come back to but I wish to yield to my colleagues. I have one last observation: Is it your feeling that because of this lack of experience in a revolution in the French sense, that this makes it difficult for us to understand either the need for, or perhaps the outbreak in some cases of, revolutions in Latin America or anywhere else in the world?

Mr. Hartz. I think there is no question that this is a great interfering element in our understanding of revolutions elsewhere. This is not to justify revolutions elsewhere. It is simply to say that to the extent that a nation is conditioned by its history, we are not conditioned to understand this peculiar kind of experience.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I didn't mean to imply that we should be promoting them or justifying them, but they do occur, not with our connivance.

Mr. HARTZ. Quite right.

The CHAIRMAN. But what do we do with them is the question.

Mr. HARTZ. Quite right.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you venture to say, because of this failure to understand them, that this has a bearing upon what our policy and our attitude should be as a nation?

Mr. HARTZ. I think it has always had a bearing upon our policy. As I said, I think it has had a bearing on our attitude toward the European revolutions of the 19th and 18th centuries, and I think that same influence continues in the 20th century.

I think, however, as I was trying to suggest in my last remarks, that we are currently in the process of outgrowing many of these earlier inabilities to perceive and appreciate on the score of revolution. I am tempted, for example, to think, without exaggerating the significance of our activity here this morning, that the fact that you can have a hearing on social revolutions of this kind is a most eloquent testimony to the fact that the United States has an attitude quite different from what it had in the 19th century on this score. And this would be inevitable, because what I have been arguing is that our historic ability to understand revolutions derives from our experience. Now, we have experience with revolution on the international plane, and for that reason we are learning about it. In the same way that we did not learn about it before, we are learning about it now.

In the last analysis, I think that nations, like human beings, tend to learn centrally from experience.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Morse, do you have a question?

A CHANGE IN AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD REVOLUTIONS

Senator MORSE. Professor Hartz, it is my loss not to have heard your full statement. I scanned it and realize that I am not prepared yet to really discuss without further study what I think are the challenges of the paper in some of its philosophical implications. The only question I would ask you, based upon very inadequate scanning, is regarding the attitudes in our country toward the whole phenomenon of revolution: Is it fair to draw one conclusion that, whereas in our early history there was a tendency on the part of public opinion, for the people of the United States to show a sympathy toward revolutionary movements on the part of populations that seek to free themselves from what is considered to be oppressive rule, to a point now where there doesn't seem to be that same degree of public support in American public opinion or governmental opinion for the interest of people seeking to free themselves from what they consider in their time to be oppressive rule?

I am seeking, Professor, to apply the tenets of your paper which is obviously a brilliant one, to world events of today. We are going to start this week before my Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, hearings based upon studies prepared for us by recognized authorities in the field. I should be very much interested in whether some of the premises those studies can be sustained because they point out reservations as to our policies in Latin America to support regimes that apparently repress revolutions. Do you think that we are coming to an evolutionary change in our governmental and public attitudes toward supporting regimes that repress revolutions?

Revolution in itself is not necessarily bad. It depends on what is being revolted against. I ask you if you think there has been this change over the decades in American policy?

Mr. HARTZ. I think I can begin in answering your question by dealing with the issue of the historical change in our attitude. There is no doubt that there has been a change in our attitude toward revolution. As I tried to suggest, centrally this change is due to the fact that revolution has changed its content in a social way. The French Revolution, after all, was a revolution, for all of the violence in which it engaged, designed to achieve objectives very similar to the ones that we achieved through migration to the United States. Ultimately it sought democracy, it sought individualism. Although there were some radical episodes in that revolution which went beyond, as I suggested, the essential liberal view, they were marginal.

Hence, even though we have difficulty on the purely formal plane, sympathizing with radical phases in a revolution like the French Revolution, substantively we have no difficulty.

When the revolution, however, becomes Socialist and Marxist, when you get the Russian Revolution, for example, as distinct from the French Revolution, you add to the initial difficulty something very, very important, a change in ideological content which alienates this country from the revolutionary movement.

There is a great deal of difference between the objectives of the Bolsheviks and the objectives even of the more radical French Revolutionaries like the Jacobins. The Bolsheviks seek goals that we consider would clash with our way of life. Hence there has been—and you can trace it on the historical plane very clearly, as revolution begins to move, say, in 1848, in a Socialist direction—a change in the American attitude. There is no question about that.

Not only that, because our change in attitude has taken place due to this fact, among the people who are collectivist in orientation, we have ceased to be a revolutionary country as we were for the French in the 18th century. And, as one knows, from their polemic, we are viewed by them as a reactionary country.

AN INSPIRATION TO OPPOSE REVOLUTION

Now, the second part of your question, I believe, was whether this shift in attitude has inspired us, indiscriminately, to oppose revolution. I think there is no question about the fact that this shift in attitude has inspired us to be suspicious of revolution in and of itself in a way which, in the 18th century we were not. We know that Jefferson greeted the French Revolution, and so on.

Revolution per se, at least in the initial stages, didn't trouble us in the 18th or over most of the 19th century. Now revolution does tend to trouble us, and I think because of the shift which I have described.

REVOLUTIONS NOW INVOLVED IN WORLD POLITICS

I also want to add one other factor and that is that revolution has become involved in international politics. For this reason it immediately triggers off a diplomatic consideration which it did not trigger off in the 18th or 19th century. We did not have to assess the French Revolution in terms of world politics, for the most part. We could assess it just as a revolution. But revolution today is so deeply involved in world politics that an additional factor has entered into the picture.

Senator Morse. It is this last point of yours that raises the point I made. You talk about Communist revolutions and Marxist, Leninist revolutions. Of course, that is a revolution against the concepts of economic freedom that we hold dear, and which we believe the preservation of which determines whether we remain politically free. You can have revolutions such as the Marxist revolution; it doesn't make people economically free, but makes the state the economic enslaver. From that standpoint there is, of course, basic instinctive objection on the part of people, such as the people of the United States, who enjoy economic freedom as a goal and objective.

But you can also have revolutions for economic freedom on the part of people who don't have it, and that gets you into the international political situation to which you allude. Although there are great differences of opinion about the hypothetical I now raise, nevertheless I think it will illustrate the difference between whether or not you are going to diplomatically support, or at least not oppose, people who are fighting for economic freedom so that they can become politically free. I hold to the point of view you have to have the first before you can have the latter. But you know there has been quite a debate going on in our country for some time in regard to what we should do, give support or not give support to certain revolutionary trends in Latin America. One of the debates of recent times concerned the position that our Government should have taken in regard to the Dominican Republic uprising of the last few years. There are those who thought that the Bosch movement was communistic. My hypothetical is based on the assumption that it was not; that it sought only to free the people of the Dominican Republic from a military rule that did not promote economic freedom to the degree that the people and the people's leaders thought that it should have. So they sought to overturn the old military-economic complex of the Dominican Republic. Therefore, a division has developed in our country as to whether or not we should have followed the course of action that we followed or insisted upon the return of constitutionalism and not given any support to the military junta that took over. Some of us held to the latter point of view. I use it as a hypothetical though to ask you this final question:

SORTING OUT FACTORS OF A REVOLUTION

Do you think, dealing now with your introduction of international politics and diplomatic policies in evaluating revolutions, that there has been some tendency by us to support a status quo on the part of a government that seeks to prevent the uprising of people who revolt for economic freedom, instead of moving toward further enslavement by way of a Communist revolution?

Mr. Hartz. I think there has been a tendency in that direction, yes. I think it is to be assessed in terms of the very complex task of disentangling issues of national security from issues of social change which have to be viewed in precisely the democratic and humane manner which you suggest.

The problem of such disentanglement, since the issue is a real one, is not a simple problem. But if you were to ask me whether in the arduous task of sorting out factors here, our general suspicion of revolution has not intruded itself, I would be bound to say that in my judgment it has.

Senator Morse. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MEANING OF TERM "DEMOCRATIC"

Professor Hartz, I think your paper is a little too profound to digest in detail without a great deal of study. I am not going to try to pick it to pieces. I am afraid I would be totally unsuccessful if I tried to do that. But I have a few questions that I would like to ask you to clear up. You talk about democratic processes, democracy. What do you mean by that? What do you mean by the term "democratic processes" or "democracy?" I will illustrate what I am trying to inquire about. There is the East German Democratic Republic or the Peoples' Republic of China. What is the authority for what is "democratic" and what isn't democratic? What do you mean by the term?

Mr. Hartz. That, of course, is a very fundamental question, and there is no authority to which, as it were, the world can appeal to resolve these differences.

One of the problems with current ideological debate in contrast, let us say, to debate in the 18th century or even the 19th, is the fact that all sides are using the same terms. In the earlier period aristocracy was placed against democracy and you could pretty well work out your distinctions. But now since everybody is democratic the problem becomes the much more complicated problem of finding out who is, so to speak, authentically democratic and who is not.

Senator Hickenlooper. In what sense would you use it in our own country, let's say. I think perhaps that is a more fair question.

Mr. Hartz. I would like to relate this issue to some of the historical considerations which I have been trying to develop.

For one thing, since our society has, on the whole, been in the United States fairly affluent, fairly democratic to begin with, for us the term "democracy" has tended essentially to have a political meaning. In other societies where social change is necessary the term "democracy" is not necessarily a political term alone. It is perhaps most significantly a social term.

Now, the term "democracy" viewed in this social sense is not easy for the American to understand because he has always by virtue of his migration had a pretty good time socially. This is one of the reasons why certain States and certain philosophers honestly believe themselves to be democratic though from a political point of view it is patently true that they are not. They view themselves as democratic because they see themselves as dedicated to certain social changes in the democratic direction which, since we have never had to make them, we have difficulty understanding.

Senator Hickenlooper. I agree it is a difficult term to define and probably it is a term to be used relatively. But I want to pass on. I don't want to take up too much time.

PURITANISM AND LIBERALISM

You have spent a great deal of time defining Puritanism; what is puritanical or what is Puritanism? What is liberalism under our concept? What is its objective? What does it try to do?

Mr. Hartz. Well, here again the term could be used in many ways. I have used it in my discussion to describe a specific set of ideas which are historically recognizable in the modern period involving essentially the ideals which we identify with the Declaration of Independence, ideals of individualism, equality, and so on.

Now, liberalism outside of that context of historical definition can mean numerous things. A liberal can be a New Dealer, a liberal can be a man with a humane, progressive attitude toward social mores. A liberal can be a person who has certain ideals in the realm of race relations. But I am using the term "liberal" in the historical Declaration of Independence sense, and in that sense all of American culture has been ideologically liberal. I use the term "Puritan", as I have said, as a kind of theological introduction to modern secular liberalism.

Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.

SEVERAL KINDS OF REVOLUTIONS

We have talked about revolution and that, of course, is the basic purpose of your statement—the American attitude toward revolution. I assume there are several kinds of revolution, that is, in the restrictive sense. One could be an armed revolt. Another could be a revolution such as we seem to be having nowadays of marching in the streets. I wonder if you agree that another revolution could be occurring as shown by the divisions within the Supreme Court which changed and altered the attitude of our law toward public affairs and so on, and in the legislation passed by Congress which many people seem to think invades the provinces heretofore restricted to the States and the people. Do you agree that there are a number of kinds of revolution which might be interpreted along those lines?

Mr. Hartz. Well, the term "revolution" perhaps like the other terms we have been discussing is used in many contexts and I am not denying the validity of its use in any context provided we all know what is meant.

Personally, I would not use the term "revolution" to describe the decisions of the Supreme Court——

Senator Hickenlooper. What would you call them when they change what has been in the past?

Mr. Hartz. In a loose sense, of course, we call them revolutionary and we call the ideas they contain revolutionary. But the term social revolution, as I have used it involves a fundamental change in social systems and in class relations.

Senator Hickenlooper. Social revolution involves legal aspects, does it not?

Mr. Hartz. It does, it has many legal results. Both the French and Russian Revolutions had enormous repercussions in law. However, it is one thing to say that, I think, and it is another to describe some major legal change within a context which has not been essentially altered in terms of social constitution or class structure.

IS OUR COUNTRY UNDERGOING A CONTINUING REVOLUTION?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do I understand it to be your attitude that perhaps we in this country are going through constant revolution or a continuing revolution in the broad sense?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, we have certainly been going through a process of change from the outset.

I would, however, say this, that in my judgment, the change involved in American history in the 20th century is much more fundamental in many respects than any involved prior to this time. And the reason is that due to our return to the world we have in some sense undone the work of the 17th century. If, as I believe, our escape from Europe has shaped our development then our return not to Europe and to the world touches a basic fact of our prior experience. In this sense I believe that the period we are now undergoing is more important than many of us may appreciate.

As I tried to indicate in the close of my paper a reverse voyage of the *Mayflower* is a rather fundamental matter for a country which originated out of that voyage.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Professor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

AMERICA'S AGGRESSIVE OUTLOOK

Senator GORE. I find your paper stimulating. I wish to refer particularly to your description of the American response to 19th century revolutions as an aggressive outlook on the world plane. Would you clarify your meaning of aggressive outlook?

Mr. HARTZ. You want to know, I take it, what I mean by the term "aggressive" in that context?

Senator GORE. Yes.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, what I had in mind was precisely what you are suggesting, that Wilson did believe that Americanism could be evangelized, that it could be spread and rather easily spread to countries which had not experienced it. One of the main disappointments, I think, of the First World War is the disappointment which arose from our discovery that this was not really as easy to accomplish as Wilson thought.

I have no doubt that this Wilsonian orientation is a very fundamental orientation in our outlook on the world. I think it is fundamental for reasons which perhaps I have not spelled out in my paper very extensively.

Let me say this: Due to the fact that we established a certain way of life successfully in this country by leaving other ways of life behind in Europe, we have only had familiarity with this one way of life, which I have called liberal, Puritan, Jeffersonian, however you want to use these terms.

Now, when a country has had experience only with a single way of life, when even the Civil War, as I tried to suggest, didn't represent a basic break in that way of life, and that country is thrown back into the world and has to deal with other people, the inevitable instinct of the country is to spread its way of life to others. This is not merely because its outlook seems the only legitimate one since no others have been encountered but also because it is hard to have a rational conversation with people completely outside the ken of your own experience. I think the Wilsonian attitude, perhaps at its most fundamental level, derives even more from the desire to hold intelligible conversations than from the desire to spread absolute virtue.

APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CONCEPTS TO CERTAIN SOCIETIES

Senator GORE. If American concepts were difficult to apply to European civilization, from which we inherited many terms of reference, then would not American concepts even be more difficult to apply to societies of less comity in history?

For instance, you have used terms "liberal," "puritan," "reformation," "bourgeois"—there are others that I do not just now recall to mind which you have used today—which have a European social and governmental connotation. Would you agree?

Mr. HARTZ. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Even so, you say that because the American pioneers migrated away from the problems of Europe and established here through a unique and successful experience an Americanism whose ideals were out of conformity with Europe. But would they not be more difficult, more incongruous to a society with which we had less historical relationship?

Mr. HARTZ. I think there is no question that this is so. I think that if we have had difficulty understanding Europe by virtue of our detachment of a single phase of European culture from the other phases, certainly the problem of understanding is even greater when we move outside the European sphere completely. I definitely agree to that.

I would say, however, though this is not to qualify the point, that there is now, throughout the entire non-Western world, a passionate effort on the part of peoples to attain knowledge of Western values and to realize them.

The spread of Western ideologies to the non-Western world has derived for the most part from the ambitions of people to attain Western achievements and to identify with them. And under these circumstances there is an impulse in the non-Western world itself, which facilitates our relationship to it.

Senator GORE. Is this urge for adoption of Western and American idealism stemming from material desires or ideological concepts?

Mr. HARTZ. I think it has stemmed from both material desires and ideological concepts. Certainly the spread of egalitarianism, socially and politically, has been marked. This may often be innocently identified with material achievement, it is true, and there may be a rather subtle interplay here.

However, I would say this, that the issue you initially raised is not resolved by the sympathy of people outside the Western frame of reference toward Western values. There is still a problem of communication, indeed, one peculiarly, difficult as I was trying to suggest earlier.

When people use the same words and mean different things by them, you have special problems. When they use different words, and you know by virtue of that verbal difference the distinctions involved, even though you may be separated from them more completely, you may be able to understand them better.

AMERICAN VALUES IN WILSON'S 14 POINTS

Senator GORE. Well, lest we wander too far away, I want to ask you for a further elaboration on your statement that President Wilson "will always stand as the classic symbol of this view." To what extent did Wilson's 14 points relate to American values which either did not have the same meaning to European societies or did not meet with their acceptance?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I think they were essentially a projection of American values. I don't think that Wilson himself was aware of this. I think Wilson himself felt that he was relating to novel experience, but I think in retrospect we can see that many of his orientations, not least his orientation toward national self-determination, was necessarily a projection of the kind of experience we have had.

In this connection, I ought to say something that I perhaps have not stressed before sufficiently, although I have mentioned it in the paper on one or two occasions. We have a most instantaneous sympathy, with revolutionary movements abroad in terms of nationalism because these are terms that we can identify with our own revolution and Declaration of Independence.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S 14 POINTS FOR SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM

Senator GORE. Would you comment upon President Johnson's 14 points for settlement in Vietnam?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, could you define more specifically what you have in mind there in terms of the issues involved?

Senator GORE. I refer to a speech by President Johnson in which he outlined 14 points of a program described as an adequate basis for peace in Vietnam. I am not using his exact words, but that is a paraphrase of what he intended.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, what would be the issues you want me to discuss in connection with it?

Senator GORE. The relevancy.

Mr. HARTZ. The specific substantive issues?

Senator GORE. The American concept of Western values to a settlement of an essentially oriental problem. For instance, is a written constitution an American value or an Asiatic value concept?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I think a written constitution is not necessarily an American value in the sense that it is an idea which has found also considerable vogue in European political history. But a written constitution does not of itself, I think we would perhaps agree, indicate the presence of a functioning political system beneath it. It is a notorious fact in political science that the British, who have many constitutional guarantees, and a workable parliamentary system, have no written constitution in the American sense.

What one, therefore, searches for when one is dealing with the issue of a written constitution is not the question of whether it is written or not, but what actual political system is going on in relationship to it.

Senator GORE. When was the the first constitution in Asia in the sense that we understand a constitution? Did China ever have one?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I am not familiar exactly with the Chinese experiences on this count. I would very much doubt whether China had a written constitution historically although there may have been written documents of constitutional significance.

Senator GORE. Did Japan ever have one until the American occupation?

Mr. HARTZ. Once again my knowledge of Japanese history isn't sufficiently precise to answer that, but I can think of no written constitution in the Japanese system.

INDIVIDUALISM AS A THEOLOGICAL CONCEPT

Senator GORE. This is but a specific. I want to ask you further about the question of individualism being a theological concept, and you have explained that, I think, well. Individualism in one's religious responsibility, one is practice of religion, came out of the Protestant revolution, the Reformation. Now, to what other religions is individualism a theological concept?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I think individualism is a theological value in all Christian thought, and I think in the whole Judaic-Christian tradition individualism is important. Individualism is not so important in other theological systems. For example, in the Hindu theological system, individualism would not, I think, be accounted a very significant value although it has been argued that in that theology there are individualistic elements.

This is a very important matter, of course, because there is no doubt that Western individualism and our whole faith in the individual in the West is grounded in our earlier religious experience.

When you move into theological traditions outside that experience I think it becomes much harder to locate a historic sense for individuality.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator yield for a supplement?

WILSONIAN PRINCIPLE

These penetrating questions of Senator Gore have whet my curiosity to get your observation on an aspect of them. I raised the matter of the Dominican Republic issue where this country took sides, and where in the view of many of us, we helped put down a revolution, in effect bringing to an end a constitutional regime of Bosch.

Now, Senator Gore asks you about the President's 14 points vis-a-vis Vietnam. There is a common element to the Dominican Republic case because here again we take sides, and some of us hold to the view that we are repressing a revolution in Southeast Asia by sending the *Mayflower* on another voyage back to Asia, to use your figure of speech.

My question is this: Have we reached an evolutionary point in these governmental attitudes, and undoubtedly strong public opinion attitudes, that because of the international politics to which you earlier referred, that we tend to take a point of view because of our affluent society, a very secure society, that we should prevent revolutions unless the revolutions are of the type we sanction? This concerns me very much in this discussion of revolutionary trends. I would like to have you comment on Senator Gore's reference to the President's 14 points vis-a-vis Vietnam. If they are adopted, then Vietnam would have to adopt our formula and they have to agree to our pattern, our culture and mores that for centuries have formed our values. Are we coming to the point where we take the position that we are for revolutions if they are to our liking but we are going to repress those that are not to our liking?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, as I have suggested, I think the balance of our sympathy is always in the direction of institutions identical with our own. I think the Wilsonian principle has by no means disappeared in the United States. I think, however, that there has been an increase in sophistication on this count, and the way I would describe the current situation is that there is in the country a tug of war between two attitudes: one, the Wilsonian attitude of seeking to impose our institutions, seeking to evangelize the results of a peculiar experience, and another which seeks to recognize the relativity of historical situations and to work within that relativity.

Basically if we really do believe in liberty, there is nothing wrong with holding to that as a value regardless of what the history of a country may be or how different from our own its culture may be. I personally would take that point of view myself. I wouldn't care how different any culture or any society would be from the American society or from Western society, I would still judge it in terms of some of the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

On the other hand, the problem we face——

Senator GORE. Excuse me.

Mr. HARTZ. Yes.

JUDGING VALUES OF LIBERTY AND FREEDOM

Senator GORE. You are saying this as an American, proudly American. You would judge these values of liberty and freedom from the standpoint of their description and their reference and their character in the Declaration of Independence.

Mr. HARTZ. Let me be clear about my position on this count. And let me be sure I am not advancing a position apparently which I do not believe in substantively. What I am saying is that the value of liberty seems to be to me a value to be generally applied. When liberty does not exist in a society even though the history of that society has been different from the history of any we may be familiar with, I say that that society is open to criticism because liberty is not present in it. On the other hand, and here we come down to what seems to be the root of the matter, what we have to do is to disentangle our faith in the norm of freedom from the peculiar historic experience in which it has been cast in the United States. We have to be able to distinguish the universality of an ethic from the peculiar framework in which we have received it. Once we do this, then we are embarked upon a perfectly realistic path. We have a value, we have a norm by which we can evaluate social situations, even foreign social situations. We are not morally adrift. We have not surrendered to the idea that anything is as good as anything else and any culture is as good as any other culture. We have not sunk to complete relativity. But at the same time we are not demanding of other cultures that they instantly become like ourselves. We are willing to realize that the norm of liberty can fulfill itself in many different ways depending on the contents involved, and even if it compels certain procedures, that some cultures will not be able to achieve these ways easily.

Senator GORE. Are not the remarks you have just made subject to the statement you made to Senator Hickenlooper earlier, that terms will have one meaning to us and an entirely different meaning in other cultures?

Mr. HARTZ. This is correct, and if we want to carry on a rational conversation with other cultures, we have to disentangle meanings.

Senator GORE. Let us cite some of the terms used here today. Liberty, freedom, constitution, election, democracy, self-determination, federalism, are these not essentially Western concepts, Western values—Western Europe and the United States—vis-a-vis the Far East?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, they are Western values, and though you might find some like federalism outside of the West, certainly a number of the ones you have cited are Western in character. But I think there is a problem here which has to be gotten at. If you do not wish to engage in a policy which imposes automatically American culture on other cultures, if you want to have a respect for the diversity of world experience, are you then compelled to surrender in certain American values as norms? I do not think it is necessary to do that.

I do not think that a realistic sense of cultural relativity requires us to surrender a moral frame of reference in terms of which societies are valued.

APPLYING OUR SENSE OF VALUES TO OTHER SOCIETIES

Senator GORE. I am not speaking of the possibility of the United States itself surrendering any moral values in order to be realistic, as you say, in applying our sense of values to the settlement of international problems to which you refer as America's aggressive concept on the world plane. Is it not necessary to find a formula that takes into consideration the cultural values, the social mores, the religious concepts of the area with which we are dealing rather than to formulate our plans and our policies, our programs, upon the essentially Western values and Western concepts which have, of course, basic political appeal to our own people?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I think I agree with the drift of your remarks, Senator; I feel, however, that there is an issue which is involved here which is not precisely described in those remarks or articulated in them. That is the question of the moral evaluation of social experience elsewhere.

If a society practices a certain procedure which from a humanitarian or libertarian point of view you find unacceptable, what does this mean? It does not necessarily mean that you have to abolish the procedure. It does not mean, even if you have contact with that society, that you have automatically to try to get that society to surrender the procedure, because this may be historically impossible. It does not mean either of those things.

At the same time, I do not think it also means that you must give up the judgment that the procedure is morally unacceptable.

Senator GORE. I would agree with that. Then could we agree that if we recognize the limits of our perspective based on our own unique experience, must we not concede that the ethics we believe in may not be suitable for others?

Mr. Hartz. The ethics we believe in may not be suitable for others, that is precisely correct. They may not be suitable for historical reasons.

Senator Gore. Economic material reasons.

Mr. Hartz. Economic material reasons. However, does this mean then, and we are getting back to very fundamental ground here, that we have to assume that the procedures which are being practiced in situations of historic hostility to our norms are for that reason as good as the ones we would like? Do we surrender our final moral judgment even though we accept to the fullest the argument of historical relativity and historical diversity?

SURRRENDER TO OURSELVES

Senator Gore. What do you mean surrender—surrender where and to whom?

Mr. Hartz. To ourselves. Do we say, "Well, we have no way of judging world experience."

Senator Gore. You say surrender to ourselves. Surrender what, where?

Mr. Hartz. I think the term "to ourselves" is the relevant one here. Do we cease to make a moral judgment in connection with experience which we consider to be morally unacceptable but which we cannot change or cannot easily change or need not change?

Senator Gore. Well, I agree there, but you used the term, "surrender our values." I thought we were speaking in terms of the projection of American idealism on the world plane.

Mr. Hartz. This is correct.

Senator Gore. You would not necessarily mean that we surrender it because we are unable to impose it, or decide not to seek to impose it, would you?

Mr. Hartz. No; that is correct. And what I have been criticizing in this paper is the automatic attempt to impose not only our own values but a specific historical formulation of those values upon other societies. That seems to me really our problem.

I think perhaps the matter of a discussion between us is not so major a problem in actual political experience as it is a problem in pure theory.

Senator Gore. Well, theories must be put to practice sometimes. Well, I have enjoyed my exchange.

DOES A MORAL JUDGMENT REQUIRE AN INTERVENTION?

Senator Morse. May I ask a supplementary question to your last one? This has been a fascinating discussion. Are you satisfied, Professor, that we make these moral judgments to which you refer, and not praise a society with which we do not agree because it does not share our Western notions of liberty and the other concepts that Senator Gore raised, or do you think we should go beyond making a moral judgment and intervene in that society to change its policies?

Mr. Hartz. I do not think that a moral judgment requires political intervention, and if one holds out for moral judgment which, after all, is the basis of morality itself, certainly that does not commit any man to spreading his morality everywhere. That is an entirely different matter which I want to detach from the other.

Senator GORE. In other words, you think there should be limits to our messianic zeal.

Mr. HARTZ. I would accept that formulation.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator Mundt, do you wish to question at this time?

Senator MUNDT. I will question after Senator Pell.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

LAND CONFISCATION IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Professor Hartz, I was looking through your paper; I apologize for not being here when you delivered it, and I know just purely as a matter of subjective interest you mention that more acres were confiscated in the American Revolution than the French Revolution; is that correct?

Mr. HARTZ. I think there are some people who suggest that. I did not say I believed it. I said even if it could be proved, it would not make the Tories aristocrats in the authentic European sense, French sense.

Senator PELL. Right. But actually the fate most of the Tories suffered was just as rough then as the fate the European aristocrats suffered after World War II, would that not be a correct statement?

Mr. HARTZ. After World War II.

Senator PELL. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland.

Mr. HARTZ. Yes, their expulsion was total. In that sense it was more severe than that suffered by the French aristocrats.

Senator PELL. We had our revolution a little bit earlier.

STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY

Another point that struck me was the progress of society as it moves along. Through your paper I think I detected that you moved from the feudal stage where power is based basically on land, to another stage which is the bourgeois or capitalistic stage, where power is based on the possession of machinery, or the capital with which to buy machinery. But you left it a little up in the air, because nothing is final, and nothing is permanent as to what the evolution of this trend is. Would you agree with Ken Galbraith's theory that the next stage would be where the possession of mere money per se or ownership is not as important as the mental capacity to provide the direction for the intellectual and managerial estate which is now coming to the fore in our country. Therefore, it is more and more the managerial and intellectual groups that are the ones that are becoming dominant?

Do you see this trend going on, or do you misread this interpretation of your paper?

Mr. HARTZ. I would not say that that trend is in my paper. However, that does not mean that I do not believe there is something in that. I believe that this is and has been a development in American economic life.

Senator PELL. But in your paper you touch on the first two stages certainly, the feudal stage and the bourgeois stage.

Mr. HARTZ. Yes.

Senator PELL. Is it conceivable in your mind that society can eliminate the middle stage and jump from the feudal directly into the intellectual and managerial stage?

Mr. HARTZ. It is quite conceivable. As a matter of fact, I think we are coming to realize that the liberal stage—this may be a sad thing to note in some ways—that the liberal stage is a stage which was experienced only by very few countries in the world and may never be experienced again by any other countries, at any rate in the same way in which it was experienced before.

In this matter of historical stages, there have been many jokers in the deck. For example, Marx, of course, believed that you move from feudalism to liberalism to socialism. We know that no society which effectively moved to liberalism—certainly not the American which moved most successfully but not even the European societies which moved less successfully—became Socialist. But feudal societies have become Socialist. So it has been possible to move from feudalism to socialism and not from liberalism to socialism.

That is one of the great categorical innovations from the standpoint of Marxian thought, and one which the Bolshevik revolution more or less evolved within itself.

MANAGERIAL CLASS IN MARXISM

Senator PELL. Basically, then, what you are suggesting is that Marxism has within itself the seeds of its own destruction. It has to come to the social intellectual, managerial type of civilization into which we are evolving as being a more normal, more humanly responsive one and more efficient one. Would this be your thought?

Mr. HARTZ. Yes; this is so, except I do not think there is anything in classical Marxism which would preclude the presence of managers.

Senator PELL. Yes.

Mr. HARTZ. Marxism presumably in its classical form would be compatible with the managerial culture. This would, however, be in the context of the ultimate utopian prophecies of the Marxists, very few of which have been spelled out. It would involve, according to those prophesies, a great deal of anarchistic liberty.

FORCE AS A COMPONENT OF REVOLUTION

Senator PELL. But force is not a necessary component to revolution; is it?

Mr. HARTZ. Of what, the Marxist?

Senator PELL. Force, violence, death, those are not necessarily components.

Mr. HARTZ. They are not necessarily components.

Senator PELL. I am asking you if you think so. For instance, in Japan they had a revolution after World War II without force where they had to go from the feudal to the bourgeois estate with no violence at all in a very few years.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, yes; of course, you had the Second World War as a background. I am not saying that you cannot have fundamental alterations in social systems without violence. I believe they can take place gradually. It is notorious, for example, that British history has been a history in which many of the goals which France sought to accomplish by rather more violent means were accomplished peacefully.

However, one does not tend to use the term "revolution" to describe the British experience, say, in the 19th century under the first Reform Act. One tends to use the term "revolution" in connection with the Puritan revolution of the 17th century and that was violent.

Senator PELL. You could qualify it and will perhaps call it the industrial revolution?

Mr. HARTZ. The industrial revolution is an interesting revolution but in the analysis that I have developed here, I do not think that the term in this context has more than metaphorical meaning.

MOVEMENT INTO MANAGERIAL SOCIETIES

Senator PELL. What I am leading up to is the thought that if the so-called bourgeois society is moving into this intellectual and managerial kind of society into which we seem to be evolving, and the Socialist societies are not able to evolve their own they will not survive either because of their own—and having lived behind the curtain I speak with some experience—their own failures to perform and their own drive against human nature. Thus they too are moving in the same direction. Would that not be correct?

Mr. HARTZ. They, too, are moving——

Senator PELL. In the direction of the managerial and intellectual society in which we are evolving into.

Mr. HARTZ. There is no doubt that the argument that managerialism is part of the future has a great deal to be said in favor of it.

However, I think that one can introduce quite a number of complexities into this situation because not all managerial societies are alike, and quite a number of cultural differentiations can take place within the context of managerial life.

Senator PELL. But the fact remains that the Communist system cannot survive as people acquire consumer goods and education, and demand the same things that they do in any other society. Would that not be correct?

Mr. HARTZ. Will you restate that again?

Senator PELL. I am saying that communism basically contains the seeds of its own destruction. We are too frightened of it. When you see it work you see how inefficient and incompetent and how rotten a system it is, and if we only realized that more, we might react differently in many areas.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, there is no doubt that many of the utopian hopes of Communist revolutionaries do not fulfill themselves. There is no doubt also that there is a certain amount of inefficiency, if one can use that term, which takes place in the context of collectivist revolutions.

However, I think it is a mistake to assume—and I am not saying that you are assuming it—that these revolutions produce societies which are necessarily in imminent danger of collapse.

Senator PELL. History is not concerned with imminence or nonimminence. What we are really talking about are seconds on a stage of rather long life—we hoped for a particular civilization and perhaps our concern is with what happens in the next five years or ten years when we should concentrate on how the life of our civilization will be some thousands or tens of thousands of years from now. You, as a historian, would be more conscious of that than anybody else.

Mr. Hartz. This is quite right. Societies do alter, and they alter in unexpected ways.

Senator Pell. I think so often we are like the really successful businessman who is the one who does not worry about next year's balance sheet; he is concerned with the one 10 or 20 years from now, and in the long haul he will come out ahead. Unfortunately, we tend to measure our balance sheets every four years.

FAR EASTERN REVOLUTIONS COMPARED TO WESTERN ONES

In the Orient do you think they can have revolutions along the same lines that we in the West do, or in the Far East?

Mr. Hartz. We in the West have had historically?

Senator Pell. Yes.

Mr. Hartz. I would say that that would be impossible, if only because the Western revolutions have already taken place. Even within the West it was true that once a revolutionary experience had happened in one country, it could never be duplicated precisely in the next country because that country had seen the experience of the prior country.

EXTENT OF REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS IN VIETNAM SITUATION

Senator Pell. Let me ask you a very specific query in connection with this problem of Vietnam which we all are so concerned with and in almost a myopic way. In your view as an historian, is the strife that is going on there more of a revolution or more of a war between two geographic areas?

Mr. Hartz. Well, I think it has elements of revolution. I do not want to sidestep this question. I think it has elements of revolution in it. And it has elements of geography in it.

Senator Pell. Why, because the leaders in the south come from the north and vice versa?

Mr. Hartz. Well, there is a southern and a northern area there. I do not want to say it is a civil war in the precise geographical sense. You might minimize the geographical elements in it.

Certainly there are revolutionary elements. The revolutionary elements, however, from my reading on Vietnam, tend to be a distinctive kind.

Senator Pell. But there are revolutionary elements in it, you would think.

Mr. Hartz. I think there are revolutionary elements in the Vietnam situation from everything I can discover about it.

FATE OF ABORTED REVOLUTIONS

Senator Pell. From the historical viewpoint, and again addressing you as a historian, what is our general experience with the fate of aborted revolutions?

Mr. Hartz. Aborted revolutions? What specifically?

Senator Pell. By an aborted revolution, I mean a revolution that is coming along and it is stopped. What I see in Vietnam is a revolution of sorts that we are aborting. We are stopping it.

Mr. HARTZ. Oh, I see. I understand your question now. I thought you had in mind what has been our experience with revolutions which have spontaneously, themselves, been aborted.

Senator PELL. Yes.

Mr. HARTZ. But you are asking the question, what has our experience been in connection with our own effort to limit revolution, is that it?

Senator PELL. In general when revolutions start—for instance in the Soviet Union we tried to stop their revolution in 1918–19 with our expeditionary force. In general, what has been the fate of aborted revolutions?

Mr. HARTZ. I think the record of that in terms of success or failure is very obvious.

Senator PELL. That is right. I am asking you as a historian—I am a politician—just what you think. As a politician I would like to get a different perspective.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I think efforts comparable to the Soviet intervention have been rare in American history and indeed I do not think any such effort took place in American history prior to the Soviet intervention at that time. Hence you would not have a great deal of experience on which to go, would you?

Senator PELL. Not limiting it to American history. You are not necessarily just an American historian, you are a historian. Just what is the general history of revolutions that have been stopped?

Mr. HARTZ. I think experience indicates that it is extraordinarily difficult if not impossible through outside intervention to repress a revolutionary situation in any area.

Senator PELL. At the best, it just produces postponement, would that not be pretty well correct?

Mr. HARTZ. You can postpone it, perhaps. I think in the international phases of a revolution—for example, if you think of the French Revolution in terms of Napoleon—you can contain the revolution by armed force.

However, in the end the victory over Napoleon did not end the French revolutionary movement which spread all over Europe throughout the 19th century. So in the long run the proposition that if you have an authentic revolutionary situation, military action against it is extraordinarily difficult, is a perfectly valid proposition to entertain in light of historic experience.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

MOLDING THE WORLD IN OUR OWN IMAGE

Senator MUNDT. Dr. Hartz, I am sorry I came in late, giving me a limited opportunity to scan your statement rather hurriedly. I have a question or two I would like to ask. I presume that the purpose of these hearings is to try to determine, as a nation which was born in the crucible of revolution, what should subsequently be our attitude toward other revolutions in other areas of the world. I take it that you have stated your general concepts in this paper.

Do you feel that this country should seek to mold the rest of the world into its own image?

Mr. HARTZ. Let me say, first, Senator, that the burden of my remarks has been to attempt to establish that America did not arise out of a revolutionary experience but rather out of a migration experience. Under these circumstances, I do not think the issue we confront is an issue of exporting our revolution elsewhere. It is true that we have had a revolution for national independence and to some extent that would be involved in the problems of other nations. But if we are concerned with matters of social revolution and social change, the American experience does not give us, if we are looking inside that experience, anything, that we could export elsewhere. I think, therefore, the issue is the rather more complicated issue of whether we should seek to spread automatically to societies experiencing social revolution the results of an historic experience which has arisen out of the entirely different experience of migration. And my answer to that question almost inevitably is that we must not fall into the fallacy of attempting to do that.

I have argued in some of my remarks here that this does not mean that we have to surrender ultimate moral evaluations. It does mean, however, that we have to be very careful in attempting to project the peculiar context of our own development elsewhere.

DETERMINING CRITERIA FOR RESPONDING TO REVOLUTIONS

Senator MUNDT. It is true, however, that our American experience includes a political revolution by which we disengaged ourselves from the British empire; is it not?

Mr. HARTZ. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. And whatever the causes, whatever we brought with us in the process of coming over on the *Mayflower*, we reached a point where that became part of our national history and, as a Committee on Foreign Relations, we are primarily interested in what our national attitude should be toward these various political revolutions as they occur. One side or the other, and sometimes both, seek first our aid and then our military support and sometimes our guidance after the event.

How far should we go in associating ourselves with the political revolutions of other countries? What should be our criteria for determining whether we participate or just let events evolve?

Mr. HARTZ. Your question then, I take it, is what criteria should be applied in specific cases when revolutions break out elsewhere concerning our attitude toward them.

Senator MUNDT. If you assume that foreign policy is a guerrilla war, which I do not, there should be some concepts that we follow in terms of political revolutions generally.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, you talk, Senator, about political revolutions. In fact none of the revolutionary situations that we encounter in the world today of any significance are purely political revolutions.

They have political aspects, but they are deeply involved in the issue of social change. If you ask for a criterion stated in one sentence as to what our policy should be in revolutionary situations, I would have a hard time stating such a criterion. It is no attempt to escape the burden of your question but rather, I think, a frank confrontation of the complexity of the situation, to say that one would have to assess revolutionary situations individually.

One can make certain generalizations. I do not think we are obligated to put down every revolution that appears in the world. That does not mean that we need not have a policy or ought not to have a policy with respect to certain revolutions.

Senator MUNDT. That comes close then to violating the earlier concept that we should not try to make the world over into our own image.

Mr. HARTZ. What comes close to that?

Senator MUNDT. Are we going to have different rules, in terms of participation, for different revolutions—those we like, we support, those we do not like, we ignore?

Mr. HARTZ. I would not say it modifies that principle. I think, however, it is related to the principle. It is one thing to say we ought to surrender the Wilsonian messianism, and it is another to say that as a national power we can be indifferent to what happens in other countries.

It is a well known fact that this is impossible. It was not even possible in the 19th century, or the 18th; even attitudes of noninterference had to be worked out diplomatically in relationship to revolutionary situations.

If the problem of diplomacy in this respect could be solved simply by a blanket principle of withdrawal, then I think it would be rather more simple than it is.

U.S. POSITION ON RHODESIA AND ANGOLA SITUATIONS

Senator MUNDT. Let us take two specific cases where there are incipient or actual revolutions on the part of areas trying to break political ties with a colonial power—Rhodesia and Angola. We are concerned about Portugal's attitude toward the people of Angola. We are rather friendly with Great Britain and we are alarmed at what the Rhodesians are trying to do. Should we apply different rules to the Rhodesians who are trying to get political independence from Great Britain and a Portuguese colony trying to sever ties from Portugal?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, in assessing your attitude toward revolutions, I think you cannot escape some concept of the substantive nature of what is involved in the revolution. This does not justify intervention in either case.

Senator MUNDT. It is the intervention I am talking about.

Mr. HARTZ. Regardless of what the content of a revolution may be, there is no ipso facto necessity for intervention on the basis of the content.

However, intervention is different from that inevitable diplomatic presence I think a power has in relationship to other powers.

If you ask me within that narrow context of inevitability whether the substance of a revolution is of consequence, I would be inclined to doubt whether we could be wholly indifferent to substance.

Senator MUNDT. I do not think we could be wholly indifferent to anything that happens any place in the world, revolutionary or other. But I am relating it to our foreign policy, and to what justifications we find in terms of the philosophy that you described that we do take an overt position in the effort of the Rhodesians to divorce themselves from Great Britian. We move in and apply economic sanctions, wisely or unwisely.

In the other case, in terms of the Portuguese with whom we are less friendly, we take overt action against Portugal. I am wondering how we rationalize those different actions.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I am not going to defend or even to evaluate our policy in these two instances. However, there is no doubt that the Rhodesian situation is substantively of a very distinctive kind, and whether our policy is one that one would support—and in this particular case I would tend to support it—it certainly is true that to the degree we have a policy we ought, as I said before, to recognize the moral content of the situation. In some sense, I do not think you can call the Rhodesian situation a revolutionary situation of the land with which we have been grappling in this discussion. The revolutionary situation in Rhodesia may not be the effort of the current Rhodesian Government against Britain. It may be ultimately the effort of the African masses in Rhodesia against that Government itself.

Senator MUNDT. Which could come as a sequel, but that is not the case at the moment.

Mr. HARTZ. Yes; it is the revolutionary element implicit in the other situation. Hence I am not sure what revolution we foster if we take one position or another. This comes back to the very significant matter of the use of the term "revolution" in different contexts, which can be very misleading; and it also comes back to the issue of national independence as a special phase of revolutionary experience.

U.S. REACTION TO POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS

Senator MUNDT. That is why I am limiting my question to political revolution. There are all kinds of revolutions, but I am interested as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations in dealing with the American attitude toward political revolutions, whether we look at one revolution one way with one set of facts that motivate us and another revolution another way. If we do, then we get back to the fact that to a certain degree, we are trying to be the judge on Mount Olympus, determining what we want to have happen everywhere, making the world over in our own image.

Mr. HARTZ. Yes; I think we are agreed presumably on the unwisdom of that course, and certainly everything I have said in my paper has been designed to expose the undesirability of such an automatic response.

Senator MUNDT. We can do it by force, we can do it by example, we can do it by missionaries. I am talking about force. I am trying to put the problem into realistic cases that involve foreign policy decisions, to wit, Rhodesia versus Great Britain and Angola versus Portugal. It is a little difficult to generalize, I know.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, as I say, it is extraordinarily difficult to generalize an automatic principle for dealing with every situation that occurs in the world. I think any such principle would be destined to failure. I think diplomacy of all political practices or political arts has to be flexible, has to have the capacity to adapt itself to distinctive situations.

SEEDS OF SELF-DESTRUCTION IN NAZISM

Senator MUNDT. Turning to another aspect that Senator Pell mentioned, that communism has within it the seeds of its own destruction, is it not likewise true, and to the same degree, that nazism had within it the seeds of its own destruction?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, we are not exactly sure how far nazism had the seeds of its own destruction in it because it was defeated in military conquest. I think it is likely to assume——

Senator MUNDT. Let us assume there had been no military conquest. Do you feel that nazism does not have within it the seed of its own destruction as communism has?

Mr. HARTZ. "The seeds within it of its own destruction" is a very vivid term, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. Whatever you may agree to it as with communism.

Mr. HARTZ. I am not agreed to it in connection with communism. I think that phrase was presented by Senator Pell. I do not want to be identified with that terminology in the Communist case.

Senator MUNDT. Yes; maybe the author of the phrase would tell us what he meant and then we can discuss it.

Senator PELL. By that I meant it goes against human nature which in every way is a desire for free speech, free movement, all of these things are endemic.

Senator MUNDT. That is why I said nazism is to the same degree.

Senator PELL. Right; I am not sure I agree about Nazism because if Mussolini had died in 1938 he would have been thought of as one of the great rulers in Italy, and I think fascism and nazism unfortunately coincided more with human nature because all human beings like to feel superior to other human beings.

I think you could have your values untouched under a Nazi system which is just as evil as a Communist system which really goes against human nature.

Senator MUNDT. You do not think the concept of concentration camps, the concept of the master race, these elements of nazism are false?

Senator PELL. I would like to agree with you. My father was the U.N. representative to the U.N. War Crimes Commission. I would agree with you. But I think these instincts of one race being superior to another are in human beings; I wish they were not.

Senator MUNDT. I want to say that I believe that nazism has within it the seeds of its own destruction, and I believe communism has within it the seeds of its own destruction. I think they are both entirely antithetical to general concepts of decent human behavior. Would you not agree that a political system that has inherent in it, as communism and nazism do, the training of youngsters to spy on their parents and to become creatures of the state, to carry tales of what happens in their own household that result in imprisonment, sometimes of their own parents, that that concept necessarily carries within it the seeds of its own destruction, if it continues long enough?

Mr. HARTZ. I would like to believe this was so. I think, however, I would have to be more cautious in my own response on that count. I think we have made a mistake in the past in assuming that authoritarian systems are around the corner from destruction and then have been rather disillusioned to discover that they have survived in the the face of our pessimistic diagnoses.

It may well be that we are learning in the 20th century that the capacity of human beings to tolerate authoritarianism and perhaps some of its more unfortunate extremes is greater than we assumed in the past.

EXPECTED WORLD CONQUEST OF COMMUNISM

Senator MUNDT. You are coming now to my next point which I believe you will support. We do not know yet, of course, whether communism is going to collapse of its own power. I share Senator Pell's idea that over the long pull eventually this type of system is going to necessarily collapse, as I believe that nazism would have collapsed.

But what concerns me is that we cannot build a foreign policy on the hope or expectation that it is going to collapse. Before that, in the death throes of a precollapse condition, they are going to attack their neighbors and try to bring the fruits of the successful countries back to Rome and consequently ignite world conflagration. This happened with nazism. I think it can happen with communism before it collapses.

I do not believe we can build a foreign policy simply by hoping long enough that communism will collapse under its own power any more than we could have in connection with nazism. I think if we had a thousand years both would collapse. In the meantime, I think there is a great likelihood that the Communists will take the overt action that the Nazis did.

Mr. HARTZ. Of course, we have to realize in that case that the Nazi system was a monolithic system coming out of a single national power whereas the Communist system has become by now rather pluralized so that the comparison is not absolutely automatic on that count.

Senator MUNDT. It is not entirely monolithic. Out of nazism there was the fascism of Mussolini; and whatever political system Nasser calls Egypt and there have been other totalitarian concepts. The point I am trying to make is a great nation cannot build its foreign policy in the hope and expectation that a system that is bad is necessarily going to collapse on its own power before it tries some great adventure of world conquest, or at least expends its borders sufficiently to make its own failures less evident so it can take better care of satisfying the creature needs of its people.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, this assumes that reality in this situation is exhausted by two possibilities when in fact I wonder whether this is so. It assumes that a given system either collapses because of the seeds of its own destruction or that it plunges the world into a third world war.

There is a possibility—I am not predicting necessarily the future—that it will neither collapse nor produce that international outcome.

Senator MUNDT. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

JUDGMENT OF EACH CASE ON ITS OWN MERITS

Senator CASE. There are people who think that democracy is equally fragile and leads inevitably to the dictatorship of the masses and then to the rule of a tyrannic demagogue.

I am not sure that any of these things are terribly helpful in ordering our day to day or even year to year or decade to decade foreign affairs.

What we are searching for though is some kind of guidance in that area. I ask as one who read your first book with great interest and later talked to President Smith about how proud he was to have had you as a student.

Mr. HARTZ. Thank you.

Senator CASE. Is there anything we can say about intervention except that each case has to be dealt with on its own bottom, trying to take into account all the factors involved in it? Can anybody say more than Brzezinski did when he said that you intervene or not depending upon whether intervention on the whole in a particula case is likely to be more or less harmful than nonintervention?

What can you say about that?

Mr. Hartz. I would agree.

Senator CASE. This means you have to have very good leaders, able leaders, and you cannot answer these questions by pulling down some line of historical tradition or some tenet from Sinai or anything else. You have to answer each one on the basis of commonsense, a broad knowledge of history and sympathy and everything else, but you have to do it on its own, is that about right?

Mr. HARTZ. I think that is right. Unfortunately this does not give us the kind of abstract wisdom we would like to have.

Senator CASE. I know.

Mr. HARTZ. But it does reflect, I think, the inevitable pragmatism of foreign policy.

Senator MUNDT. If the Senator will yield, that is very discouraging from the standpoint of a historian.

Senator CASE. I do not think so. I think anything that anybody can teach us, whether it is discouraging or makes it more difficult or whatnot, that happens to be a little closer to the truth than those thoughts we have been following, is a useful thing.

That is all.

DISTINGUISHING THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF A VALUE—LIBERTY

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hartz, one thought occurred to me in the earlier part of your exchange with Senator Gore. You were talking about liberty as a concept and value which we approve. It occurred to me then that sometimes we tend to confuse the value itself with the form rather than the substance. Unless the form in which it occurs is familiar to us, we tend to conclude that they do not have liberty. Is that true?

Mr. HARTZ. This is a marvelous illustration of the problem of form and substance. It is without question true that we tend to assume that formal incarnations of the experience of liberty that we know are the only possible ones when, in fact, there is quite a lot of liberty that we have never tasted.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been so concerned in recent years with China and with the Far East, as we particularly are now, and we have assumed that the Chinese have never experienced liberty, certainly not as we have it. But I was impressed that in the days when they had what was called the Mandate of Heaven, for a very long period they probably had a greater degree of liberty, not in our form, than nearly anyone in the world.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I have no doubt that there was a very considerable amount of freedom in China historically and in other non-

Western societies. As a matter of fact, we come here to a question of political science which seems abstract but which is astonishingly close to the problem we face concretely. We have not really researched the experience of liberty, if I can use an unfortunate word, we have not really pinned down that experience in terms of identifiable procedures and responses and situations.

The term "liberty" has been more or less monopolized by polemicists, and it has not been defined in terms of clear empirical study.

Now, once we do that, I think we will discover—difficult as the problem is—that there are many, many liberties. We may even come to an assessment of American society which sees in it the absence of quite a number of liberties which we would like to see present here.

HAS AMERICA EVER HAD A DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION?

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned in the course of your statement Tocqueville's comment that America has never had a democratic revolution. Would you elaborate briefly on that?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, Tocqueville made the statement that the Americans, though democratic, had never had a democratic revolution. What I think he meant, since he was French and thinking in terms of the French Revolution, was that they had not had a French revolution, which is the essential point I am trying to make. They escaped that revolution by migration. This is a factor which is easy to see from the outside; Tocqueville, being an outsider, was able to see it better than people inside the United States. For when you migrate, when you leave the enemies you would have fought in a social revolution behind, you never see them; and not seeing them, how can you know that you have escaped them?

The basic migration, out of which the history of this country arose, narrowed the vision of the country in some fundamental sense. I suppose in commonsense language one would say the country did not appreciate its blessings. But why should it? It is true that the first migrant will remember the antagonist he left behind, and certainly the first New England colonists were constantly going back to their memory of England. But the children of these colonists and their children will not have the same exeprience because they will not have migrated. They will not even have a memory of their European enemies. They will take their situation for granted. Indeed if they have a revolution against England, they will assume that this is about the biggest revolution you could possibly have, which I think has been the instinct of our historical interpretation.

Senator MUNDT. Will you yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

NATURE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Senator MUNDT. I cannot quite concur that by migration you leave behind all the vices from which you fled. It is true they migrated away from their land, and they migrated away from their homes, but they did not migrate away from the political controls of and the corrosion against which they ultimately revolted. I do not agree with you in fact that we did not have an American revolution. They revolted against the obnoxious political controls from which they fled; is that not right?

Mr. HARTZ. That is correct. Our revolution, therefore, was a revolution against imperial control. Although this is an important experience and does link us, as I have suggested without qualification, to numerous nationalist developments elsewhere, it is a good deal different from a social revolution in which basic social systems are changed. For this reason I would myself not minimize the importance of the initial migration even though it did coincide with the persistence of imperial connections.

SITUATION IN GUATEMALA

The CHAIRMAN. Your question prompts me to read you a paragraph from a letter I recently received from one of the priests who was in Guatemala, and I think maybe illustrates the difference quite well. I quote:

> I don't write this letter as a complaint. I write it as a warning. The masses of Latin America are becoming more and more restless. Their governments do not want any real progress, because it would have to come at the expense of the landed oligarchy, which in turn control these governments. There is only one solution: Revolution. I would like to think that these revolutions could be peaceful, but I know from personal experience that the 2 percent that are bleeding the masses white, will not give up their power peacefully. It must be taken from them. It is they then who are provoking the violence, not the poor.

Is that a situation contrasting to what you have described as ours?

Mr. HARTZ. It is a contrasting situation to any that we have experienced in the United States. If you want to find a Guatemalan analog to American history in the context of that discussion, it would be if the people who felt themselves oppressed in Guatemala were to migrate to some unsettled spot in the Western Hemisphere or elsewhere and create a society in which that oppression would no longer exist.

The CHAIRMAN. But, in the case of the American migration, the oppression followed it. You would have to add to that that the oppression would follow them to the area they migrated to.

Mr. HARTZ. The oppression would follow only in the sense——

The CHAIRMAN. The way King George followed us.

Mr. HARTZ. This is moving to a hypothetical realm but one still illuminating. The current Guatemalan state would have some imperial connection, with the Guatemala settlers in the new land.

But that connection, if we take American experience as a guide, would not involve traditionally a severe set of imperial restraints. And in any case it would not force the installation in the second Guatemalan situation of the landowning oligarchy which was referred to in that letter.

Now, the very interesting question, if you are interested in finding out what America out of its own resources has to "export," is, where would the Guatemalans today go if they wanted to leave? Where are the undiscovered places of the world comparable to North America where discontented people can go? Where are the possibilities of this type of revolutionary escape? Fundamentally they no longer exist. The experience out of which the United States was created is gone practically forever from world history. And I think it is well for us to realize that our development is anchored in an event as impossible of resuscitation, as the event of the migration.

Senator MUNDT. It could occur exactly like the people who came on the *Mayflower*, if we assume now, as they did then, that they had a perfect right to shoot out of the saddle and take it over from the people who held this land and who owned it, the American Indian. But if you are still going to adopt that ethic now, as they did then, they can go to any one of the islands of the Indonesian archipelago and shoot the Indians out and say, "We don't like them."

Mr. HARTZ. Yes; of course I think that the luxury of aboriginal destruction has also disappeared from world history, not because there are no new places to go to but because the humanitarian conscience of the world will not permit that.

Senator MUNDT. Right. This was not an uninhabited land.

Mr. HARTZ. That is right.

LETTER FROM GUATEMALA

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if I can pursue this a little. I want to put this letter in because it deals with the problem that really does confront us now. The next paragraph of this letter says:

> This insignificant minority maintains itself in power by paying the national armies. The United States sends technical help, money and armaments to modernize these armies. Last year four new troop-carrying helicopters were donated to Guatemala; 2,000 new policemen were added to the force with their salaries, uniforms, and latest of weapons all paid for from the Alliance for Progress. American experts in antiguerrilla warfare, with the help of professional torturers of Cuban, Puertorican, and Dominican nationalities keep the countryside terrorized. What is the answer?

In other words, in the first paragraph he describes the local conditions and states that we are using our money and influence to perpetuate that situation. This is contrary, I would think, to our history and our national interests.

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I think to the extent that we perpetuate such a situation it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any views as to whether or not this letter is reasonably accurate?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I am not an authority on the Guatemalan situation. I think I have done enough studying of the Latin American picture generally to state what practically everyone who has studied Latin American society affirms, that there are numerous situations of social inequity and social tension in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not an expert either. The writer has been highly publicized, although I have never met him. He offered this letter to me on February 14. I think it would be interesting in connection with this study to put the whole letter in the record to illustrate at least the views of one American who is present in that country.

(The letter referred to follows:)

MEXICO, *February 14, 1968.*

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: For the last few weeks, Guatemala has been on the front pages of the world's newspapers due to the acts of violence that have been occurring in that unfortunate nation. The one that attracted the most attention was the killing of two American officials attached to the United States Embassy in Guatemala.

In the past 18 months, more than 2,800 labor leaders, union organizers, students, intellectuals and just plain peasants have been killed by the government secret police, army, and right wing organizations. "Mano Blanca", one of the right wing organizations, staffed by policemen, with headquarters in the main police building in Guatemala City, admits that only "one in every ten is perhaps a communist". None of these deaths are publicized in the international press, and few of the bodies are found in a condition that enables them to be identified in the local press. This is all done under the auspices, albeit secret, of the U.S. Military Mission. If the United States wants to know why two of its officials were killed, let it read the quote of one of them printed in Time Magazine dated Jan. 28, 1968.

I have been working in Guatemala for over ten years. I personally started 3 credit unions, 2 agricultural cooperatives, one industrial cooperative, 2 land distribution programs, the countries only cooperative league, aided in the formation of nearly a dozen other cooperatives, and worked as hard as anybody in Guatemala to improve the miserable lot of the peasant. I didn't accomplish much, because we forever ran into government indifference at best, and government interference at worst. If any program showed signs of success the Alliance for Progress men were right there to offer money in exchange for the right to hang their publicity signs.

I don't write this letter as a complaint. I write it as a warning. The masses of Latin America are becoming more and more restless. Their governments do not want any real progress, because it would have to come at the expense of the landed oligarchy, which in turn control these governments. There is only one solution: Revolution. I would like to think that these revolutions could be peaceful, but I know from personal experience that the 2% that are bleeding the masses white, will not give up their power peacefully. It must be taken from them. It is they then who are provoking the violence, not the poor.

This insignificant minority maintains itself in power by paying the national armies. The United States sends technical help, money and armaments to modernize these armies. Last year four new troop-carrying helicopters were donated to Guatemala; 2,000 new policemen were added to the force with their salaries, uniforms, and latest of weapons all paid for from the Alliance for Progress. American experts in anti-guerrilla warfare, with the help of professional torturers of Cuban, Puertorican and Dominican nationalities, keep the countryside terrorized. What is the answer?

If the United States government continues with its policy of believing that all national insurrections are manipulated by Moscow or Peking, then it is going to find itself in more than one Vietnam in Latin America.

I was expelled from Guatemala in December along with two other priests and a nun, for the simple fact of having assisted at a reunion where we listened to the guerrillas' point of view. The expulsion was engineered by the United States Embassy. We had given our lives to the Guatemalan poor. Our expulsion does not mean the end of our dedication to them. We intend to do everything necessary to help them get a government "of the people, for the people and by the people", to quote a great American statesman. I would hate to find myself fighting someday against U.S. servicemen. But if the U.S. foreign policy is going to continue to be dictated by men like Paul Warnke, who think that the United States has a moral obligation to step in anywhere at the invitation of the local oligarchy-government to preserve *their* freedom to exploit the masses, then I'm afraid that this is just what is going to happen.

I know that you are very preoccupied with the situation in Vietnam. But it might be well to turn some of your attention to Latin America also. After all, everyone seems to disclaim knowledge as to just how we got involved in that far off land, and the big difficulty now is how to extricate ourselves "with honor". It would be a shame if such should be repeated down here also. But the real shame would be that hundreds of millions of starving human beings would come to realize that their real enemy is the U.S. government and not the local oligarchy. At least they have hopes of toppling the corrupt governments so long as the United States does not interfere. When the United States becomes involved, they are forced to turn to Moscow, to Peking, to anywhere, for help.

May you use your prestige in any circles that are capable of influencing the U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. Hoping that someday I may have the pleasure of meeting you personally, and asking God that He aid you in maintaining your courage, I remain,

Sincerely,

THOMAS R. MELVILLE.

THE "LITTLE ISRAEL" EXPERIENCE OF AMERICA

The CHAIRMAN. One or two other questions.

How did it come about, as you suggest, that a nation which started out regarding itself as "a little Israel"—that is, as an example for the world—later became, as you also suggest, a world crusader for democracy in the American image? What caused us to do this?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, there is a connection between the two principles. The concept of "a little Israel" involves the concept of a special and absolute virtue. The idea of having brought to the New World a morality which is unlimited in its meaning, but which unfortunately can only be realized in a given spot.

All right, when you are projected back into the world, as in the 20th century we have been, what is the necessary result? You apply the morality to the world. The detachment of America in the context of "a little Israel" experience, though it made our historic experience provincial, did not mitigate one whit our sense of the universality of our morality. We believed that we had the truth. We may have believed that other cultures were sufficiently decadent not to be able to appreciate the truth as we did. But when we were projected back into a relationship with them, what alternative did we have but to spread the truth to them? Certainly, we could not live with falsehoods, immorality. The Wilsonian idea is in this sense an integral outgrowth of the "little Israel" idea. Both believe in absolute morality, and both believe that the Americans have it.

AN INFLUENCE BY THE FORCE OF EXAMPLE

The CHAIRMAN. Why did we not pursue the idea that we could be a greater influence to the world primarily by the force of our example than by carrying it to them with armaments?

Mr. HARTZ. In the 19th century and in the 18th century this view was held, that to the extent that America did have a world mission, that mission would center about the preservation intact of a specially excellent experience in the New World. I have no doubt that if the Americans had their own way, they would still be maintaining that view.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by having their own way?

Mr. HARTZ. Well, I think actually the question you now raise is a rather disturbing one because of the suggestion that there may have been a possibility for us to have remained as isolationist in the 20th century as we did in the 19th. But I think if we look at the record, the evidence suggests that we could not escape an involvement in the world, that we clung to our isolationist view about as long as we could. The First World War, the Second World War, the sheer shrinking of the globe, the expansion of American power, all of these seem to have been part of a pattern slated to eliminate isolation.

The CHAIRMAN. That suggests that our involvement in Vietnam is inevitable and is simply part of the course of these historical developments.

Mr. HARTZ. It does not suggest that our involvement in Vietnam is or was inevitable. Vietnam is a specific situation. It does suggest, however, that our general involvement in the world is inevitable.

The CHAIRMAN. And that we cannot return to the "little Israel" concept. The trouble about this is that with the troubles such as Detroit last year and many other places, this "little Israel" concept is evaporating because we no longer would be an example to anybody if we continue down that road. So we have only the arms to propel us into influencing the course of events, do we not?

Mr. HARTZ. I think the events in Detroit and I think the problems which those events symbolize do not really eliminate the position of America as a democratic symbol in the world. I think there is still enough democracy, still enough functioning liberty in the United States for the United States to be fascinating for peoples abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. As of now. If this continues and we become ever and ever more militaristic—we have now over 50 percent of our budget in military expenditures—if it becomes 90 percent, do you still think there would be a functioning democracy?

Mr. HARTZ. I think the military matter is very significant. I am not speaking at all in fact of the military phase of the situation. The militarization of the United States would, if carried to an indefinite degree, clearly undermine the identity of the country abroad and at home.

The CHAIRMAN. We must adjourn because of the cloture vote. I am sorry we have to end this hearing, Mr. Hartz.

On Thursday, March 7, the committee will hear testimony of Dr. John McAlister of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University on revolution and modernization in Vietnam.

Thank you very much, Dr. Hartz. I appreciate very much your coming here. I regret we have to leave so precipitously.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, February 27, 1968.)

THE NATURE OF REVOLUTION

THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 1968

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Church, Clark, and Pell.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

The Committee on Foreign Relations this morning is holding a public hearing, fourth in a series, devoted to a study of the nature of revolution and the significance of revolutions abroad for American foreign policy. Our witness is Dr. John T. McAlister, Jr., lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

Earlier hearings in this series have explored the broad historical background of the topic, the overall American attitude toward revolution, and the general revolutionary situation in China and Asia as a whole. Today we are asking Dr. McAlister to give us his views about the revolutionary aspects of the most concrete and urgent foreign problem confronting this Nation; that is, the situation in Vietnam.

Dr. McAlister, we are very pleased that you have been able to find the time to come before the committee, and we welcome your presence and your statement. Will you proceed, sir?

(The biographic sketch of Dr. McAlister follows:)

Biographic Sketch of Dr. John T. McAlister, Jr.

Dr. John T. McAlister, Jr., is a Lecturer in Public and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, offering courses on revolution and modernization with respect to Vietnam and southeast Asia. He is also a Research Associate at the Center of International Studies at Princeton.

Before accepting his present position, Dr. McAlister served for two years as an advisor to the River Force of the Vietnamese Navy while on active duty as a Lieutenant (j.g.) in the United States Naval Reserve. In November 1961 he prepared a staff study, "The Internal Security Problem, South Vietnam."

Born in Spartanburg, South Carolina in 1936, Dr. McAlister graduated from Yale University in 1958, having started the study of the Vietnamese language there in 1957. He received his Ph.D. from Yale in 1966.

Dr. McAlister has contributed to various journals including *World Politics* and the *American Political Science Review*. His book, *Viet Nam: The Origins of Revolution,* will be published later this year.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN T. McALISTER, JR.,[1] WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Dr. McAlister. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am indeed flattered to be invited to come before your committee and I would like at the outset to indicate why I feel that it is appropriate to be able to respond to your invitation. I have worked for 10 years now on problems of Vietnamese politics and culture, and for two of those years I served as a naval officer in Vietnam as adviser to the river force of the Vietnamese Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Dr. MCALISTER. I was there from 1959 to 1961. This was in the Mekong Delta where I was working with a 100-boat group that was providing the major means of mobility in that area.

Subsequently, I returned to complete my graduate work and have just completed a book which will be called "Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution" which will be published later this year.

I would like to indicate that there are so many unknowns about Vietnam, and one of the reasons that there are so many unknowns is that there are no more than a dozen qualified people in this country with the language training, with the background and the culture, social science, et cetera, who have been able to bring the knowledge that we have to the attention of the public, and because of these limits, I would say from the outset that I have tried to overcome these limits as much as possible, and I hope that my testimony will be seen in the light of the limits of our knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

By any chance, did you ever run across Bernard Fall in your studies?

Dr. MCALISTER. Yes; indeed I did.

The CHAIRMAN. I considered him one of the most informed men about Vietnam.

Dr. MCALISTER. Indeed he was, sir. A tragic loss.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was.

Dr. MCALISTER. Sir, I will proceed with my prepared testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Please do proceed.

PROSPECTS FOR OUR MILITARY FORCE IN VIETNAM

Dr. MCALISTER. A nagging question in the minds of most Americans is: why hasn't the military power of the United States thus far been able to bring the war in Vietnam to an end? And is there any prospect that our military force, even if expanded massively, can—by itself—end the war anytime soon?

Now that additional forces have been rushed to Saigon's aid, the President has said that he will give the commanders in the field whatever forces they need, is there any indication that a more massive application of force will make a decisive difference militarily? Even if our troop strength is doubled or tripled from its present size to a level of a million or a million and a half men, can we expect that such military force will achieve a position of supremacy and create conditions favorable for the revival of political order?

The gravity of the current military situation, especially at Khe Sanh and around Saigon, and the possibility of a full-scale mobilization here at home calls into question our earlier rationalizations about the utility of force in Vietnam and the level of strength required there. Now, before events overtake us completely, is there any possiblity of finding some more dependable basis, other than the existing one, on which to assess the present dangers and future prospects of our military operations in Vietnam?

In searching for answers to these questions it may be useful to note that as late as 1938, only 11,000 French troops aided by a 16,000-man local militia were able to maintain France's colonial control throughout the whole of Indochina—an area nearly half again as large as France itself—which included Vietnam along with the States of Laos and Cambodia. Even after the war broke out in Vietnam in 1947, a French-led force consisting of only 70,000 French regulars, 68,000 Legionnaires and Africans, and 300,000 Vietnamese, or a total of less than 450,000 men was able to hold out for seven years against the Communists and ultimately to contain them to a territory north of the 17th parallel.

Why is it that more than 500,000 American troops cannot now quell the armed opposition in a small portion of the territory in 1968 that only 11,000 French troops were able to control with hardly firing a shot just 30 years ago? Certainly this is not because American troops have not fought bravely and fiercely. On the contrary, as the events of recent weeks have shown again, our men have fought with rare courage and uncommon tenacity.

The reason a force nearly 50 times larger than the one in 1938 cannot now be more effective in two-thirds less territory is that during the past three decades Vietnam had undergone far-reaching and fundamental political changes—changes which have not resulted in political stability or agreement about the kind of political order the Vietnamese might desire or accept, but changes which have led to a pattern of conflict involving increasingly larger numbers of Vietnamese in military operations.

UNRESOLVED POLITICAL CONFLICT

Our own difficulties have risen because when we went into Vietnam, our policies did not take into account that the country was in the midst of an unresolved political conflict nor did they reflect an understanding of what the underlying nature of this conflict really was. We are not merely fighting against an external invader that is attempting to gain control over a culturally distinct foreign country by force, nor are we fighting in a civil war that is a purely internal matter among southern Vietnamese, but, instead, we have become engaged in a revolutionary war involving all of the Vietnamese people.

Saying that Vietnam is in the midst of a revolution——

DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND CIVIL WAR

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask, as a matter of semantics, do you distinguish between a revolutionary war and a civil war?

Dr. McALISTER. Yes, sir; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the distinction?

Dr. McALISTER. The distinction that I would make is that in civil wars, including our own, there are secessionist goals on the part of those who are fighting. In a revolutionary war, by contrast, as I will say in subsequent paragraphs here, the primary goal is a unification, people who are fighting with a common assumption that there is one nation and that they want to impose one government over it. So that in a secession war such as the one in the United States, the one in Nigeria, other secessionist wars, this is a civil war in which one portion of the country is wanting to secede, another faction is trying to maintain unity in the country. This does apply in VN!

Moreover, in a revolutionary war there are very distinct political goals about the whole reconstitution of the basis of political order involved rather than simply the maintenance of a control over a territory.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, with that definition, is our own War Between the States a civil war or a revolutionary war?

Dr. McALISTER. I would say that was a civil war.

The CHAIRMAN. They were seeking to secede?

Dr. McALISTER. We were seeking to secede; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We were seeking to secede. [Laughter.]

But we failed.

Dr. McALISTER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And since then it has been a revolutionary war as to who controls it?

Dr. McALISTER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Dr. McALISTER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

ASSESSMENT OF UTILITY OF AMERICAN FORCES IN VIETNAM

Dr. McALISTER. Saying that Vietnam is in the midst of a revolution has usually been interpreted as a polemical attack or as a purely ideological assertion. But when I identify the political conflict in Vietnam as a revolution it is not because I wish to engage in polemics but because I wish to lay the basis for an assessment of the utility of American military force in that country.

My discussion of the way such an assessment can be made will focus around two major points: One, a definition of the nature of revolution in Vietnam and, two, an analysis of the military weaknesses which have resulted from the inability of the Saigon government to conduct a strategy of revolution.

NATURE OF STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM

The war now raging in Vietnam is a continuation of the pattern of conflict launched by the Communist-led independence movement, the Vietminh, against France and the non-Communist Vietnamese during the first Indochina war of 1947–54; it is not a war being fought between two separate nations but it is a revolutionary struggle involving two competitor governments within one nation. More conspicuously than in wars between nations, revolutionary war is a continuation of politics by other means. It is a competition between two or more governments, each of which wants to become the sole legitimate government of a people.

Since it was founded on September 2, 1946, by Ho Chi Minh, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has claimed to be the legitimate government for all the Vietnamese people and in fighting to eliminate French rule it carried out military operations and enjoyed political support in all sections of Vietnam. By accepting a military cease-fire and the partitioning of the country in 1954, the Hanoi government did not, in the process, relinquish its claims to legitimacy throughout the country.

Moreover, the Republic of Vietnam founded in Saigon in 1956, by Ngo Dinh Diem has, despite our assumptions to the contrary, also seen itself as the sole government for all the Vietnamese. For example, the constitution of the Republic of Vietnam written in Saigon in March 1967, states that the purpose of the Government is to unite the nation and unite the territory. The constitution's first article says that "Vietnam is a territorially indivisible, unified, and independent republic" and article No. 107 says that "Article 1 of the constitution and this article may not be amended or deleted."

The CHAIRMAN. It is clear that that applied to all of Vietnam, not just South Vietnam?

Dr. MCALISTER. I think it is certainly clear to those of us who have been studying Vietnam and it is clear to those who wrote it. I would say it has not been generally clear to the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. The people or the Government?

Dr. MCALISTER. Well, I think our Government is part of our people and we have not been clear on this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. MCALISTER. While the United States regards the Saigon government as sovereign over only the territory south of the 17th parallel and, therefore, believes it to be a separate Vietnamese state, known as South Vietnam, this has not been the way that the Vietnamese have looked at it. Though the Saigon regime has been hard pressed to maintain its claims to sovereignty even in the cities of southern Vietnam, it has never given up its goal—as the new constitution again indicates—to be the sole legitimate government for the whole country. Thus there has been a recognition by both Saigon and Hanoi that, as long as the country remains divided, a revolutionary conflict will go on until some form of agreement is reached on the nature of the political order for the whole of Vietnamese culture.

OBJECTIVES OF REVOLUTIONARY WARS

Revolutionary wars not only have unique political objectives but these objectives are the immediate goal of the conflict and their pursuit directly governs the conduct of military operations. In wars between nations, political objectives are by contrast, usually sought indirectly by destroying the military power of an adversary and then using a position of military supremacy to dictate political terms. The object of revolutionary warfare, however, is to eliminate the political structure of an opponent government and replace it with one's own political structure.

In this process, the elimination of an opponent's political effectiveness by assassinating village chiefs and terrorizing provincial officials is much less important than the task of filling the vacuum which such terror creates. The primary goal of a revolutionary competitior in Vietnam must be to forge peasant villagers into a totally new political community—one which can command loyalties because it rewards performance in support of the revolutionary cause by offering increasing amounts of politics, power, and personal authority. Through this strategy, military force is used not just to decimate the institutions and armed forces of an adversary like the Saigon government but also, and more importantly, to provide means for popular participation in revolutionary politics.

The Communists have been able to develop more and more power in Vietnam because as they have forged a new political community;

* up to limits!
and for the "loyal"; not for "unworthy"!

they have been effecting a revolution in Vietnamese politics. In Vietnam, revolution has been characterized not only by the effort to eliminate French colonial rule and to create a single legitimate government for all the Vietnamese people but also by fundamental changes in participation in politics and in the access to political power. Through new institutions—such as revolutionary committees and assemblies which have been established through southern Vietnam as well as military units and popular associations—Vietnamese peasants are having a chance to achieve a greater share of power as their participation contributes to an increase in the overall power of the revolutionary movement.

Only when such institutional links reach out into the society and create political opportunities which are qualitatively different from those of the past can a modern political elite in Vietnam identify itself with those still living traditional lives of relative isolation in the countryside. As these new opportunities have enlisted the participation of rural people in new forms of politics and won their commitment to a new and much broader political identity, it has been possible to mobilize ever larger amounts of popular strength.

vs W-L

Through the opportunities which the Communist system provides, the Vietnamese villager has been able to find a more predictable access to the attributes of modern life (i.e., literacy, technical skills, and organizational ability, etc.) and the rewards of political influence than through any other governmental structure in Vietnam. And by this mobilization of the potential strength of the peasants and the sharing of governmental authority with them, the Communists have been acquiring greater legitimacy and gaining increasing compliance with their will as they have conducted their military campaign.

* for ... ?
to do ... ?

POLITICAL STRUCTURE LINKED TO THE PEOPLE

Without a political structure linking it to the people, a government in a revolutionary war like the one in Vietnam may exist in name but not in fact. It will be unable to rally a people behind it, since it will have no dependable means of sharing power and influence with those called upon to participate in its behalf. But with such a structure of political commitment a government can lose much of its regular military strength and even much of its territory yet still continue to be a serious revolutionary competitor.

** Because it will not have to hold on to territory in order to insure the political loyalty of the inhabitants, a revolutionary movement with an effective political structure like that which the Communists have in Vietnam can achieve a greater freedom to maneuver its armed forces against an adversary. Moreover, its adversary may more likely be required to keep his troops in static positions in order to provide security for a population whose loyalty he has not otherwise been able to win.

As one revolutionary competitor develops the strength of its political structure so that it can—despite heavy casualties—mobilize increasingly larger armed forces and also free itself of local security responsibilities, then it will be able, by its greater maneuverability, to force its opponent into more and more fixed positions of defense. With his forces spread out and tied down, such an adversary will be vulnerable to the piecemeal decimation of his paralyzed and help-

** we see this as a result of greater ruthlessness, use of terror.

less troops by the highly maneuverable forces of this revolutionary competitor.

U.S. forces are not pinned down to vulnerable fixed positions at Khe Sanh and numerous other similar locations in Vietnam because our policies have not reflected an understanding that the conflict there is a revolutionary war and that in such a war the lack of an effective governmental structure is not just an annoying drawback, but a decisive military liability.

Moreover, Communist-led forces have now been able to achieve the third and final stage of their revolutionary war strategy, that of positional warfare, because we have for political reasons in Vietnam lost both the initiative in combat and the operational mobility in our strategy.

POLITICAL WEAKNESSES OF SAIGON GOVERNMENT

Most of our military problems have arisen because we have been attempting to compensate with ever larger amounts of our military force for the political weaknesses of the Saigon government. Since the Republic of Vietnam has not been able to mobilize increasingly larger portions of its own population for revolutionary war by putting their young men into the field as troops, U.S. troops have had to take over the major role of fighting for them. And since Saigon has not had the political structure to consolidate its hold on territory in the countryside once it is cleared of the adversary, the military strength of the United States has had to offset this political weakness by using our troops to try to hold on to the ground by force.

Because no better way has been found to win the political support of the people in the countryside than by trying to provide them with security, the result has been that increasingly larger portions of Vietnamese and American troops have been tied down to static positions. And when these forces have been moved to other locations in response to more pressing problems elsewhere the political support, which had been won by temporary security, is lost. Despite its rhetorical commitment to revolution as, for example, in the revolutionary development cadre program, the Saigon government has not been able to carry out fundamental change—revolutionary change—in the means of access to political power and the sharing of governmental authority. Consequently, it has not been able to win the far-reaching political commitment of the peasants in the countryside or mobilize them into revolutionary war programs.

Saigon's only hope has been that through a program of pacification it could win the temporary commitment of the peasants not to join the Communist-led National Liberation Front. But pacification, in effect, if not in design, has meant military occupation of the rural areas.

Any more positive commitment has been out of the question because the Saigon government has had no program in which it might share power with the peasants or provide a pattern of predictable rewards in return for performance in support of the Republic of Vietnam. For instance, the village militiaman in the so-called popular forces does not have the opportunity to progress upward into the regional forces and then into the regular army as does his village counterpart who joins with the National Liberation Front. Through the NLF, a peasant

* a high-cost basis for "support"

xx W.L. But Saigon "cannot" do what they ask.

villager might become an officer, but up until very recently no one could become an officer in the ARVN unless he were a graduate of a lycée and had a baccalaureate degree, and though it is now possible, there is by no means a free access into the officer corps without this educational background.

So long as our ally, the Saigon government, does not have any effective political structure with which to gain popular support and bring order to the countryside, it can only try to achieve these goals by the use of force. But the lack of such a political structure also means that the Saigon government cannot mobilize the recruits for an army large enough to hold on to the countryside by force alone. Since the Saigon government cannot survive except by the use of force and since it cannot mobilize the force to provide for its own survival the United States is faced with an anguishing dilemma.

UNITED STATES FACED WITH TWO ALTERNATIVES

The current focus of our policies seems to leave us with only two alternatives. Either we go on fighting with the realization that the conflict will intensify and demand greater numbers of American troops as the political strength of the Saigon government deteriorates further, and that of the Communists increases, or we acknowledge that our ally does not have the political capacity for victory and that our policies have been wrong. In the days ahead these harsh alternatives will have to be confronted as they have not been before.

Whatever the approach adopted in the immediate future, it is clear from the official statements about the recent Tet offensive that our estimates of the utility of military force in Vietnam and the level of strength our strategy requires still do not take into account the revolutionary character of the war. Yet even official statements make clear that no matter what the purpose of the Tet attacks on the cities, their principal effect has been to weaken further the political structure of the Saigon government and shift even more of the burden of fighting the Communists on to the shoulders of the United States.

Moreover such a pattern of attacks seems certain to continue because the Communists, by destroying the last remaining shreds of political strength and effectiveness that Saigon still enjoys, could leave the United States with no indigenous political ally to carry on the war. A political collapse of the Saigon regime might then permit the Communists to achieve a revolutionary war victory without ever having to defeat U.S. forces in the field. But whether or not a sudden governmental collapse occurs, the past performance and the existing resiliency of the Saigon regime such as was demonstrated with the political collapse of the governmental authority in Hué and many other provincial centers, suggests that we be fully prepared for its role in the war to diminish substantially and probably to the vanishing point.

U.S. MILITARY SITUATION IS CRITICAL

Even without a governmental collapse, however, the military situation in Vietnam is a critical one. By trying to compensate for the political weaknesses of the Saigon regime and at the same time trying to stop a revolutionary movement by force we have positioned many of our troops in dangerously exposed locations. Because there are not now enough Americans in Vietnam to defend the cities, keep open the roads, carry out pacification, fight infiltration, and launch attacks against enemy main force units, they have been spread thin and therefore have been exposed to attack. While all eyes are on Khe Sanh, at this moment, it is not the only such exposed position, and following the pattern of previous surprise attacks, the Communists might well choose to hit some other location. They will have many options to select from, since troops have had to be drawn around the cities to provide protection for them and others have been shifted north around Hué and the DMZ.

Only by concentrating our troops in defensible perimeters or by rushing more substantial reinforcements to Vietnam could the exposure of these forces be reduced. But by giving up our tenuous hold on parts of Vietnamese territory we would be abandoning the population of these areas to Communist control and thus weakening our credibility among other Vietnamese who have believed in our assertions about protection. On the other hand, a substantial expansion of our combat forces would merely raise again the question of what effectiveness we believe our use of force in Vietnam can have.

ACHIEVING A MILITARY SUPREMACY

As the Saigon government declines in its political strength it becomes more and more clear that we are primarily fighting against a revolutionary movement and are trying primarily by force to prevent it from forming a Communist led government in southern Vietnam. Since we cannot sponsor an effective political alternative to this revolutionary movement we must, if we are to force it to give up its goals, achieve a clear-cut position of military supremacy which will allow us to dictate political terms of our own choosing.

A basis for calculating the strength that the military supremacy in revolutionary war would require is either the 10-to-1 ratio of the military strength which the French amassed in Algeria or the 50–to–1 ration which the British mounted in Malaya. If these ratios are applied to Vietnam where the Communists have approximately 300,000 men in all their forces then the United States would have to send either three million men to achieve the same kind of supremacy France had in Algeria where the war was won militarily but lost politically or 15 million men to repeat the British success in Malaya.

Many military specialists will dispute the efficacy of these ratios but whatever the ratio required to achieve pure military supremacy in Vietnam it must be calculated with the realization that so long as the Communist political system is not affected, they can be expected to mobilize greater and greater amounts of force. And if we expect to prevail militarily then we had better plan on matching the Communists' increase in military strength with increases of 100 to 500 of our own troops for every 10 more of theirs. Thus there would be no net gain in terms of military supremacy from such increases in troops alone.

If our troops in their exposed positions are to avoid a humiliating military setback in the months ahead, then more massive reinforcements are required to assist them. But if there is a full-scale mobilization here at home then our people should realize just how high the price will be for what I believe to be an illusive military supremacy.

If we want to avoid both military humiliation in Vietnam and years of full-scale mobilization here at home, then it seems necessary for our military power to be used to achieve some more feasible political objective in Vietnam. This must be done in a manner which will focus the political energies of both the combatants and the relevant members of the international community such as France, China, and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, the path toward political accommodation in Vietnam will obviously be an unhappy and protracted one, but it is the path that offers to our national prestige and our international credibility.

Sir, this concludes my prepared remarks. I want to thank you very much indeed for the opportunity to present them to you and the committee.

FUNDAMENTAL MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT NATURE OF WAR

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. McAlister. I think you have prepresented a very provocative statement which raises a matter of most fundamental importance. I think there has been a great misunderstanding in this country as to the nature of this war. It has been presented, I believe, by the Government, as such, as a classic invasion by one external power of another. One of the most common analogies has been the invasion by Hitler, say, of France or of her neighbors. Very often we are told that Ho Chi Minh is acting in the role of Hitler and that we must respond in the same way. I would take it you don't agree with that analogy?

Dr. McALISTER. I don't think that in this instance that Ho Chi Minh would be regarded by people living in South Vietnam as a Hitler

EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR II ON REVOLUTIONARY TENDENCIES

The CHAIRMAN. Did you regard World War II as a revolutionary war?

Dr. McALISTER. No, sir, I didn't, I do not. But there are, coming out of World War II there have been, opportunities for numerous revolutionary movements to be started. One of them in particular in Vietnam, and this is again the focus, one of the focuses, of the book that I am working on.

The Japanese occupation of Indo-China played an instrumental role in the revolutionary movement being able to get started in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. It loosened the influence and dominance of the colonial power, and that is what resulted almost all over the world: the colonial power disintegrated because it was mutilated by the effects of the war, isn't that right?

Mr. McALISTER. Indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. And these tendencies to revolution, of course, were allowed to assert themselves. They were there all along but they had not been strong enough to overthrow the colonial power; is that correct.

Dr. McALISTER. That is correct, sir.

POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. At the end of your statement I don't quite understand what you are suggesting when you say this must be done in a manner which will focus the political energies of both the combatants and the relevant members of the international community. Just what did you have in mind by that sentence?

Dr. MCALISTER. I had in mind, sir, that political accommodation in Vietnam, if it is to have some durability, will both require accommodation among local political forces as well as international ones, and what I meant to suggest by that statement was that if you did not have both of these elements brought into the settlement that your chances for durability of your settlement would be thereby diminished.

The CHAIRMAN. Would an illustration of that be that if a political settlement is worked out, the French, the Chinese, the Soviets and ourselves would have to accept it and perhaps, as a symbol of that acceptance, agree to the neutralization of this area, that we all would stay out of it? Is that possibly what you have in mind?

Dr. MCALISTER. Well, I think neutralization is a very elusive word in this particular context. I don't think that neutralization necessarily means that all of these countries have to stay out of the area in order for there to be a neutralization.

What I have in mind here is that if we do not look at the volatility, the instability of the Southeast Asia wide political—mainland Southeast Asia political—system and realize that it doesn't have the internal elements for order, and that necessarily international power is going to impinge on the region that does not have the internal elements for order more than it would than, say, in a European system or other regional systems of politics which do have those internal elements, that international power is going to be thrust upon it, and that rather than trying to extricate it, the important aspect of it is to use it in the achievement of local political stability, and rather than this having been done in the past, international power has contributed further to this political instability and, therefore, the thrust of my remark there was that if we simply got a local accommodation, that is by the purely local indigenous forces, and there was not some overarching agreement among the international powers, then the international powers might then return at some future date.

Or by contrast if there were an agreement by the international powers and this were not linked to local agreements, then local difficulties might again draw international powers into this situation once again.

I hope in some way that clarifies this remark.

MEANING OF NEUTRALIZATION

The CHAIRMAN. All I meant by neutralization, really, I was using the term loosely, is that the major powers simply agree themselves not to maintain military establishments there; to leave them more or less to develop their own political institutions. Is that at all consistent with what you just said or not?

Dr. MCALISTER. Well, I would think that the real focus of getting a stable power situation in Southeast Asia would not, in the abstract or in theory, be totally antithetical to the position of some troops, for example. If we or if a SEATO group or some group had troops in some portion of Southeast Asia this would be counterbalanced by troops in certain locations by other groups such as France or other powers, this might serve to get at the political balance of the stability that we are talking about.

I am not advocating that those troops be used in such a way. But I think it is possible to conceive certain circumstances in which the troops might serve it. Therefore, I would say that in looking for the heart of the matter I would not look at the presence or absence of troops, but the way that political power is being managed in this entire region.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say what you have stated about this revolutionary situation would be applicable even though this particular revolution is a Communist revolution? Supposing it is just a nationalist revolution, a non-Communist nationalist revolution? Would this alter your views about its character or not?

Dr. McALISTER. No, sir, it would not.

ELEMENT OF COMMUNIST IDENTITY

The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't matter. Your opinion is, what you've said is valid for a non-Communist nationalist revolutionary situation as valid it is for a Communist. It is only incidental that it is Communist.

Dr. McALISTER. Well, it is not totally incidental that it is Communist. The point is that the Communists, particularly in Vietnam, have been more true to the genius of developing revolutionary strategies than have non-Communist groups, and the element of the Communist identity, of course, links them with other international Communist powers. Just as, let us say, if we had, speaking now in the abstract, if we had a revolutionary strategy for the transformation of underdeveloped countries, and this resulted in there being a local indigenous elite that could somehow identify with a free world revolutionary ideology, their coming to power, of course, would link them to an international system the same way that the Communists coming to power through this revolutionary ideology, strategy links them with international Communist groups. So that there is obviously going to be international competition, in my judgment in most every revolution. I can't conceive of there not being. But that the real functional elements here are not ones that the Communists in any way need have any monopoly over.

They have it by default, because none of the non-Communist powers of the world, either—I should step back on that—there are some indigenous nationalist revolutions such as, for example, the one that Mr. Nasser has carried out, which he didn't have to go through a revolutionary war the way the Vietnamese had had to go through. It has been a very unique circumstance on Vietnam. But Mr. Nasser has been somebody who has had his own revolutionary strategy, for example. The Indonesians, non-Communist Indonesians, have had a revolutionary strategy. Unfortunately, we haven't, because of our lack of sensitivity to the problem of revolution in undeveloped countries, been able to contribute a great deal to the development of these revolutionary movements that are not of a Communist nature.

Senator CLARK. Would the Senator yield briefly at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. I will be very glad to yield.

Senator CLARK. I am very much impressed with your statement, Dr. McAlister.

Dr. MCALISTER. Thank you very much, sir.

IDENTIFIABLE VIETCONG LEADERSHIP

Senator CLARK. I was in Vietnam in January. And what bothers me is that you don't get any feeling that there is an identifiable Vietcong leadership. You mentioned Nasser. We know about Suharto. We know about Castro, but except for Ho Chi Minh in the north you don't find any identifiable Vietcong revolutionary leadership to which those who oppose the Saigon Government can rally. It seems to be anonymous. We don't even know what the Vietcong infrastructure is. I wonder how you tie that into the questions the Chairman was just asking you about this being a true revolutionary concept?

It seems to be a revolution without leadership, except through the effort of the North to dominate the South.

Dr. MCALISTER. Well, the members of the National Liberation Front leadership do not command the prestige that Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap and Pham Van Dong and others have commanded in earlier periods of revolution in Vietnam.

It seems, however, that such leadership as does command prestige, is primarily at the local level and, therefore, their prestige has been only over provincial or two provinces or similar levels. So, in other words, it would be like saying that the people who really count in terms of leadership are at the precinct level in South Vietnam at this point and they are the ones who look to——

Senator CLARK. I asked who are the Vietcong leaders in the Delta, for example. They couldn't tell me.

Dr. MCALISTER. I would just say this, sir, that I don't know of the experiences you have had, but there is a general feeling on the part of most of us who have followed this particular conflict that the province chiefs, the district chiefs, know their counterparts extremely well, extremely well.

And they know who the commanders of these particular regiments and battalions are, and in many cases they have school ties and other ties with them. So that this is why I get back to the sort of precinct level leadership, if you will, that is not an anonymous force at all.

Now, I think that you are quite right there is no one with a particular charismatic appeal within the NLF that Ho Chi Minh, Giap, Pham Van Dong and others have. But I would just urge you to keep in mind that the Lao Dong party politburo is far from being devoid of native southerners. They are there, they are represented there, and certainly one of the great problems stretching throughout Vietnamese revolutionary history from the 1930s to the present, is how southern revolutionary movements could be controlled by a national party.

For example, in 1940 there were two uprisings in southern Vietnam concurrent with the interventions of the Japanese which the national party specifically ordered not to occur, and southern revolutionary groups carried them out nonetheless, to their own lack of success and decimation of their own forces.

So that there is—it seems one of the characteristics worldwide of how does the center control the people in the southern areas has certainly been true for the Lao Dong party as well.

Senator CLARK. I am sorry to interrupt, Mr. Chairman.

MEXICAN REVOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. If I may return to this other point about the revolutions, Mexico is an example in this hemisphere of the most successful revolution, and it was not a Communist revolution.

Dr. MCALISTER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Although it might have been called a Communist revolution if it had occurred today, wouldn't it? There is a very loose application of the word "Communist" in some of the Latin American revolutions. Anyone who seeks to upset the established order is generally referred to as a Communist, or with Communist proclivities in this day and time.

Dr. MCALISTER. Well, I would think just for this reason that probably at this moment nowhere in the world is there a revolution going on that we could be more aptly identified with than the one, as I see it, occurring in Chile under the leadership of President Frei. This gets back to many of the issues that I was trying to confront, and that is it is perfectly possible for an incumbent to be the leader of a revolutionary movement. As I don't pretend to pose as an expert on Chile, I am talking only about the knowledge I have been able to obtain secondarily, that here is a very pronounced effort to share power, broaden the basis of political participation, undertake social and economic change, and perhaps if we were a little more deft in identifying ourselves with something of this kind and saying that this is really the type of thing that is to be supported, and with this type of effort the probability of a guerrilla-led revolution moving on into a major revolutionary war, the chances of that would be diminished.

DICTATING POLITICAL TERMS

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement you say since we cannot sponsor an effective political alternative to this revolutionary movement we must, if we are to force it to give up its goals, achieve the clear-cut position of military supremacy which will allow us to dictate political terms of our own choosing.

First, do you think this is a feasible objective?

Dr. MCALISTER. I have tried by the subsequent comments that I made there to indicate that I think it is only feasible if we are willing to put between 3 and 15 million men in there, and I think even at that point there is no certainty that it is going to be any guarantee that we are going to get that position of military supremacy.

No, I am not advocating this at all. But I think that anybody who feels that there are chances of military supremacy has to confront these previous experiences, put our present experiences in context of these previous ones.

The CHAIRMAN. If we achieved that, do you think this would protect the Saigon government from pressures toward political changes and compromise?

Dr. MCALISTER. Given our past history of trying to influence it in this direction, I would not see that a more massive introduction of our force would lead to greater influence with it. As a matter of fact, it seems to me that the more we have moved to compensate for its political weaknesses, the more the leverage it has got over us.

POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say that your comments imply that the path toward political accommodation is the only way out for the United States?

Dr. McALISTER. Well, I have tried to lay alternatives here. I am saying, as I did say in the final paragraph, that this is obviously not the only way out. The way out will ultimately be determined by national leadership and, of course, they may seek other ways out, and they might find them with rather massive amounts of force, but I am saying that the path of political accommodation in my judgment is the one with the least danger to our national prestige and international credibility.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about the arrests by the Saigon government of the various candidates in the recent election, and the return, in effect, to martial law? I believe the government requested the right to rule by decree. I think it has been rejected, hasn't it, by the——

Dr. McALISTER. The lower house has rejected it. It has not been acted upon by the upper house, and if it is accepted by the upper house there is the possibility that the lower house decision could be overturned.

The CHAIRMAN. If that is true, do you think that this would affect the outlook for moving toward a political accommodation?

Dr. McALISTER. I think that it would affect it, but I don't think that it would be a decisive means of affecting it. In other words——

The CHAIRMAN. Would it promote it?

Dr. McALISTER. Well, I can conceive of certain circumstances in which there was undue pressure brought to bear to have this get the votes, to vote such a thing in the assembly, and that there could then be a disaffected group, particularly the one under the leadership of Senator, former General, Tran Van Don who might, at that point might, be more interested in accommodation simply because it had been overruled within the legislature.

In other words, I think that while this is obviously an important consideration, there is no question about that, that still it wouldn't be the decisive thing that would prevent the combination from occurring. I think that from the point of view of President Thieu and Vice President Ky their move here was obviously dictated from their interests and from their point of view in seeing a coalition government at least for the moment checked, and it was from their terms of reference a very prudent move indeed.

LAND REFORM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. According to a New York Times report datelined March 5, by Mr. Felix Belair, he says a study on land reform in South Vietnam made for a House subcommittee contained the following statement, and I quote:

Virtually all land reform ceased in 1961, and the major new development in the law has been one prescribing in effect "negative land reform," or the return of the landlords to their former positions in areas that have been re-secured.

Does this statement conform to you understanding of the situation?

Dr. McAlister. In general it does, sir; but I am not primarily—I don't have special competence in the legislation and decrees on the land reform itself. I have been more concerned with the political consequences of the land tenure pattern rather than a lot of what I would regard as the relatively tangential ones, whether they have a land reform law or whether they haven't. I think it is the consequences of what they have or have not done that I have been giving my time and attention to.

The Chairman. Generally speaking, land reform is a rather common characteristic of revolutionary movements in most of the former colonial areas, is it not?

Dr. McAlister. Indeed, it is; sir.

Let me, if I might, expand just on this point. It is not just the fact of land reform or lack of land reform in and of itself that leads to political power, but what you do once you have gotten land reform undertaken; that is to say, large concentrations of landholding obviously result in an oligarchical configuration of political power and, therefore, breaking up that oligarchical configuration of power, if you are seeking to achieve a broader share in the power, is obviously very advantageous.

But simply breaking up that configuration of power does not in and of itself insure you broader political support nor does the simple awarding of the land to landless peasants, they may like you, they may come forward and be very well-disposed toward you, but this doesn't mean that they are going to be committed to you in a political sense, in the sense of discipline.

POLITICAL DISCIPLINE

I think one of the things that the people who consider people who talk about revolution, as I talk about it, fuzzy-minded and not hard-nosed enough is that they are not always looking at the results of these changes; that is, results that come in the form of political discipline and political organizations rather than looking at changes that might serve to increase welfare.

So that I would characterize part of the academic—indeed, the political debate that has gone on over the past two decades in this country between those who say, as they were saying 20 years ago about China, they aren't really land reformers and political reformers, they are really totalitarian, political operatives who are seeking to get control of the populace by force. On the other hand, people were saying you were not keeping your attention focused on the fact that the peasants they were organizing had very basic needs and here was a movement that was responding to their basic needs.

What I am trying to say, by bringing the spectrum of opinion into focus, where I think it can be very useful to us both as scholars and as policymakers, is that truly the political discipline is what ultimately is going to count. But you just don't go out and get political discipline simply by forming people into ranks and indoctrinating them with ideology.

There is a response to very profound opportunities in Vietnam as elsewhere. I know of no more pragmatic people anywhere than a Vietnamese peasant. He has a wet finger to the wind to try to figure on it where the advantages are going to lie for him, and simply because his margin of existence is so slight that he is much more shrewd in his calculations than more fortunate peoples elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reporter. I will put that entire article in the record for reference to this last question.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From The New York Times, March 6, 1968]

EXPERT'S REPORT ASSAILS SAIGON ON LAND REFORM

(By Felix Belair, Jr.)

WASHINGTON, March 5.—An expert study made for a Congressional watchdog committee has concluded that the absence of effective land reform in South Vietnam "is costing the lives of large numbers of American soldiers and is significantly prolonging the war."

The author of the study, Dr. Roy L. Prosterman, is a professor of law at the University of Washington and a consultant on land law at the Stanford Research Institute. He conducted an extended investigation of land conditions on the scene as a member of a six-man team.

Parts of Dr. Prosterman's report were included in a statement of views filed with the House today by the chairman and by the ranking Republican member of the Government Operations subcommittee on foreign operations and freedom of information.

Representative John E. Moss of California, the chairman, and Representative Ogden R. Reid, Republican of Westchester, cited Dr. Prosterman's findings in rebutting the dissenting views of two Democratic Representatives—John S. Monagan of Connecticut and L. H. Fountain of North Carolina.

The dissenters argued that the subcommittee report, as approved by the parent committee, failed to "place its findings and recommendations in the proper context of a South Vietnam shattered and buffeted by war."

Representatives Moss and Reid said that "on the contrary, the report is most explicit when it quotes a high adviser to the U.S. mission on land reform who testified that the farmer's interest in land reform is latent and enduring and that he wants to own the land he farms."

"The security of the countryside in Vietnam is directly dependent on whether the peasant has a stake in that security." they said. "If he does not, these areas will never be secure."

The rebuttal added: "It is the view of Dr. Roy L. Prosterman, a prominent and well-known consultant to the U.S. mission, that the recent massive Vietcong attacks against Saigon, Danang, provincial capitals and American air bases 'vividly demonstrates the near bankruptcy of the Saigon regime's effort to win the loyalty of the masses.'

"Dr. Prosterman points out that the scope of manpower and logistics involved in mounting a complex of attacks of this kind 'make it wholly unlikely that they could have occurred without multiple specific advance intelligence warnings except in a setting in which the wills of the population ranged from apathetic to hostile toward their Government.' "

Several of the more dramatic passages from the Prosterman report were omitted from the joint rebuttal statement by Representatives Moss and Reid but have now been made available here. The passages included the following:

"The failure to undertake a sweeping and genuine land reform in South Vietnam assuredly is costing, during each year of delay, the lives of large numbers of American soldiers over and above the number that would otherwise be killed. It is significantly prolonging the war.

"Virtually all land reform ceased in 1961, and the major new development in the law has been one prescribing in effect 'negative land reform.' or the return of the landlords to their former positions in areas that have been resecured.

"The Americans are thus placed in a position of those-who-are-here-to-take-back-our-land in the eyes of hundreds of thousands of peasants, and must unconsciously bear the enormous burden of their opposition as well as the burden of fighting the true hard-core Communist elements."

The statement by Representatives Moss and Reid took issue with a statement in the dissenting report quoting a study for the Defense Department made by the Rand Corporation, a research-and-development organization.

The study said at one point that "from the point of view of Government control, the ideal province in South Vietnam would be one in which few peasants operate their own land, the distribution of land-holdings is unequal and no land redistribution has taken place."

The Moss-Reid rebuttal said on this point, "We discovered that the author of this study had never been in Vietnam," and added: "We strongly believe it is morally wrong deliberately to keep the people of any nation weak and dependent in order to control them—whatever the end."

The report of the subcommittee was completed last October, but an endorsement by the parent group was delayed until last week. After endorsement by the full committee, the report was made public Monday.

The subcommittee staff had been on notice that there would be a dissenting opinion. The dissenters felt that the matter belonged more properly to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. When it developed that the dissent went to substantive issues, Chairman Moss and Representative Reid determined upon their rebuttal.

The full committee report was filed with the Speaker of the House today, and the rebuttal was appended to it.

REPORTED INCREASE IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. McAlister, the South Vietnamese Government is reported to have decided to increase its armed forces by about 125,000 men by this June. Does this decision seem likely to be implemented, especially since all their equipment, presumably, would have to be supplied by the U.S. Government?

Dr. McALISTER. I would think a much more difficult problem for them than getting equipment would be finding dependable resources of manpower.

There have always been, in my experience since serving in Vietnam, units that have generally been understrength 10 to 20 percent from their table of allowance, and I would just say that anybody who really wanted to go out and organize a military organization in Vietnam, I would think that one way or another they would find military equipment without problem.

Now, whether that would be the military equipment they would want and whether it would be shiny and just unpacked from a crate and so forth and so on, may be another consideration. But if there are people who want to fight, I think they will find equipment.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE DRAFT

The CHAIRMAN. What is your explanation of why the Saigon government has been so slow to draft its younger men, 19-year-olds and 18-year-olds?

Dr. McALISTER. Well, as we are aware, the problem of drafting people is a very important political issue, and I am sure you have got great experience with the draft boards that exist all over your State and how people are appointed to them, and this is a grassroots political organization. It is one with a national hierarchy in this country, and one which is in itself a political system that reaches from the lowest to the highest echelons of American society.

We have that kind of political system for a good reason, because there are lots of decisions that have to be made about who is going and who isn't, and what kind of allowances can be made for deferments, and, what time they go and so on, and this really takes quite a large decisionmaking process.

Moreover, once people get into the military organizations, we have to be allocated to various locations, various services, and so forth and so on.

I think one of the major weaknesses here comes back to a political weakness to be able to organize such a decisionmaking apparatus and to have it just beyond the pure technical aspects of political organization.

QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY OF THE GOVERNMENT

Then there is the question of compliance, legitimacy of the government, and legitimacy really comes down to when the draft call comes who is going to go. The legitimacy indeed of our own Government is being tested by those who feel they don't want to go into the draft because of the war.

The Chairman. Does this mean that you think they have been hesitant to do it because they didn't think they would comply?

Dr. McAlister. I do indeed, sir. And I think the question of raising a military establishment here has been one that people have been extremely reluctant to fight simply because of the political consequences that flow from their joining up with the military establishment in Vietnam.

The Chairman. Why are they so reluctant? We are supposed to be fighting there to give them self-determination. The assumption is that these people want a non-Communist regime. If they do why aren't they willing to fight and to be drafted?

Dr. McAlister. Well, I would come back to this question of legitimacy, and while there is a possibility pretty broadly of people not wanting to be Communist that is in essence a negative attitude, whereas the positive attitude of what they do want to become is yet undetermined.

So when the question says, "Well, you will be a draftee or you will be this, that or the other," this means becoming identified with the Government of Thieu or Ky or becoming identified with the Vietnamese military in which the opportunities of mobility are very slight indeed.

If an upper class Vietnamese is a person who has these degrees that I have suggested that are requirements for being a member of the officer corps, he could go in the officer corps and then if—he is already on the top of the military establishment to a great extent. Yet even there the mobility upward is on a criteria that is much more intrigue than it is in military performance.

The way this government, military government, got into power is through its shrewdness in being able to organize coup d'etat groups, so that in a political environment of this kind, the thing that really gets the most attention is how shrewd you are in manipulating the structure there, rather than going out and winning battles. And obviously, for the person who comes in as a draftee, what are his opportunities going to be?

You had two years ago General Gavin come before your committee. Here is a gentleman who enlisted in the U.S. Army, from a modest background, I gather, and from this he had a chance to go to West

Point and ultimate mobility to the topmost echelons of the U.S. military.

Well, this kind of opportunity has been characteristic of our military, it has been the thing that has contributed to our military establishment's strength. That kind of opportunity does not exist in Vietnam.

Again, it is a reflection upon the rather tight oligarchical nature of the political environment as distinct from the pure formal institutions of government in that country, and the unwillingness of that oligarchical environment to be able to change itself and to look to us to compensate for its own weaknesses and to preserve itself as long as it can.

IS VIETNAM POLITICAL SITUATION UNIQUE?

The CHAIRMAN. I have noticed that many scholars who are concerned with Vietnam seem to regard the political situation as unique and they tend to dismiss the fancied analogies between the events of World War II or even Korea.

Would you agree that there are some parallels or not? What is your idea about that?

Dr. MCALISTER. Obviously, there are numerous unique factors about the Vietnamese political situation in the present war. I feel that discharging one's responsibility as a good scholar means that you look for the unique aspects of it and look at those aspects of the situation which do have parallels to other situations.

I think that the unique aspect of this has been the fact that the Vietnamese have never been able really to resolve at any point in their past the principle on which they would found political order. In other words, they have not had as China has had, as Thailand has had, a consensus on organizing even a traditional political system, much less a modern one.

Now, the parallels, however——

The CHAIRMAN. You say they never have had. Do you mean since the French took them over? What about prior to the French?

Dr. MCALISTER. Prior to the French, when I say never here, I am opening up a large area of dispute among scholars, among publicists, and others.

Let me be quite specific on this point. The territory now occupied by Vietnamese people and who identify themselves with Vietnamese culture from the tip of the Mekong Delta to the border of China, was unified politically only in 1802, and that unity was maintained only up until 1863 when the French intervened and began to partition the country into three colonial administrative areas, Cochin China, Annam and Tonkin as they called them.

Well, previous to this period of 1802 the country was divided from 1602 to 1802 on a north-south basis much as it is today with a wall built across the 16th parallel 11 miles long, 40 feet high, and there were warring factions that had fought up to 1620 to try to create a national unity, political unity, a durable one and they had not been able to achieve it.

In earlier periods the Vietnamese had had political unity over just the Red River Delta and the Tonkin area, but they subsequently migrated southward into the Mekong Delta reaching there only in the 18th century fully taking control over that area.

So what I am saying is that you have got a very unique historical experience here. I suppose by definition all historical experiences of a people are unique. This one certainly stands out with fewer comparable aspects to it than those of surrounding cultures.

The point of comparability, as I come to look at it, is what has been the revolutionary process, the revolutionary strategy that has gone on in this country during the 20th century. It seems to me here, as I do, talking about competition between two governments, each of which wants to be the sole legitimate government of the people, you are having situations that are comparable to other revolutionary war situations.

In China, for example, and indeed in our own revolution there was a competition as to what was going to be the legitimate government, and I think that this kind of focus gives you something that can refer your unique characteristics to try to bring together so you can deal with it and not be simply submerged by all the horrendous complexities which exist in this problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You have given us a very interesting statement.

Dr. McALISTER. Thank you very much, sir.

CAN MILITARY SUPREMACY MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT?

Senator CHURCH. You made reference to the military ratios, the military superiority that the British in Malaya and the French in Algeria had to mount in revolutionary situations. And that does project a very bleak picture if we are required to establish comparable ratios in Vietnam.

The French, as I recall, in Algeria were able to achieve complete military control. The French Army was never defeated. In fact it had occupied and maintained control over all parts of Algeria. Very large numbers of Algerians were placed in concentration camps. I think the figure may have gone as high as 2 million in a population of 12 million at one point in that struggle.

But despite the 10-to-1 ratio, and despite the full military supremacy of the French, effective government in Algeria collapsed, did it not, and in the end didn't De Gaulle recognize that military supremacy in this situation really didn't matter if the capacity to govern had collapsed?

In other words, my question to you is, can military supremacy, even though this ratio is established and even though the military does physically occupy and control all parts of the country, necessarily determine that effective government can be maintained?

Dr. McALISTER. In my judgment it certainly does not mean that you get effective government.

I think that one of the very ironic things about the present circumstance that we have gotten into in Vietnam is that we have been the ones to say that Communists, particularly using words of Mao Tse-tung, say that political power flows from the barrel of a gun, whereas in my judgment political power has flowed from political mobilization, from sharing of political power on the basis of performance, and this has contributed to military flexibility. Whereas it seems now that by need of providing security resulting in military occupation of the countryside, it seems that we are more concerned about political power coming out of the barrel of the gun in order to compensate for the political weaknesses of the Saigon government.

If you have an alienation of the population which might result from such a massive occupation then if you had an American fighting man for every Vietnamese, I would question whether that would guarantee you political control.

If a people really do not wish to be controlled, then I doubt that any amount of force can control them. I think this is one of the important aspects about this war.

Military force, the use of force in our own streets in this country, wherever, ultimately comes back to the question of whether you have a consensus among your population on the legitimacy of the use of that force and that is what political legitimacy is all about.

You don't get political legitimacy just by using the force and trying to convert that force into political power.

Senator CHURCH. Isn't it almost a truism that the effectiveness of any law passed depends for the most part on the general acceptance of the law and the popular consensus that lies behind it?

Dr. McALISTER. Indeed.

MILITARY HAS BEEN GIVEN A POLITICAL TASK

And this comes back to the question as to who it is who makes the laws, and if you are going to comply with the law then as an individual you want to have some feeling that the person who has made these laws is a person that you feel is legitimate to have made them.

Senator CHURCH. But doesn't it go even beyond the question of the legitimacy of the government? I can recall when we enacted in this country the prohibition laws, there was no question in the public mind but what the action was legitimate. Yet it developed afterward there was no effective means to enforce the prohibition because such large numbers of our people simply refused to refrain from drinking alcohol, and so the whole enforcement system broke down. Finally, we had to repeal the amendment.

Dr. McALISTER. I think if you would just permit me there, Senator. this brings to mind what I think is an extremely important point for us, and that is that our military have been given a task to do which is, more than any other previous task that it has been given, a primarily political task, and the question of the limits on the effectiveness of military force in this situation was not properly appreciated in advance.

We had the view, perhaps growing out of the Second World War, perhaps growing out of Korea, that there was a general invincibility for any and all purposes to which we would decide our military would be committed, and in my judgment, speaking as somebody who is now a member of the Reserves, and who faces, along with many of my colleagues throughout the country, decisions that are going to be taken within the next months and weeks, somebody who has served in Vietnam, somebody who has devoted a substantial amount of time to studying this question, that a disservice has been done to our military to ask them to do a job which was beyond being done by military power alone.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT

But, getting back, Dr. McAlister, to your statement about alienation of the population in Vietnam, to leave the academic language and to get down to the language of the street, is it your view that the people of Vietnam in the present situation tend to regard the Government in Saigon as a puppet government?

Dr. McAlister. I think one of the most difficult things for people who have studied Vietnamese opinion has been the difficulty in getting any really hard information that looked convincing as to whether or not you really had public opinion samples along the lines we are familiar with in this country.

I think that the question that is always uppermost in the minds of the Vietnamese, peasant, city dweller, and otherwise, is who is it that enjoys the mandate of Heaven.

Now, this, as you have suggested, gets back to a little more exotic, maybe academic language, but I would say that this kind of phrase is not academic in terms of the mental outlook of the Vietnamese peasant or indeed of more sophisticated city dwellers, and there are circumstances, I think, that if you just take a look at this article that appeared on the front page of the Wall Street Journal yesterday with this rumor that the Americans were really at fault in allowing their own Embassy to be attacked, and the reason that this rumor got started, not upon the Communists to start with, but among people of the upper class in Saigon, was because they couldn't believe, with all of this power and all of our presence there, that we would really—that this thing could be done without our having played some collusive role in it and, therefore, they were looking to our having, in effect, lost this mandate that they viewed—in other words, with the previous experience they would look upon our backing of this government to indicate that, "Heaven has really said that this is where power lies, and although we may not like Americans and so on we can't really fight with the will of Heaven because this is the way things should be."

But when we, then, in our strength, begin to look like heaven is not any more smiling upon us then this is when, I think, that their attitude gets more shaken than almost any other.

MOTIVATION OF VIETNAMESE REVOLUTIONARIES

Senator Church. In discussing the revolutionary aspects of this question in Vietnam, would you say that the Nationalist element is as important or more important than the Communist element in connection with the support that is given to Ho Chi Minh in the north and to the insurgency in the south?

Dr. McAlister. In the way that you phrased it, it has often been interpreted that the Communist element here means an international conspiracy——

Senator Church. No, no.

What I mean is, what is it that motivates these people to fight so hard and so fiercely against the tremendous American military power that we have amassed there, and the vast support we have given to the Saigon Government which overbalances, at least by a ratio of 10 to 1 and perhaps by a ratio of 100 to 1, the amount of outside support that has been given to the insurgency?

Now, my question is: Are these people motivated to fight primarily out of a belief in Marxism and a desire to establish a Marxist system or are they motivated primarily by a desire to drive the foreigner out of the land and to establish independence for the Vietnamese? They fought a long time against the French. Do they think that we are other white people or do they understand that we are quite different from the French? What is the thinking that gives them such fierce fighting power, a belief in communism or a belief that they represent the legitimate Nationalist cause, and that this is a continuing effort to achieve Vietnamese independence from foreign domination?

Dr. McAlister. The major problem that most people in the world have had is how a Vietnamese peasant could become an adherent of Marxism-Leninism. What does it mean to them?

I think that the most important thing I could say in answer to your question, sir, would be that Marxism-Leninism, not so much by its specific programs as we know them in their great works of Lenin, Marx, and on up to the present, this has not been the thing that has been important in Vietnam. What has been important in Vietnam has been that under the influence of a principle that provides a coherent plan for all—for organizing a political community, a political elite—has been able to make contact with the mass of the population of the countryside and to say "We have a complete plan in which you are going to share and in which there is going to be a role for you."

Senator Church. You mean by this they have land reform for the peasant?

Dr. McAlister. Well, not only that but much more important is what you are in terms of your own identity. In other words, the non-Communist——

Senator Church. They have a role for the peasant to play?

Dr. McAlister. That is correct, sir; very definitely. And it is this whole question of identity within a political community that is the real essence of this political problem, and the fact that no non-Communist political movement has been able to penetrate beyond the urban areas——

A POLITICAL VICTORY

Senator Church. Do you think that any elite group, composed largely of military people, or business people and landlords, which depends for its continued existence upon the massive support of a foreign power, can provide such a plan for general popular participation and make it credible?

Dr. McAlister. If we are talking about the specific case of Vietnam and at this specific moment my answer would be "No, I don't think so."

Senator Church. So you are saying then that with Vietnam at the present moment, and that is what we are focused on, there isn't any way for us to win the kind of political victory that is necessary to provide the basis for a viable government?

Dr. McAlister. Although there might well have been in earlier periods, but there is not now, in my judgment.

Senator Church. So you are saying that the cause is lost?

Dr. McAlister. Well, I would say that the cause in the way that it has been approached thus far, in my judgment, is yes.

AN ALTERNATIVE FOR THIS COUNTRY

Senator CHURCH. What, under those circumstances, would you prescribe as a course of action for the United States?

Dr. MCALISTER. Well, I would say that it would be necessary to analyze certain elements of the problem to determine what goals seem to be most important and then to try to get at what are some means of achieving these particular goals.

Now, as I have indicated earlier in response to Senator Fulbright's question, I think that any program of political accommodation, which I have mentioned in the prepared testimony is the one that I think will lead to the least danger to our national prestige and international credibility, must be seen in a Southeast Asia-wide context; that is, the type of political weaknesses that we have experienced in the Saigon government are not found in the governments in Thailand and Malaya and Singapore and in other areas of this region. Obviously, therefore, a precipitous unilateral withdrawal militarily on our part, or as it has been described, cut and run, would not lead to further political stability in Southeast Asia and might, I am very much afraid, lead to some more conventional war between the Thai and Vietnamese which, I must say, is one of my great fears because a battle of that magnitude on a more conventional basis would certainly be a worse circumstance than the one that we have now.

I am saying that we must keep in mind that things are not as bad at this particular moment as they could be in Southeast Asia and that we cannot simply say: "All right, we have made mistakes, we are wrong, now let's get out and get back and turn our attention to other things."

Senator CHURCH. All right, you are against a precipitous withdrawal and I think with that most of us are in agreement. What would you be for?

Dr. MCALISTER. Let me go on and try to sketch out other elements here which I think have to be taken into account.

I think that, first of all, I have said we need this relating of our military power to political goals, more feasible political goals, and I think that we have to keep in mind here that we are going into a period, we have been in a period, where there has been fighting with negotiations. The statement has been made that our adversary does not distinguish between negotiating and fighting, and I think that is absolutely correct. Therefore, I think that we must be prepared to compete on that basis as well. That is to say, that our military power, rather than this simple occupation of territory getting larger body-count statistics or whatever these elusive goals have been, that the use of our military power has to come in an accommodation with those who have got the comparative advantage in political organization and political mobilization in Vietnam; that is to say, rather than seeking to check their ultimate establishment of the Government, our military power must be used in order to get as many guarantees as we can about their future conduct in Southeast Asia.

Senator CHURCH. You mean by that we should use our military position in Vietnam as a bargaining lever to secure as many concessions as we can that will make for an honorable settlement from our point of view?

Dr. MCALISTER. Well, I tried to suggest in response to the Chairman's question earlier about this international versus local dimension to the problem that we need not just concessions in the sense that that word is so often used, but——

Senator CHURCH. What would you bargain for? I am sorry, if you covered this with the Chairman. Have you covered this with the Chairman?

Dr. McALISTER. No; we have not gone into this detail.

A REALISTIC POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Senator CHURCH. What would you bargain for without worrying about the term used? What kind of political settlement do you think is obtainable that is realistic, and would be acceptable from our point of view?

Dr. McALISTER. Well, I think that the type of accommodation that I am talking about is ultimately to lead to a government in South Vietnam, south of the 17th parallel, which is in a situation that those who have the comparative advantage in political organizations and political mobilization are the ones who are enjoying the maximum amount of formal governmental authority.

I think one of the ways that we are going to be determined in this is using our military power to see that the accommodation is beginning to occur.

I think because of the knowledge that the local level——

Senator CHURCH. You mean by this an accommodation between the Vietcong and the Saigon government and the other religious and political groups in Vietnam?

Dr. McALISTER. Yes. This gets at the whole spectrum of Vietnamese politics when accommodation begins to come out. In other words, I think one of the major reasons why accommodation is not occurring now is not because these members of the Siagon government or the other religious and political groups don't know their counterparts, who there is to be accommodated, but because we are there and are making it easy for them not to have to do this.

Senator CHURCH. Yes. What would the elements of this accommodation be, in your judgment?

Dr. McALISTER. Well, let me just say parenthetically that my thinking has been influenced by several articles written by other figures, people that I would like to bring to the committee's attention. In particular, an article by Mr. Robert Shaplen of The New Yorker magazine appeared in the October issue of Foreign Affairs. Also, an article written in his own magazine, The New Yorker, on the 20th of January; and also an article by Dr. Gerald Hickey called "Political Accommodation in Vietnam," which was a monograph of the Rand Corp.

Each of these gentlemen has suggested that the mechanism here is local accommodation, that is between the Government of Vietnam, of the Saigon province chief, and his counterpart in the NLF can occur.

We also know or at least it is my belief that we don't have enough troops to occupy all of the ground in Vietnam. Therefore, in certain provinces where we might withdraw on a gradual basis more and more of our troops, so that the local province chief is seeing it is in his interest to begin to accommodate, then I think that you begin to get the types of lines of political communication that are—and I want to keep this in mind, I don't think that this is anything more than an initial step, I am not trying to suggest that this is the total panacea.

You have got an enormously complex problem here in which you ultimately have got to move from a position where we are fighting and negotiating until an ultimate solution on the other end of the spectrum which is going to be lengthy, require a lengthy period of time, in which you ultimately have a political system which is operating, in which we have got certain guarantees about its future conduct in Southeast Asia.

Now, from this local accommodation, which I think you, as Mr. Shaplen says, Mr. Hickey says, you already have in many areas, they have made their political settlement.

I think that as that accommodation goes further, then the major step for us is going to be to achieve a cease-fire so that the accommodation process can get moving somewhat further.

NERVOUSNESS OF SAIGON GOVERNMENT

Now, any steps to move toward a cease-fire are obviously going to result in a great deal of nervousness on the part of the Saigon government about their future.

One particular technique that might be introduced at the earlier stage in this, and I am suggesting now a broad range of possibilities rather than advocating any particular one of them, trying to give a map, as it were, to where we might go here rather than to say that this is the line to follow, but one way to try to get ourselves accommodated to the nervousness on the part of the Saigon government would be to ask them to designate an area along the coast in the vicinity of Cap St. Jacques up to Cam Ranh Bay, somewhere in that area, designate an area to be a free port in which we would undertake to, with our resources, to build this up into a free port on the order of Hong Kong or Singapore, it would be a Vietnamese free port to which people who saw, who have been, beguiled by us, who committed themselves to us, and who would have no other place to go except fall under the sway of the Communists, might look upon this as an option, and looking upon this as an option, might be a way that they could feel more flexibility on the whole quest on of political accommodation.

If we got them recognizing that their local officials are carrying on this accommodation because of our unwillingness to keep military forces in every province in Vietnam, and that they were able to see a way out through a free port mechanism of some kind or another, where they would have a future, we would then take this cease-fire beyond this local level up to the level of talking between ourselves and Hanoi.

Everything I have suggested up to the present would be only within the South Vietnamese political context.

CEASE FIRE AS A START

Once we have gotten to this kind of threshold there might be the possibility of saying we want a cease-fire, and obviously in my judgment the place that we want it the worst is in the I Corps. I think that this area, Khe Sanh, the whole area around the DMZ, Quang Tri, Hué, Phu Bai, and so on, is going to be in a very perilous situation in the next several weeks and months. I am not sure that the type of scenario I am trying out is going to be achievable in time, really, to be of benefit to us there and, of course, if we can't do something there then the possibility of military setback is certainly going to prejudice any of the types of accommodation that I am suggesting.

But let's just follow through and say we are able to get through this first threshold. I would then say it would be as an indication of our desire of having a ceasefire we would withdraw 50,000 of our troops and say that at the time that the North Vietnamese had withdrawn 50,000 of their regulars, which is the number that they have, our estimates suggest of the 300,000 of the enemy forces in South Vietnam, once they have withdrawn their troops then another 50,000 of ours would be withdrawn, provided they had done this within a 90-day period. Thereafter we would continue on a 50,000-man increment at 90-day intervals in order to move toward this process of withdrawing our forces, this again on a totally honorable basis, with an indication on the part of our leadership that our military men have done their job with honor, with courage, with bravery, and with every credibility of the traditions of the U.S. military. That as this process is going on, here we get to the third level, at the international level, I think you have got to keep these levels in mind, the fact that any accommodation to be worthy of our country is going to have to be carried on on all of these levels, and at this third level you will need the participation, particularly, of the Soviet Union and France in international conversations about the whole future of the Indochina area. I think one area where our interests overlap more conspicuously than any other is in the future neutrality of Cambodia, and with the international discussions being started about this status of Cambodia neutrality, that this would then come back into a general international agreement about the status of the two portions of Vietnam, that we would get as many guarantees as we potentially could, that a coalition government in South Vietnam would recognize the status of Cambodia.

Here, I think, I don't mean to suggest by any of the things I have said, Senator, that this is a fleshed out plan or that I have a fully detailed plan or that I am an advocate of such a plan.

What I am trying to do is to suggest from my studies ways that I think that this problem could be dealt with.

Again, it comes back to using our power as a negotiating tool. It comes back to the question of fighting while negotiating, it comes back to the question of accommodation on various levels, proceeding at time periods that are going to be difficult to forecast in advance.

ARE WE IN A POSITION TO DICTATE A SETTLEMENT?

Senator CHURCH. Of course you don't have, Dr. McAlister, a crystal ball, and I understand the difficulty of being precise. I think you have detailed a possible scenario, but doesn't it come down to this, that they cannot force us out, they must negotiate us out, and that, therefore, we are in a position to insist upon the kind of settlement that we would regard as honorable and consistent with our general purposes.

Dr. MCALISTER. I am very much afraid, Senator, that in the weeks and months ahead they are going to be able to score, to dramatically score attacks to call into question our present military posture there and, therefore, to diminish this attitude that you were suggesting that they have no other recourse but to negotiate, and it is for that reason that I am saying we have got to take the initiative with what military power we have got in the country there now, and I don't—I am sure you understand I haven't tried to play the role of a prophet.

I have been in this terrain that is now under attack, I have been throughout most of the areas of Vietnam. I have spent a year in the archives of the French Army, classified archives of the French Army, which I was given access to and went through 15,000 cartons of documents, taking notes of the way that the Viet Minh planned their entire military operation and, quite frankly, Senator, this present circumstance leaves me very scared indeed about the military prospects.

The differences that I see from my experience on the ground, my experience in research and the type of statements that are being made today about our military position—I don't in any way wish to be alarmist, but I do think that this attitude that our military can put up with almost anything in Vietnam is not one that I would base future projections on.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark, do you have questions?

Senator CLARK. I would like a few minutes, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

SERVICE IN VIETNAM

Dr. McAlister, I see from your biography that you served for two years as an adviser to the river force of the Vietnamese Navy while on active duty as a lieutenant in the U.S. Naval Reserve. When were you last in Vietnam?

Dr. MCALISTER. I was there in 1964–65 and late December and early January of that year, sir. It was just, to continue, I was there totally in a civilian capacity, it was in conjunction with research that I was doing in connection with a doctoral dissertation at the time. I was a graduate student at Yale University and I was traveling under funds that had been provided by the foreign area fellowship training program of the Social Science Research Council.

Senator CLARK. When were you there in our Navy?

Dr. MCALISTER. I was there in the years 1959 to 1961. I came there in August of 1959 and I left in the summer of 1961.

Senator CLARK. What part of the country did you serve in?

Dr. MCALISTER. Well, my service was limited by the area where we could go with our boats. This was the Mekong River area.

Senator CLARK. You know we have that river force in the Mekong Delta now. Were you in that general area?

Dr. MCALISTER. I was, sir. The Mekong area is about the size of the State of Connecticut, 15,000 square miles, at that time a population of about 5 to 6 million people. It had less than 500 miles of paved roads and about 2,000 miles of navigable internal waterways.

Senator CLARK. I was there myself less than 60 days ago.

Did you also get up to the Hué and Da Nang areas?

Dr. MCALISTER. Yes, sir; I did.

STALEMATE IN VIETNAM

Senator CLARK. Now, I prepared a report which is about to be issued by the Foreign Relations Committee as a result of my trip over there. I am going to read the concluding short paragraph and ask you to comment on it and see to what extent, if at all, you agree with it.

> In short, we are stalemated in Vietnam as we were in Korea 15 years ago. We must take the action we took then; seize the initiative to reach a compromise solution—without military victory but also without defeat. And never, never again should we commit a ground army on the mainland of Asia.

Dr. McAlister. I would think, first of all, we may have had a stalemate 60 or 90 days ago.

Senator Clark. You think we are on the way to military defeat?

Dr. McAlister. I would say that military defeat is something that implies a total defeat in the entire territory of the country. I think that there is something between stalemate and defeat that I am trying to put my finger on and that is what I would regard as an embarrassing, indeed humiliating, military situation.

I certainly, as I have tried to indicate, I think there are many areas in Vietnam where this kind of humiliation could occur and that Khe Sanh is far from being the only one.

Senator Clark. And perhaps Hué would be another.

Dr. McAlister. Well, the statement of this morning's paper that Hué would be the next one. I have been very concerned about these two brigades that are located at Phu Bai, which is an area just south of Hué. I think that is an area that would be of concern. I think it is not out of the question to talk about an overrunning of Camp Carroll which is less than a defended area, and if enemy forces could capture the 175-millimeter guns located there and perhaps train them on Khe Sanh if only for a matter of minutes or hours before our airstrikes might come in there but let's just think of the possibility if airplanes can't get up at Da Nang and other areas, can't get off the areas, and they do capture those 175-millimeter guns and that they are free from attack by virtue of the weather, that they might then bring that artillery fire to bear directly on Khe Sanh and at the same time they might attack Gio Linh, or they might go into the Quang Tri city. I think they have got quite a number of options at their disposal in that area, and this leads me to feel that the use of the word "stalemate" gives us a greater sense of security militarily than I think is justified.

STABILIZING THE SITUATION

Senator Clark. Well, I share your concern about the immediate tactical situation. But my view would be that while we might suffer immediate tactical defeats, that they cannot drive us out of South Vietnam militarily, and with 500,000 people there we ought to be able to stabilize the situation reasonably well.

Would you disagree with that?

Dr. McAlister. I think that the problem then comes about of withdrawing, under the scenario that you have suggested the means we would have to withdraw to defensible areas and I am saying that the more we withdraw to defensible areas, the less political certainty the Vietnamese are going to have and, therefore, the less willing they are to comply with us and the more concern they might have toward joining up with the other side. So that——

Senator Clark. I don't want to get——

Dr. McAlister. Let me say, I realize this is a speculative area, but what I am trying to suggest here is really coming from my particular area of competence. I haven't been in Vietnam, as you can appreciate, in three years, and I don't read all the cable traffic. I do try to keep up with many of the press dispatches in as many of the languages as I am competent in.

What I am saying is that we have got to expand this spectrum of analysis so that saying, no, we can't be driven out of Vietnam by force—I am saying there is a possibility of political alienation to the point where there is a total governmental collapse, a fleeing of the country by the present leadership of the Saigon Government, and therefore a complete uprising of the Vietnamese populace, while it looks very, very remote at this point, I am not prophesying it, certainly hoping that it won't occur. I am saying that it ought to be within the realm of our analytical thinking to conceive of such a thing, and to plan in our contingencies for it. So that I am not trying to dispute what you are saying, sir. I am trying to suggest here a broader spectrum of analysis which I think is absolutely necessary, based on my past experience.

Senator CLARK. Well, I don't want to get into an argument with you about the military situation because I am no more qualified to express an opinion on it, I quite candidly say, than you. My own view is we are in immediate tactical trouble but no strategic trouble. If we retreat and hold defensible areas they can't drive us out.

In your statement, where you say, and I quote "The primary goal of a revolutionary competitor in Vietnam must be to forge peasant villagers into a totally new political community—one which can command loyalties because it rewards performance—"

SUCCESS OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Why isn't this revolutionary development program, which is now under the supervision of Ambassador Komer, a wisely conceived and reasonably well carried out effort to do just that, until the Tet offensive practically destroyed it for the time being?

Dr. MCALISTER. Well, the total information that has been available about the program under Ambassador Komer's direction has been focused primarily on his computers and what these indicate about the relative attitudes in the village.

I would say, first off, the reason that it hasn't been a success, if his indications are that it hasn't been, is that Ambassador Komer is not a Vietnamese, he does not play a role in the sharing of power among the Vietnamese political system and that with every good intention in the world as I am sure you were asking the foreign aid officials, is the aid getting down to the village level, are they getting what they need, and so forth and so on, well, this really, to characterize it, Senator, would be tea and sympathy. This doesn't come to the point of saying there is a stake in political power here and that you have a role in a political community. That has got to come from a Vietnamese leadership, and despite the programs Ambassador Komer and others would have conceived of this has got to be something that ultimately works into a political community of their direction.

Senator CLARK. Well, again, I don't want to get into an argument with you, but I went out into the field and looked at several of these villages which were in the process of being pacified. (I suspect, as of now, the situation is probably different.) I went into a hamlet in the delta on the edge of the Mekong River where there was a very, very effective and objective defense of pacification. There are no Americans in these RD teams. They are 59 each. Every single one of them is a Vietnamese. They have a maternal health clinic building with a midwife. They built a hard path along the edge of the river in front of the village. The place is full of school children who were being instructed. There was a fish pond to give them some variety of diet. I talked to the elders through an interpreter, to be sure, and my conclusion was that this was a good program which was working in that hamlet.

Now, in this report of mine I have the last map which Ambassador Komer prepared. I think we shouldn't denigrate his computers. I think they are a useful tool in determining the extent of pacification. There is a map attached to my report which shows the situation as of the 30th of December which I characterize as indicating the pacification program is out of the batter's box but not to first base. That has all been knocked into a cocked hat by the Tet offensive.

But I still think there was a good program underway when I saw it.

SOCIAL SERVICES WHICH RESULT IN A POLITICAL COMMITMENT

Dr. McAlister. If I might just suggest to you, sir, I have been this past year a member of the study group at the Adlai Stevenson Institute in Chicago.

Senator Clark. That sounds quite appealing to me.

Dr. McAlister. This is a study group on the politics of violence, and we have people who are scholars from the whole country who are concerned with the problems not only of violence in revolutionary situations abroad but problems here domestically, and one of the problems that we have been turning our attention to is the whole area of black power. One of the members of our study group is Professor Charles Hamilton of Roosevelt University, who is coauthor of a book on black power with Mr. Stokely Carmichael.

Now, my conclusion from the discussions we have had is that almost no amount of social services per se really is going to result in the type of political commitment that is going to bind up people to participate in a political community, that is to say, in the NLF villages they probably don't have anywhere near the dispensaries and midwives and so forth and so on that you saw that were tangible indications of our providing for the social welfare of people in these villages.

The question that I would ask, and I ask this both from the perspective of Vietnam and perspective of some of the black power people who are saying, "Sure, welfare is there but we aren't able to participate in the decisions that are affecting our lives. There isn't any political mobility for us upward to be really a full first-class, not second-class, citizen."

What about the people who are going to be recruited from that village into the military?

Well, the young men really don't have a way, as our young men have, of going down to the post office, enlisting, and then being able to have that mobility upward into the regular army to be of officer status and so on. They are just being held there in that village, so to speak, and their loyalty has got to come on the quid pro quo of tangible welfare that is coming primarily from the American, even though there is this 59-man revolution development cadre.

I don't wish to denigrate the computer gathering of information. I wish, I only wish that the information we have been able to gather had been more beneficial to us so that we wouldn't have had the type of intelligence problem that resulted in the Tet attacks.

I am not denigrating welfare that is going to the—the increase of welfare in Vietnamese villages. What I am concerned with is what is their perception about the political community that they are going to belong to and where is their ultimate loyalty going to lie.

STATE OF INDIFFERENCE

Senator CLARK. My own conclusion was that, generally speaking, the great mass of the South Vietnamese peasantry have no loyalties. They are not loyal to the Vietcong. They aren't loyal to the Saigon government. They don't like the white man and, therefore, they don't like us.

There is a large state of indifference in there and no commitment. This is a problem which I doubt very much if we can overcome because, while you can pacify a village, while you can get the certain amenities and while you can keep it quiet, you don't win their hearts and minds. They are still indifferent.

What they want is three square meals a day—they only eat two—and a roof over their heads and some security. We haven't provided it.

Dr. MCALISTER. Sir, I would indicate that there are a substantial number of people whose hearts and minds have been won to the extent of getting them into military formations that would relate in their carrying out, I suppose there is no other word for it, heroic attacks.

Senator CLARK. Yes; but on the other hand, if you look at this map you will see, and I think it is reasonably accurate, that the number of villages and people controlled by the South Vietnamese is still a minority, the recruiting of the Vietcong is in excess of losses; we allies have more men under arms substantially than the Vietcong do, and I think the terroristic attacks are making much of an appeal to the Vietnamese peasant.

When we destroy, it is not as an act of vandalism. Why did we have to destroy Hué, just because they wanted to fight in their most sacred and most cultural city and let it go down the drain? I don't think we can pin any roses on the Vietcong, either.

Thank you very much, Doctor. I think fundamentally I agree with much of what you say.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL

Senator PELL. Dr. McAlister, it is very nice to welcome you. As a member of your advisory council, I am going to be here and get advice, and I hope you will remember me to the people of the Woodrow School.

Dr. MCALISTER. Thank you. I would like to point out here, with me today are some 15 members of a class of mine at the Woodrow

Wilson School, and this class is a conference course which I am sure you are familiar with at the Woodrow Wilson School, and we are considering the problem of revolution and modernization in Vietnam.

As you know, in this conference course technique that we have in the school, we try to stimulate a quasi-governmental or political context.

Senator PELL. Isn't that the idea of Princeton's leaders in the Nation's service?

Dr. MCALISTER. That is correct, sir. One of the ideas is that this conference course is arranged around the assumption that this committee would be holding hearings on the problem of the nature of revolutions, and I dreamed this up just as something to focus our discussion on, and obviously the students and myself are very pleased that there was a decision to hold these hearings.

I think just one anecdote on Princeton in the Nation's service at Alumni Hall, 91 Prospect Street, Princeton, sir, there is a portrait of James Madison under which it says "James Madison, first President of the Princeton Alumni Association, fourth President of the United States of America."

Senator PELL. Thank you. I appreciate the sequence there, too. If any of your students would like to come through my office, I would be delighted to have them as a member of the council.

Dr. MCALISTER. I am sure they would, sir.

TWO CHOICES FOR THE UNITED STATES

Senator PELL. I notice in your paper here you mention that General Navarre was able to hold the Vietminh up above the 17th parallel. I wonder if that statement is really accurate.

Dr. MCALISTER. What I meant here was that, first of all, the area that, south of the 17th parallel between the towns of Da Nang and Nha Trang was an area that was never contested by the French after 1945. You are quite right to indicate that this—that as of the time that General Navarre was there he didn't have total mastery south of the 17th parallel. The point is that their military power, connected with diplomatic bargaining negotiations, which was what I am trying to suggest, has got to be the way that we have ultimately got to move, was sufficient to be able to hold them to that area and my point here was taken in the nature of trying to suggest that their power was capable of doing this because the other side hadn't mobilized as many forces as they have now.

Senator PELL. Your job basically in coming here as a witness and as a teacher, too, is to make the complex simple and abbreviate it. So many of us can make the simple complicated as I do. What we are seeking is a very simple proposition: what are the landmarks, the main directions, the main pitfalls, where to go.

As I read your statement, you are saying we really are faced with two choices, not much of a middle course, either defeat or military erasure of the area.

Would that be correct or not?

Dr. MCALISTER. In my remarks I made some changes from the text. What I meant by that statement was that the current focus of existing policies leaves only those two alternatives, and that, I think, that other alternatives have to be sought, and that is why I suggested that the alternative along the lines of political accommodation in which we were using power to get political objectives which were more within our reach was an alternative that I thought hasn't been explored, that is not one that is presently being given the emphasis that it might be. So that there is that amendment from my prepared text.

Senator PELL. Right.

RESULT OF MILITARY ERASURE OF AREA

What is your own view that if we adopt one of these two courses, which is military erasure of the area, because as you know we saved Hué by 70 percent destroying it, et cetera, what is the end result of that policy in your view? I realize this is purely a prognosis. But what do you think would be the result?

Dr. MCALISTER. Well, perhaps to indicate again trying to get across in questioning with Senator Church that I think there is no guarantee that massive amounts of military power are going to insure conditions favorable for the revival of the political order on terms——

Senator PELL. Excuse me, my question was what will be the result of military erasure?

The CHAIRMAN. You mean destruction?

Senator PELL. Erasure.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the way we save it. We destroy it in order to save it.

Senator PELL. Erasure, isn't that a valid word?

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't understand it.

SENATOR PELL. What is the result of a military erasure of South Vietnam?

Dr. MCALISTER. I am sorry, I thought I had understood you to saying ratio, r-a-t-i-o.

Senator PELL. No.

Dr. MCALISTER. I think you contribute to further political instability and you are making it more and more difficult to create political order. One of the problems in Hué—

Senator PELL. Excuse me, I am trying to get the complex simple here. What is the end result if we erase it, there is no civilization left? Is it war with China or does it end that way? Try to keep it simple?

Dr. MCALISTER. I think there are several time periods here. One would be, as I was trying to respond to a more immediate time period in which you don't have the elements of political stability and as those elements deteriorate then we have got to get more and more power to compensate for the lack of political strength, and that as our military force becomes more and more massive then we have to destroy more and more towns and if we are not able——

Senator PELL. I am saying when this result has been completed and we have completely destroyed it, thoroughly destroyed it, what is the end result?

Dr. MCALISTER. I suppose if we destroy it without rebuilding, which we say we are committed to rebuilding at various points, you just don't have a country there. I don't think that it is really possible to speculate very precisely on what there would be.

Senator PELL. You would reject a Carthaginian solution?

Dr. McAlister. I would certainly hope that that wouldn't—I would certainly not advocate it. I would hope that nobody would want to try it.

Senator Pell. I share your views on this, but I was just wondering what would you think would be the results of a Carthaginian solution.

Dr. McAlister. Well, taking the assumption we might be able to do it, I think you would have a genocide of a good portion of Vietnamese population and even if you had, I am not sure that you could assume at that point that the northern regime would stay out of it. I think that they might intervene with more and more of their regular troops from north of the 17th parallel in order to try to prevent such a thing as if you suggest, a Carthaginian approach were tried.

WILL THERE BE A WAR WITH CHINA?

Senator Pell. I am not saying it as a matter of policy, but if our present policy continues it may end up as the result, and I am asking you, when a Carthaginian solution has been arrived at, what do you think will be the results upon the United States at that time? What I am leading up to is will there be a war, do you see a war, with China, if there is a vacuum on its border, or not?

Dr. McAlister. I think that is a question that I am somewhat more competent to deal with than the other kind. I think that so long as our troops are not introduced north of the 17th parallel, I would not foresee that Chinese troops would be introduced.

But I can conceive of our troops being, if they were, trying to talk about contingencies here, if they were introduced in massive numbers north of the 17th parallel I would envisage something along the lines of Korea occurring.

Now, there are several things to be kept in mind with this Chinese analogy of Korea.

First of all, the border areas of south China are quite different in importance, different in, culturally from those of north China adjacent to Korea. The relationships between China and Korea are quite different from what they are in China and Vietnam. There is a treaty relationship between China and Korea. There is not a treaty relationship between China and Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh has very definitely tried to maintain a status of autonomy, this going back to the traditional lines of autonomy of the Vietnamese vis-a-vis the Chinese. I am very much persuaded that Ho Chi Minh does not want to see Chinese masses or Chinese regular troops introduced into this country. The last time he had to put up with this, as I have gone into in detail in my book, when there was a nationalist regime, there was a Chinese Nationalist regime, troops under Chiang Kai-Shek, these forces depleted the resource base of northern Vietnam very substantially, so that I think that there is the interest on the part of the Hanoi government to do things in its power to prevent circumstances going far to the point where they feel that they absolutely have to have Chinese troops.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

I must add here I strongly reject myself the Carthaginian solution. I have other thoughts.

Are you familiar with my own—as you know, one of the discouraging things of the Administration is we have about a hundred different foreign policies in the Senate—are you familiar with my own plan or proposals at all? There is no reason why you should be.

TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Another question here, when you were doing the river force duty do you happen to recall what the territorial limits of South Vietnam were, was it 3 miles, 12 miles sea limit?

Dr. McAlister. I was not operating at sea. I was operating totally within the territorial boundaries of South Vietnam, and it never became an issue in my actual military operation, naval operation since I was not operating out at sea. There was a great deal of concern at that point about, I was in Vietnam in 1960 when the Geneva Conference on the law of the sea was going on. There was a great deal of controversy between Cambodia and Vietnam and so on, and my recollection, although it is not an accurate one, was that the Saigon government very much did not want to be limited to our ideas of the 3-mile limit. What they ultimately did and so forth is a different thing.

Senator Pell. You don't happen to recall what the North Vietnamese attitude was on that?

Dr. McAlister. That, again, I was operating river boats within the river estuary in the Delta area and did not get involved with the problems as my colleagues who were advising the sea force of the Vietnamese Navy did get into.

Senator Pell. Right, thank you very much.

CHINESE DEPLETION OF VIETNAM RESOURCES

The Chairman. Dr. McAlister, when you say the Chinese depleted the resources of Vietnam, what did they do? It is a rather abstruse way of doing it. You mean they ate the rice or what did they do?

Dr. McAlister. One of the most bizarre things that they did was when a senior Chinese Nationalist official in part of an airlift that was going on between Kunming and Hanoi, and which they were carting off resources, they were taking gold, and one Chinese, senior Chinese official, got a grand piano and all of the bathroom fixtures out of a hotel in Hanoi and got them on the plane to take them to Kunming.

They also were establishing the favorable exchange rate so that they would get Chinese dollars converted at an inflated exchange rate in Hanoi, would go back to Kunming, make a conversion at a more favorable ratio and then be able to purchase gold in Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh had something called Gold Week anticipating the arrival of the Chinese Nationalist forces, he met them and simply gave them gold in hopes that this was going to be a palliative, and it was more than a palliative, it was sort of a something that whetted their appetites further.

The Chairman. When did that happen?

Dr. McAlister. Chinese Nationalist forces came into Vietnam to accept the Japanese surrender under the terms of the Potsdam agreement, and they came to accept this surrender for the area north of the 16th parallel, they arrived in September 1945. There were some 100,000 to 150,000 troops that came to disarm and accept the surrender of approximately 40,000 Japanese troops, a mission that they not only didn't complete but they never turned their attention to very seriously.

They stayed as long as they could into 1946, September was the date, simply because that was the date when the opium harvest was being conducted in the highland areas, particularly around Dienbienphu where they stationed some of their troops where there were no Japanese but where there were very lucrative rewards to be gotten from the opium crop. This, I might add, is part of the text of my forthcoming book.

VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE

The CHAIRMAN. I believe in the beginning you stated you had been studying the Vietnamese situation for 10 years.

Dr. McALISTER. Yes, sir. I started 10 years ago as a college student and was successful in getting Vietnamese language taught for the first time at the college in 1957.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you speak the Vietnamese language?

Dr. McALISTER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a difficult language?

Dr. McALISTER. Extremely.

The CHAIRMAN. What other language is it most akin to?

Dr. McALISTER. Well, it has been a very difficult problem for linguistic analysis to classify. Certainly there are very strong overtones of Chinese here, but it is more of Chinese influence the way Latin would have been an influence in certain European languages. Certainly there was an indigenous linguistic base there before Chinese was, became, adopted, as a writing system and before Chinese words were introduced.

Saying that it is the same thing as the Chinese language is a misleading statement, because if you know Chinese it doesn't mean that you automatically know Vietnamese. It is a tonal language so that you take one word with different tones it can mean very different things so that the Vietnamese in playing word games with each other will take a word like "Nha" and "Ya, ya, ya," and this comes out to a play on the word, a play on one word, and then they—this leads to quite a number of funny stories resulting in this way they pun, make puns on their own language.

IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM TO U.S. SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. Now in light of your long experience, just how important do you think Vietnam is to the security of the United States? I don't know whether you wish to comment on this?

Dr. McALISTER. It is quite a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you don't have to answer it. I thought maybe you had an opinion.

Dr. McALISTER. I wouldn't want to avoid the question because, sir, everything that I have said this morning has been to the point that we are too often as a people, as national leadership, avoiding confronting difficult questions. I think that when we talk about the importance of a particular place to the future of our security we have got to put that into some context of what our overall conception of what the world is all about and what role we are going to play, and I think that those particular issues are, at best, ambiguous today in

America, and I think that one thing that you can come back to and come back to without question is Vietnam is an area that has not had and does not today have great prospects for political stability, and Southeast Asia, as a regional system of politics, doesn't have a great deal of political stability, and that one of the things that makes it unstable is that the Vietnamese situation is so unstable.

Now, I think one of the really disturbing things here is we are all aware if governments and people in underdeveloped areas are going to move into the benefits of modern life that there is going to have to be revolutionary change of some kind or another.

Well, the comparative advantage that the Communist leadership has had thus far is that they have been able to mobilize people for military operations in a revolutionary war and that they have not, however, been able to mobilize people for economic development activity.

Their economic development program in the north and other areas has not been anywhere near as spectacular, so that the chief thing that they have in their political tradition is that they are more excellent as revolutionary warriors than they are as economic development and social welfare people.

So that I would think that their espoused goal of becoming, of creating the government that would be co-terminus with Indo-China, the former French Indo-China, which was the fruition of their traditional expansionist goals in Southeast Asia, really portends a possible conflict between themselves and the Thai, and I think that if there were to be a conflict between the Thai and the Vietnamese over the Mekong River area and the buffer states there, that this could lead to a type of conflagration that would definitely not be in our interest to see occur, and, therefore, I think it is a very important and legitimate approach, use of our power, to see that there is a stability in that area, and I don't think that there are, prospects are good that this thing will just sort of settle down and find its common denominator.

I believe there is a possibility of it festering and it becoming a larger conflict and that the Chinese in contrast to their past experience becoming involved in this area—they have not been involved militarily in this area historically—is a possibility.

So I would think that political stability in this region is important to us, and that we don't have to talk about ourselves being the policeman of the world or the guardians of freedom or a lot of other abstract phrases in order to find reasons why it is important to be concerned about stability in Southeast Asia.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN OTHER AREAS

The Chairman. Dr. McAlister, can you think of any place in the world that isn't important to us, that is, as to its political stability? The Middle East, for example, or in Western Europe, or in other places?

Dr. McAlister. I would think that the type of thing that we have been able to see happen in the Congo and sub-Sahara and Africa, on the horn of Africa, in Aden, and so forth and so on, that these are areas where, while they are important to us, there have been elements of political stability there in which we have not therefore had to become involved, and I would hope that we wouldn't become involved. But I think that there is——

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't the fact that we are not involved, one of the contributing causes to their stability? Or putting it another way, isn't the infusion of a great power, a great western power on the heels of a colonial power in itself some incentive to instability, to conflict?

Dr. MCALISTER. I would say that that would be determined in the way that the great power conducts itself.

The CHAIRMAN. You know how we are conducting ourselves, are we contributing to stability in the area?

Dr. MCALISTER. In Southeast Asia?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. MCALISTER. I don't believe so at this moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you know how we conduct ourselves.

Do you believe that many people in South Vietnam or in Vietnam as a whole regard us as stepping into the shoes of the French, that we may harbor the same objectives, with a little different cloak?

Dr. MCALISTER. I think that there are people in South Vietnam who do wish us to be there because they don't want to have to make the type of political commitments which they would have to make if we weren't there.

I think, for example, the Thai, in particular——

The CHAIRMAN. Who wrote that the Americans are sleeping in the same bed with the French but dreaming different dreams?

Dr. MCALISTER. I can't identify that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever read Jean Lacouture? Didn't he write that?

Dr. MCALISTER. I don't know whether he did.

The CHAIRMAN. He wrote that, I believe, in a review of a book and it struck me as a rather interesting phrase. I think he is the one, either he or Bernard Fall, I am not too sure. I think it was Lacouture.

I know there are people who are interested in any given area; if you bring in a Latin American expert they all think that is the most important area, that we should give our undivided attention to it in bringing about stability and progress. We have many Members of the Senate who like the Middle East and have relatives there and therefore this is the most importatnt area.

You finally get around to where different people believe different places in the world are of vital importance.

It is a strange thing to me, but until we became involved in Vietnam I was never at all conscious of the fact that that was an area of vital interest to this country. We had no investment or political affiliation, and all of a sudden it was all important and vital to our security. This is a little bit difficult for me to accept.

Dr. MCALISTER. Well, I hope the record will show that I do not advocate Vietnam or Southeast Asia as the most important area of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. But these are relative matters.

Dr. MCALISTER. But I think the point is, the reason for the importance of Southeast Asia is not its resources, not any of these other reasons that are so often given, but the reason it becames a compelling area of the world is the lack of political stability.

PROBLEM OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The CHAIRMAN. Nearly all areas have that problem. You surely don't mean the Congo is a stable military area.

Dr. McALISTER. I certainly don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Nigeria a stable political area?

Dr. McALISTER. I am talking more now about the question of to the extent to which any particular country would or would not contribute to the further stability of the region of which it is a part, and I think here, again, the question about Cuba, for example, there is Cuba, what has happened to Cuba has not automatically led to great deterioration of regional political problems in Latin America. There has been a resiliency of a political system to manage it, and I am——

The CHAIRMAN. Cuba has been relatively stable recently; hasn't it?

Dr. McALISTER. Yes. What I am really suggesting is the manner in which assessments can be made about the elements of stability that are required in various regions of the world, and then some more intelligent, some more shrewd analysis of ways in which we can or cannot contribute to fostering that stability.

I am sure that in the things that you are suggesting you don't mean to imply that we want to see political instability, instability continue on until it becomes a problem that the United Nations or some other body can't handle, and I am not advocating that we ought to be providing political stability everywhere in the world to a maximum, and that means our military presence in this.

I think that this comes really from the lack of our information about the elements of stability in the regional areas, and the way that this can lead us into an unstable situation internationally.

The CHAIRMAN. Stability in itself is not necessarily the highest good, is it? In many places, some change is needed. We shouldn't become devoted solely to the status quo, should we?

Dr. McALISTER. Well, I hope that my remarks didn't suggest that stability——

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't say they did. Stability as such——

Dr. McALISTER. I think stability without change is going to be a very transitory type of stability.

The CHAIRMAN. Rather unstable?

Dr. McALISTER. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Doctor, I appreciate very much your patience in coming here. It has been a very enlightening and interesting discussion, and I know the committee is deeply indebted to you.

Unfortunately, the Senate is preoccupied with a very controversial domestic situation, and this has prevented some Senators from being here, but your record will be most interesting to the committee.

Thank you very much, sir.

Dr. McALISTER. Thank you very much for your interest, sir. I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for coming.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.)

SUMMARY INDEX

(List of witnesses appears alphabetically in contents)

Page

- Aborted revolutions, fate of ... 42, 139
- Aftermath of revolution ... 10
- Aid funds, diversion of ... 87
- Aiken, Senator George D.: Examination of witness: Brinton, Dr. Crane ... 20–23, 26
- Alien cultures, applicability of U.S. techniques to ... 85
- American attitude toward revolutions ... 115, 124
- American aversion to communism ... 43
- American emergence from underdevelopment ... 119
- American involvement in Vietnam ... 102
- American messianism ... 119
- American omnipotence, delusion of ... 48
- American Revolution:
  - Discussion ... 15
  - Dual sovereignty in ... 7
  - Land confiscation in ... 136
  - Nature of the ... 147
  - Spirit behind ... 16
- American spirit and intentions ... 17
- American values in Wilson's 14 points ... 131
- America's aggressive outlook ... 129
- America's Asian presence, paradox underlies ... 63
- America's objectives in dealing with East Asia ... 73
- Applying our sense of values to other societies ... 130, 134
- Approach to dissenters ... 47
- Approach to revolutionary movements, a suggested ... 50
- Asian communism, as a monolithic force, myth of ... 70
- Asian dominoism, fallacy of ... 70
- Assistance to colonial countries, United States ... 31
- Balance is hard to estimate ... 33
- Balance of power:
  - In past centuries ... 34
  - Local revolution and ... 32
- Bilateralism, tendency toward ... 72
- Carlson, Senator Frank: Examination of Witness: Brinton, Dr. Crane ... 23–26
- Case, Senator Clifford P.:
  - Examination of Witnesses:
    - Brinton, Dr. Crane ... 32–37, 39, 45–46, 50–51
    - Hartz, Dr. Louis ... 145–146
    - Solomon, Dr. Richard ... 87, 88
    - Thomson, Dr. James C., Jr ... 84–86, 88, 93
- Characteristics of Chinese Revolution ... 55
- China:
  - Administration conception of containment of ... 77
  - and the international community ... 67
  - Assistance to South Vietnam ... 79
  - American attitude of aloofness toward ... 83
  - Change in pattern of revolution ... 56
  - Change of leadership in Communist ... 80
  - Civil war, U.S. involvement in ... 68
  - Depletion of Vietnam resources ... 189
  - Effect of blockade against ... 79
  - Effect of reconciliation policies on relations with ... 98
  - Effect on, of U.S. escalation of conflict ... 78
  - Hostility to world, meaning of ... 65

China—Continued Page
- Present state of revolution in 13
- Problem, U.S. unpreparedness for realities of 67
- Questioning leadership elements in 65
- Revolution, characteristics of 55
- Shock of Communist victory in 69
- Traditional attitudes toward 68
- Tripwire which would bring on intervention in Vietnam 82
- Will there be a war with 188

Church, Senator Frank: Examination of witness: McAlister, Dr. John T., Jr 173–181

Civil war:
- Distinction between revolution and 155
- If the British had intervened in the American 40
- Social revolution in the 114

Clark, Senator Joseph S.: Examination of witness: McAlister, Dr. John T., Jr 165–166, 181–185

Coexistence, Mao and the notion of 81

Collectivism, Liberalism versus 111

Collision between East Asian and Western civilizations 66

Coming revolution, signs of a 29

Communism:
- American aversion to 43
- Definition of 21
- How to counteract 47
- Justification for our attitude toward 46

Communist alliance with forces of nationalism 69

Communist conspiracy in Vietnam revolution or 20

Communist doctrine of revolution, spirit of 18

Communist identity, element of 164

Communist revolution, excesses of modern 27

Communist victory in China, shock of 69

Containment policy in the 1940's 95

Cooper, Senator John Sherman:
- Examination of witnesses:
  - Solomon, Dr. Richard 89, 91–92
  - Thomson, Dr. James C., Jr 90–91, 92, 98

Criteria for responding to revolutions, determining 141

Cultural revolution attributable to two factors 61

Definitions:
- Communism 21
- "Democratic" 127
- Neutralization 163
- "Puritan" 120
- Revolution 13

Democratic changes in the 18th century 113

"Democratic," meaning of term 127

Deterring China from aggression 96

Development of nations, U.S. contribution to 24

Development of society, stages of 136

Dictator needed in developing countries, strong 86

Dictatorships in English, French, and Russian Revolutions 8

Diversity in American outlook on revolution abroad 116

Dominoism, fallacy of Asian 70

Dual sovereignty:
- Crisis period of 7
- In American revolution 7

East Asia, America's objectives in dealing with 73

Economy and ideology as influences on a revolution 20

Element of revolution, violence as an 37

Energy of the masses, boundless 58

European revolutions:
- American attitude toward 115
- American response to 116

Evaluation of Chinese threat 91

Evolution, difference between revolution and 22

Expansion of revolutionary faith 14

Page

- Extremists over moderates, victory of, 6
- Extremist stage of a revolution, effect of, 49
- Factors of a revolution, sorting out, 126
- Far Eastern revolutions compared to Western ones, 139
- Far East field, level of competence in, 75
- Fascism, attitude toward, 45
- Foreign aid effort, effect of our, 50
- Foreign policy, problem with our, 76
- Force as a component of revolution, 137
- Force of revolution, peasantry a main force, 58
- Form and substance of a value—liberty, distinguishing the, 146
- Freedom of expression, 45
- French revolutions, "failure" of, 122
- Fulbright, Senator J. W.:
  - Examination of witnesses:
    - Brinton, Dr. Crane, 11–14, 21, 25–32, 39, 40, 42–50
    - Hartz, Dr. Louis, 120–124, 146–152
    - McAlister, Dr. John T., Jr, 154–157, 162–164, 166–173, 189–193
    - Solomon, Dr. Richard, 101, 102, 103–105
    - Thomson, Dr. James C., Jr, 75–76, 99–102, 103–104
- Gore, Senator Albert:
  - Examination of Witnesses:
    - Brinton, Dr. Crane, 14–19
    - Hartz, Dr. Louis, 121, 129–136
    - Solomon, Dr. Richard, 101
    - Thomson, Dr. James C., Jr, 102
- Greek revolution, nature of, 21
- Guatemala, situation in, 148
- Hickenlooper, Senator Bourke B.: Examination of witness: Hartz, Dr. Louis, 127–129
- Ideology and economy as influences on a revolution, 20
- Individualism as a theological concept, 121, 132
- Indonesia, effect of Vietnam involvement on, 103
- International community, China and the, 67
- International responsibility of the United States, 88
- Intervention through the United Nations, 35
- Japan:
  - Domination by an outside power, avoidance of, 93
  - Domination by the United States, 94
  - Effect of nuclear power protection for, 94
  - U.S. relationship with, 90
- Justification for our attitude toward Communism, 46
- Land confiscation in American Revolution, 136
- Land reform in South Vietnam, 167
- Lausche, Senator Frank J.: Examination of witness: Thomson, Dr. James C., Jr, 93–99
- Legacy of the revolutionary experience, 56
- Liberalism:
  - And puritanism, 128
  - Versus collectivism, 111
- Liberty and freedom, judging values of, 133
- "Little Israel" experience of America, 151
- Local revolution and balance of power, 32
- Managerial class in Marxism, 137
- Mao:
  - And the coexistence notion, 81
  - Formula, tensions sustain validity of, 62
  - Organizational methods developed by, 59
  - Questioning of his formula, 60
- Mexican revolution discussion, 166
- Migration and its consequences, 111
- Military forces in Vietnam:
  - Assessment of utility of, 156
  - Prospects for our, 154
- Modern revolutionary movements, expectations for, 11

Morse, Senator Wayne:
Page
  Examination of witnesses:
    Harty, Dr. Louis 124–127, 132–133, 135
    Solomon, Dr. Richard 76–81, 83
    Thomson, Dr. James C., Jr 81–83
Motivation of Vietnamese revolutionaries 175
Movement into managerial societies 138
Multilateralism in East Asia, U.S. proposals toward 95
Mundt, Senator Karl E.: Examination of witness: Hartz, Dr. Louis 140–145, 147–148, 148–149
National development, dilemma of 59
Nationalist revolutions, social and 2
National security served by a negotiated settlement in Vietnam 102
Nazism, seeds of self-destruction in 143
Negotiated settlement:
  In Vietnam, National security served by 102
  In Vietnam, nature of a 104
Neutralization, meaning of 163
North Vietnam, Chinese assistance to 79
Nuclear power protection for Japan, effect of 94
Objectives of revolutionary wars 157
Organizational methods developed by Mao 59
Paradox underlies America's Asian presence 63
Pattern of Chinese revolution, change in 56
Peasantry a main force of revolution 58
Pell, Senator Claiborne:
  Examination of witnesses:
    Brinton, Dr. Crane 37–42, 46
    Hartz, Dr. Louis 136–140
    McAlister, Dr. John T., Jr 185–189
Philosophies of revolutionaries 9
Political accommodation in Vietnam 163
Political instability around the world 193
Political revolutions, U.S. reaction to 143
Political weaknesses of Saigon government 159
Presidential election, U.S 22
Private enterprise 44
Proselytizing of revolution 10
Puritanism:
  And Liberalism 128
  Restrictive quality in 121
Puritan, meaning of the term 120
Reconstruction period 39
Reigns of terror and virtue 10
Religious spirit as a revolutionary influence 17
Resistance to legitimate authority 4
Responsibilities of a great power 35
Revolutionary activity, spontaneity of 5
Revolutionary elements in Vietnam situation, extent of 139
Revolutionary faith, expansion of 14
Revolution:
  And civil war, distinction between 155
  And evolution, difference between 22
  Definition of 13
  In China, present state of 13
  In Vietnam 30
  Or Communist conspiracy in Vietnam 20
  Signs of a coming 3
  In the future 23
  Now involved in world politics 126
  Social and Nationalist 2
  U.S. attitudes toward 30
Rhodesia and Angola situations, U.S. position on 142
Russian revolution, assessment of 123
Signs of a coming revolution 3
Sino-American relations since 1949 62

Page

Social and nationalist revolutions ... 2
Social base of peasantry ... 57
Social revolution in the civil war ... 114
Social services which result in a political commitment ... 184
Southeast Asia:
  Possible revolutions ... 41
  Western values in ... 18
South Vietnam:
  Armed forces, reported increase in ... 170
  Draft ... 170
  Government, Vietnamese attitude toward U.S. support of ... 175
  Land reform in ... 167
  Nervousness of Saigon government ... 179
  Political weaknesses of Saigon government ... 159
  State of indifference ... 185
  Territorial limits of ... 189
Soviet Union, current turmoil in the ... 26
  Spontaneity of revolutionary activity ... 5
Spirit behind American Revolution ... 16
Spirit of Communist doctrine of revolution ... 18
Stalemate in Vietnam ... 181
Territorial limits of South Vietnam ... 189
Tonkin Gulf incident:
  Examination of ... 106
  Reply to statement of Secretary of Defense on ... 105
Undeveloped countries, U.S. role in protecting ... 89
United Nations, intervention through the ... 35
Urbanization move in Vietnam, effect of ... 104
U.S. is a world power, not Asian power ... 99
U.S. security pacts ... 97
Victory of extremists over moderates ... 6
Vietcong, leadership, identifiable ... 165
Vietcong offensive on SVN Government, effect of recent ... 103
Vietnam:
  Assessment of utility of American forces in ... 156
  Dictating political terms ... 166
  Importance of, to U.S. security ... 190
  Longstanding U.S. involvement in ... 91
  Nature of struggle in ... 156
  Political situation unique?, Is ... 172
  President Johnson's 14 points for settlement in ... 131
  Prospects for our military force in ... 154
  Reliability of official assessments on ... 104
  Resources, Chinese depletion of ... 189
  Revolution in ... 30
  Revolution or Communist conspiracy in ... 20
  Revolution, threat of ... 32
  Stabilizing the situation in ... 182
  Stalemate in ... 181
  Success of revolutionary development program ... 183
  Two choices for the United States ... 186
  Uniqueness of situation ... 92
  Unresolved political conflict ... 155
  United States faced with two alternatives in ... 160
  U.S. military situation is critical ... 160
  U.S. stake in ... 101
  An alternative for the United States ... 177
  A civil war, was ... 100
  Fundamental misunderstanding about nature of ... 162
  Who is our enemy ... 100
Violence as an element of revolution ... 37
War and a revolution, difference between a ... 38
War atrocities ... 28
Western civilizations, collisions between East Asian and ... 66
Western Europe, growth of ... 25

	Page
Western values in Southeast Asia	18
Wilsonian principle	132
Wilson's 14 points, American values in	131
World conquest of communism, expected	145
World politics, revolutions now involved in	126
World War II, effect of, on revolutionary tendencies	162

○